
A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF INDIA


INDIAN EMPIRE
Sketch Map
showing
POLITICAL DIVISIONS
500 Miles
KASHMIR
N.W. FRONTIER PR.
R Indus
Lahore
PUNJAB
BALUCHISTAN
AGENCY
R Sutlej
Delhi
NEPAUL
BHUTAN
R Sanpo
RAJPUTANA
SIND
Karachi
UNITED PROVINCES
Allahabad
R Ganges
EAST BENGAL
& ASSAM
Dacca
R Brahmaputra
R Chambal
Patna
BIHAR
BENGAL
Calcutta
ORISSA
R Mahanadi
BURMA
R Narbada
CENTRAL PROVINCES
Nagpur
R Godavari
BOMBAY PRESIDENCY
Bombay
HYDERABAD
MYSORE
MADRAS PRESIDENCY
Madras
CEYLON
Rangoon
ARABIAN SEA
BAY OF BENGAL
60
70
80
90
100
30
20
10

A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF INDIA

FROM 1858 TO 1918

BY

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WITH MAPS

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PREFACE

THE student and the general reader alike still greatly need a volume which provides them with a brief but connected narrative of modern Indian history ; a knowledge of the past is an essential to an understanding of the present ; and so the purpose of this volume is to explain how the India of our fathers has been transformed into the India of our own day, to sketch the causes which have produced this remarkable change, and to outline the manner of their operation. It is not an easy task. In so complicated a story much must be left untold ; amid a multiplicity of causes some must be omitted, some may be mistaken ; above all the principal figures of recent events are still distorted by the passion of conflict and obscured by the dust of controversy. But in spite of these disadvantages, I hope that an attempt to tell the story dispassionately may not lack its uses, if only to point the moral that although me[n] may commit crimes, they are much more lik[ely] to commit blunders.

The greater part of the material on whic[h] present work is based consists of printed —the correspondence of the leading act[ors] official correspondence and other documen[ts] Parliamentary Papers and official report[s] documents issued by the Government together with the chief books dealing

parts of my subject. At the end of this book I append a select bibliography, intended rather to guide the reader in further studies than to indicate my own innumerable obligations.

I must particularly acknowledge the kindness of Mr. John Buchan in allowing me to read the draft chapters relating to India in his *Lord Minto*, and of Lady Minto in allowing me to read in its entirety the demi-official correspondence exchanged between Lord Morley and Lord Minto during the latter's viceroyalty. These letters, part of which were printed by Lord Morley in his *Recollections*, give a very different impression as a whole from that suggested by the printed selection.

H.D.

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INTRODUCTION

In 1858 no one would have denied that India was held by the sword ; in 1918 this had ceased to be true. In 1858 the Company's covenanted servants constituted in effect the Government of India ; in 1918 appeared a scheme to transfer the Government to popularly chosen hands. In 1858 the control of the Home Government was confirmed and emphasized by the creation of a Secretary of State for India ; in 1918 Secretary of State and Governor-General signed the report envisaging the immediate relaxation and the ultimate extinction of that control. These contrasts may serve as a rough measure of the changes that have transformed the Indian problem in the last two generations.

We must not, however, exaggerate the magnitude of these changes. They loom large because they are near to us in point of time. But rightly considered they are the continuation and development of momentous and rapid changes in the period that preceded the Mutiny. In 1858 there were many men still living who remembered the Presidency of Bengal as consisting merely of that province and Behar, the Presidency of Madras as a few strips of territory lying along the Coromandel Coast, and the Presidency of Bombay as some small islands and a little land in Guzerat ; men who remembered the days when it was customary to withhold the

revenue until it was collected by force; who had weighed the chances of Sikh or Maratha in a war against the Company; who had seen French officers commanding the troops of Sindia and Nizam 'Ali; and who had been the first pupils in the first schools subsidized by the funds of Government. The changes within living memory in 1858 were at least as remarkable as those which we can remember to-day.

Further, the period which led up to the Mutiny resembles in general outline the period which led up to Mr. Gandhi's Non-Co-operation Movement. The parallel is not exact, because, when history repeats itself, it does so with variations. The principal interests in the earlier period are those of the Company's territorial expansion and the restoration of administrative order; whereas the principal interests of our own age have been those of educational progress and political development. But in both periods the British Government urged forward the spread of Western influences, Western ideas and Western culture; and in both periods this provoked a great reaction, in which the leaders employed Western machinery to overthrow Western predominance. The unsuccessful appeal of the leaders of the Mutiny to the sword, the unsuccessful appeal of the leader of Non-Co-operation to moral influences, constitute an interesting variation in the pattern.

There was, moreover, one great factor that only began to count for much in the latter period. The dominant fact in the history of the last two generations has been the shrinkage of the world. The

development of transport and communications, the steamship and the railway, the telegraph and the daily press, have transformed man's relations with his fellows, and profoundly changed the nature of governments and the quality of their interaction. The different parts of the earth have become interdependent in a new and much more intimate sense. London and Shanghai are to-day nearer together than were London and St. Petersburg a century ago. The operations alike of trade and war have become world-wide. And though war and crime have not been banished, though the old sanctions of public and private morals have in some respects been weakened, our human outlook has undoubtedly broadened, and the new conditions have made possible a sense of human unity which of old was inconceivable. Men are not becoming perfect, but they are most assuredly being changed.

The transformation has been great in Europe; but it has been greater still in Asia. In Europe economic conditions ever since the 15th century have incessantly undergone change after change, so that society in the Western world has perforce remained relatively flexible. But in the East it was not so. There economic forces were for centuries in a position of balance. Population did not grow, for the potential increase was regularly swept away by war, pestilence, and famine. Wealth did not grow, because the surplus was seldom used but for the adornment of palaces and the filling of kings' treasuries. Knowledge did not grow, for Eastern philosophies were incurious of the world of experience, and devoted to the analysis of what

may lie behind and beyond. Social forms thus became obstinately fixed, and custom remained the great rule of life. These medieval conditions persisted over the greater part of Asia until the close of the 19th century.

In India the forces of stability were exceptionally strong, for social groups had been crystallized into castes ; and so society, solidified by economic equilibrium, became in itself a peculiar obstacle to change. But here also forces from without were perhaps stronger than anywhere else in Asia. English political predominance, established in 1818, had in the succeeding forty years brought with it new and powerful influences, moral and economic. The ancient knowledge had been attacked in the new schools ; the old economic system had been undermined by the new administration. In the latter part of that period these forces had been applied with considerable activity ; and had provoked that wide-spread uneasiness which found its principal expression in the Mutiny.

But at that time the forces of change had made little progress. They had been enough to alarm, but not enough to influence. Outside the English centres of administration, the old ideas prevailed. A village head-man in a newly-occupied district could still prove his zeal by sending in to the Commissioner before breakfast the heads of the dakoits whom he had caught the day before. Hill-peoples signalized the temporary collapse of British authority by a resolute attempt to stamp out from their midst the whole brood of wizards. Khonds still secured the fertility of their fields by the annual

human victim, bought with a price. Caste Hindus could not cross the seas without almost inexpiable pollution. Government was still personal. It still rested on military force, just triumphantly vindicated ; and the India thus held by the sword was the old India, utterly indifferent to politics, careless of what might happen elsewhere, ready to obey and assist any government that could maintain itself, and accepting the bloody retribution that followed the Mutiny as according with the practice of great kings.

Since that time the forces of change have played unceasingly upon India, with far-reaching consequences, political, moral and economic. They are still very incomplete—possibly they may never be completed. When you are dealing with a great mass of people—at the time of the Mutiny India contained probably 250 million—changes seldom are pervasive. Every country exhibits a wide difference between the ideas and the standards of its highest and its lowest classes ; and the greater the area and the larger the population, the greater is the likelihood of such divergencies. The culture of ancient India never penetrated all the strata of society ; nor does the culture and thought of modern India. The essential fact seems to be that between 1858 and 1918 external influences affected a sufficient proportion of the population to make a marked, almost a revolutionary difference.

The strongest influence has been economic. The old balance of forces has been destroyed. Since the Mutiny the population of India has increased approximately by a third. It is crowded together,

even in rural districts, in densities which in Europe would connote large cities and vigorous industries ; but in India agriculture is the normal correlative of dense population. Its growth has compelled resort to poorer and poorer lands. We cannot follow the process everywhere, for lack of early statistics ; but in Madras the cultivated area has more than trebled since 1853. The average modern cultivator has then to work harder than his grandfather was accustomed to do, save in the few regions where the tendency has been off-set by extended irrigation.

Alongside of this, and as a direct consequence, has gone a considerable agrarian displacement. As land increased in value, and the steady operation of the law-courts facilitated the recovery of debt, both real and fictitious, many enterprising persons lent money on land and subsequently foreclosed ; and besides this the rising middle-class of the larger cities steadily bought land wherever they could. These processes, familiar to the student of economic history in Europe as well as in India, have tended in spite of legislation to replace the small cultivator with possessory rights by the small cultivator with no rights at all.

Then, too, new methods of earning a living have appeared. The professions—the law, medicine, education, journalism—have arisen. They existed indeed before the Mutiny, but since then they have developed with extraordinary rapidity. So also has the demand for clerical labour, which is surrounding the Indian cities, as it has surrounded London, with mean suburbs. In short, a middle-

class, both higher and lower, with an economic rather than a hereditary basis, has established itself in India, though the individual members are still cut off from marriage outside their particular castes.

Alongside of this new class we find a nascent industrialism. Just as the professional class has sprung up to replace a group of Europeans who in 1858 still enjoyed a practical monopoly of medical, legal, and journalistic functions in India, so too the industrialists have followed the example of the Europeans who introduced modern large-scale production into their country. But this development has been much slower than that of the professional class, in part owing to a lack of capital, in part to the rigid free-trade policy followed by Government. A protective system would undoubtedly have facilitated the speedier development of such a class ; and on the whole English policy has evidently favoured the professions much more than industry. But though Indians very generally regard this as proving the subordination of Indian to British interests, it should be remembered that an early adoption of protective measures would have favoured, not so much Indian industrial enterprise as foreign capital which would have established itself in the country.

As things were, only two large centres of factory-production were developed—one the cotton factories of Bombay, the other the jute mills of Bengal. Round them, and the other lesser examples of modern industry in India, has gradually formed the nucleus of a class of industrial workers. For a long

time these men were scarcely differentiated from the agricultural population. Most of them as members of joint families had an interest in the land, and for a long time many of them paid an annual visit of some duration to their native villages, in order to take part in the harvest. However this practice gradually died out ; and a class of proletariat labour is visibly forming round the class of Indian industrialists.

Lastly, Indian trade has not only expanded at an almost incredible speed, but it has passed under the control of world-wide influences. The price of wheat or jute or cotton is no longer determined by Indian conditions ; since 1858 the power of external influences on the course of trade has multiplied a hundred-fold ; and the Indian markets are to-day directly affected by a hurricane in the United States or a bumper crop in the Argentine. This extends even to currency and the general level of prices. One of the main elements in the rise of prices which began in India in the first years of the 20th century was the general rise in prices in Europe ; so that the same train of events curtailed the luxuries and straitened the existence of a clerk in London and a clerk in Calcutta.

In all these ways subtle penetrating forces have operated, with an ever growing power, to destroy that economic independence and rigid condition of Indian society which had continued for perhaps twenty centuries.

Like results may be traced in the moral as in the economic world. Western education had been introduced long before the Mutiny ; and the

decision to establish Indian universities had been taken in 1854. But the universities themselves were only established in 1857, and the policy of constantly expanding the scope of educational activities really dates from that year. As in the economic world, so also in the moral, the effects at first were scarcely perceptible. But as money and energy were more and more largely applied, the educational movement rolled on in geometrical progression until it became self-actuated and assumed the character of a popular movement. In Bengal alone there are as many university students as there are in England. As the Calcutta University Commission justly observed, nothing comparable has been seen since the Middle Ages.

In its moral aspects this development offers many similarities to our own Renaissance. Western science has exercised much the same solvent effect on Indian tradition as Greek thought did on the medieval world. It has provoked the spirit of enquiry and criticism ; it has awakened intellectual curiosity ; it has created vernacular literatures. So that a group of influences, which on one side attacked the social and political structure by altering economic conditions, on another attacked the mental acquiescence on which that structure depended by altering the mental outlook, just as in Europe the influx of precious metals reinforced the intellectual movement of the Renaissance.

The common tendency of the economic and moral influences working in India in the last two generations has been principally manifested in the political changes with which the following pages are

are directly concerned. The new forces affected both the policy of Government and the attitude of the people.

The policy of Government reflects these changes in many ways. The development of transport and communication intimately modified its operation, bringing the whole Indian organism within reach of orders from London, subordinating the provincial Governments more closely to the Government of India, and the district officials to the local Governments. Nor was this limited to the scope of formal orders. Political influences radiating from London penetrated much more rapidly and effectually into official circles. The telegraph carried the news of India to England while still fresh and warm ; and the same instrument could carry back within effective time not only orders or advice based on the last development of circumstances, but the public criticism of the Houses of Parliament and of the English press.

The same ease of movement and communication of news aided to conceal if not to change the essential basis of Government. In 1857 evidence of its military power was everywhere apparent. But since then the troops which formerly were scattered over the whole face of the country have been concentrated in great cantonments, and normally soldiers are seldom seen. Increased rapidity of fire, from artillery as well as small arms, has diminished the relative powers of a disorderly mob. The invention of wireless has established a method in communication which cannot easily be inter-

rupted; and the aeroplane has robbed ancient fastnesses of their security.

But while governments have thus become stronger against attempted rebellion, they have also become more liable to external attack. This has been peculiarly the case with India. Time had been when the gradual desiccation of Central Asia had driven great masses of men west and south, towards Europe and into India. But such days had closed. The scanty population of those decaying regions had centuries since ceased to constitute a political danger. The forces producing these countless invasions which had brought and established in India the Aryan speech and the Mohammedan religion had long spent themselves. But a new threat emerged in full force in the second half of the 19th century. The desert might be bridged by the railway; and before the period closed Russia had assembled at the rail-heads of Russian Turkestan material to continue her lines to the very frontiers of India; and Germany had planned a road that was to have led direct from Berlin to the Persian Gulf. Politically as well as morally and commercially India had fallen within the constricting influences of the present age.

It could not be expected that the classes of Indians affected by the new moral and intellectual influences should fail to respond to the political tendencies as well. Furthermore, their response was likely to differ from that of Government and involve considerable political dislocation.

Western studies brought the political ideas of the West; the railway, the telegraph, the news

paper spread them broadcast. The teachings of Burke and Rousseau, of Mill and Mazzini, found a new and appreciative audience, which contrasted the despotic form of Government maintained by the English in India with the evident democratic tendencies of Western political theory and practice.

One result was the adoption of democratic theory as the basis of what the Indian Government ought to be. Anothei was the development of nationalist ideas. In Europe these had grown up on a foundation of common speech, common religion, and belief in a common race. These were not present in the vigorous form in which they occurred in Europe. For one thing the Indian area was vastly larger than that of any European country except Russia, and so the unifying forces were slow and diffused in operation. Each province had its own group of languages, quite distinct from the others ; Hinduism is too various and indefinite a faith to offer a good rallying point ; and India was visibly partitioned out among too many races, and the separate racial spirit too strongly conserved by the institution of caste, for a feeling of racial unity to develop spontaneously. But these disadvantages were counteracted by the new influences. English served as a common speech ; transport development familiarized the middle classes of the several provinces with one another ; newspapers acquainted them with common needs and common desires ; and finally a sense of nationality emerged, not from a common identity which indeed was lacking, but from the common contrast which all the Indian races displayed in relation to their foreign rulers.

In India as in Italy, a sense of unity developed under the pressure of foreign dominion.

The ideas of democracy and nationality long remained confined to the educated classes. But gradually the causes which had facilitated their birth facilitated their extension. Nationalist propaganda could be and gradually was disseminated among the people at large.

Up to a certain point these changes did not involve any political conflict. The English despots in India were democrats at home. But while the Indian Nationalists were formulating their views on the development of the Indian Government, the governors of India still had not formulated even to themselves the political line that should be taken. Everyone agreed that the foreign administration of India could not go on for ever. Everyone agreed that the English were acting as trustees until Indians should be capable of protecting their own rights. But no one had thought out the consequences of this position or could indicate a line of progress. The main concern of Government was how to provide India with the best administration compatible with the exigencies of finance. This involved the employment of a larger and larger European element.

Thus under a common pressure of modern political ideas, Government and the educated Indians reached mutually destructive conclusions. The one sought good government, the other self government. Hence the emergence, in the late par of the period, of a struggle between the educat classes naturally desirous of power and the br

cracy naturally anxious to preserve their excellent and elaborated system of administration.

In England itself sympathy was much divided. Englishmen were proud, and rightly proud, of their work in India; but their whole political life and history was founded on the practice of self-government, and they had always viewed with favour the efforts of other peoples to follow in their own footsteps. The question, as they reckoned it, was to what extent could the bureaucratic Government be modified in a popular direction without endangering the work already accomplished.

On the whole the decision favoured popular advance, though not so far or so fast as Indians demanded; and this situation towards the close of the period added groups of political extremists, followed mostly by the very young, and seeking to obtain by violence what had been refused to argument, to those elements of the Indian population which had always been hostile to foreign rule.

Finally the war of 1914 brought this political development to a definite stage in its progress, marked by the announcement of 1917 and the Report of 1918. Just a century after the establishment of British predominance in India, the goal of British rule was defined and a path to it projected. The event gives completeness to the period which preceded and led up to it. Until 1918 none knew certainly whither the progress evidently made since the Mutiny had been tending; and whatever he fate of the Reforms, whatever becomes of the nciple of dyarchy, the year will continue to serve great historical landmark, such as cannot

elsewhere be found since the Mutiny. It definitely marks the end of the period in which India was held by the sword.

It seems to me that three considerable errors may be traced in the British policy as a whole. For one thing there was a growing tendency for the Home Government to interfere more than had been the custom in past days. It had normally been content with laying down the general principles of policy and beyond that merely exercising a veto on the conduct of the Government in India ; but after the Mutiny the broad tendency was for more and more of the administration to be conducted from London. The activity of the Secretary of State gradually became more detailed. In part this sprang from accidents of individual character. Some men are more self-assertive than others ; and towards the close of the period office fell into the hands of one or two who were peculiarly self-assertive, and whose example, one may suppose, affected the conduct of successors naturally less domineering. But in the main this tendency was the fruit of circumstances—of the Red Sea Cable ; and so far the fault can be laid at no one's door. Similar events were strengthening the hold and increasing the influence of the Government of India on the provincial Governments, and of these on their subordinate officials. In short the conditions under which the whole government was carried on strongly promoted the growth of centralization in every branch of the Indian polity. In some conditions this is not necessarily bad. But when it is applied to a sub-continent like India. where

the people of Tinnivelly differ as much from those of Peshawur as the Spaniard does from the Swede, the uniformity which centralization presupposes is a manifest evil ; and this evil is incalculably exaggerated when the central point of control lies on the other side of the world—as if Western Europe were administered from Tokio.

In the second place it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that efficiency in administration actually was over-valued by the Indian Government. It was natural and admirable for the very able men who formed that Government to hate disorder and anomalies and mistakes and to do their utmost to root them out. But when they decided time after time to do so by introducing new European elements into the administration, they were taking the easy road. Cromer's principle—of only employing a European where he could not get the work done by Egyptians in any sort of way—was a sounder and safer method. But here again the fault was no man's. It was due to the greater and ever greater influence which European ideas of administration were coming to exercise upon the Government, and which precluded the old simpler methods by which Cubbon was enabled to manage Mysore for forty years with only half a dozen Europeans under him. So far, of course, as the later policy increased efficiency, it was a gain, because bad administration is necessarily an evil. But when it came to be used as an argument for employing Europeans instead of Indians, and for reserving the higher services as far as possible for Europeans while their numbers steadily grew, the matter evi-

dently became charged with a racial quality of a dangerously explosive kind. In this way Government suffered from the defects of its qualities.

In the third place, when we look back on the years that have elapsed, it is easy to discern that many difficulties might have been avoided had Government defined its purpose in India and devised a definite scheme by which that purpose was to be achieved. Instead of that we see experiments made in one direction by Canning, in another by Lytton, in a third by Ripon, in a fourth by Minto. There was no sequence or continuity in our efforts to introduce political reforms ; and consequently they lost much of their effect. But when we consider history as a whole, we must admit that such is the usual course of affairs. Foresight is perhaps the rarest of gifts ; and a succession of men who will strive in the same definite direction, and who must therefore view the changing current of affairs with unchanging eyes, can be secured only by a miracle. Here again the fault lies mainly in the general defects of human nature and the circumstances in which we live ; and it is easier to note it and trace its consequences as we look back, than to say at what precise time and in what precise manner it should have been avoided.

In pursuing this story of mixed gain and loss, of good and ill, I shall seek to show the effects of these modern influences firstly on the executive Government and its administrative policy, then on the foreign policy of the Government of India, and lastly on the political development of the people and its reaction on the structure of the Government.

BOOK I

The Executive Government

CHAPTER I

THE HOME GOVERNMENT

BEFORE the Mutiny the management of Indian affairs in London had followed that leisurely, prosperous, self-satisfied train which characterized early Victorian politics. Control had been divided between the Court of Directors in Leadenhall Street and the President of the Board of Control in Cannon Row. The commercial functions of the first had been brought to a close over twenty years earlier; but the Court was still divided between opulent merchants of the city and retired servants of the Company. The Board of Control had never (except at its very beginning) been more than a name. Its powers were exercised by the President alone, and he was usually an active politician of the second rank. Indeed, ever since the time of Dundas, the office had not been held by a man of real eminence except as a stepping-stone to something better.

The exact relation between these two authorities is hard to define. It certainly varied much from time to time, and depended largely on personal factors. In the last resort the President could enforce his orders by obtaining a *mandamus* against the members of the Court; but public legal proceedings were obviously undesirable; they shocked the

decorous temper of the age, and the directors possessed in any case great powers of obstruction and delay. Differences of opinion led more commonly to compromise than to the victory of either party, and, I think, arose more frequently over personal matters—appointments to high office, the pecuniary claims of individuals on the Company, or the supersession of a Company's servant—than over matters of principle and policy. The one notable exception was the Afghan War, brought about by the Russophobe policy of Palmerston. But that can scarcely be quoted as proving the advantages of ministerial predominance.

The division of the Home Government had this important consequence, that it increased the independent power of the Government of India. In any case, before the laying of the Red Sea Cable in 1870, that body was remote from control. When political events were moving at all rapidly. it always could, and indeed was obliged to, act on its own responsibility, leaving the home authorities with little choice except to approve what had been done. And this position was strengthened by the fact that, if one of the two halves of the Home Government disapproved the Governor-General's conduct or policy, there was a good chance that the other half might support him.

In general it may be said that, while the Home Government had always been supreme in theory, circumstances had entrusted the Governor-General with a large though undefined, and indeed undefinable discretion, the exercise of which, as Wellesley very truly wrote to Castlereagh, could not be

determined by rule but "must be decided in common with every practical question of government by reference to the particular circumstances of each special case." In other words, the exercise of this discretion varied with personal character, so that the relations between the Home and Indian Governments were as variable as those between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control. The more vigorous the Governor-General the more certain were disputes between him and the authorities in England. Wellesley's quarrels are familiar to every student. Lord Hastings complained that the Directors expected as blind a compliance with their orders as the owner of an English estate might expect from his steward. Dalhousie vigorously defended the dignity of his office "whose responsibilities are in danger of being increased, its character lowered, and its usefulness marred, by the undue assumption and vulgar expression of a disproportionate authority at home"; and the same Governor-General described the Board of Control as a board of interference.

But these complaints were usually elicited not by the receipt of orders to do something in the future but to undo something in the past—by the exercise of a power that circumstances did not suffer to be a power of action so much as one of veto. But it is always easier to excuse or defend past action than to induce a superior power to assent to things as yet unaccomplished; so that despite their complaints, the Governors-General really embodied the executive power of the Indian Government. They held all the advantages of

position, and in the great majority of cases succeeded in imposing their will upon their distant overlords.

The Mutiny, however, produced a reaction against this system. Both the Sovereign and the Parliament of Great Britain resolved, under the early alarm and horror of the news, to take a larger, more direct, and more responsible share in the conduct of Indian business. The Queen, indeed, had long regarded the Company as an undesirable anomaly. She strongly disapproved the grant of medals by the Company for military service in India; and had permitted the Governors-General, from Ellenborough onwards, to correspond with her as though they had been governors of a royal province. The shocking news from Delhi encouraged this feeling, and is said to have inspired the Prince Consort with the wish to decorate his wife and sovereign with the title of the Great Moghul. In a like manner Parliament exhibited an extraordinary willingness to burden itself with the solution of Indian problems and to perplex itself with the intricacies of Indian finance.

At the same time it was generally admitted that the functions hitherto divided between the East India Company and the President of the Board of Control could not safely be confided to the unlimited control of a parliamentary Minister. A Minister would inevitably be chosen, neither for his knowledge nor for his experience, but for the convenience of the party in office. Neither he nor a fluctuating majority in Parliament could be wholly trusted to determine complicated matters of which they knew

little or nothing. The deep-rooted English distrust of the expert had to be sacrificed; and while it was agreed everywhere but in Leadenhall Street that the Company must go, it was equally agreed that the new Government must in some form or other embody that Indian experience evidently necessary for the proper conduct of business and hitherto provided by the Court of Directors.

It was decided therefore to set up a Council—the Council of India—to advise and assist the new Secretary of State. But the degree in which real power was to be bestowed upon this body was much debated. Some wished to establish a Council so strong by its constitution as practically to carry over the dual system into the new régime. Disraeli, for example, was induced to propose a council in which nearly half the members were to have been elected—by the cities principally interested in the East India trade, by the holders of East India Company and Indian Railway stock, and by the retired members of the Indian services. This proposal was soon abandoned under the ridicule with which it was received. But clear vestiges of the ideas which had inspired Disraeli's plan were visible in the plan which was finally adopted. The Councillors were appointed "during good behaviour," so that they were invested with something of the independence of an English judge; a considerable proportion of them were to be nominated in the first instance by the Court of Directors; and all subsequent vacancies occurring in that particular group were to be filled by co-option. Their assent was necessary to the appropriation and

expenditure of Indian revenue and to the appointment of ordinary members of the Viceroy's Council. While, therefore, in many matters the Secretary of State could overrule their wishes, and while he enjoyed powers similar to those formerly held by the President of the Board of Control in all business which he considered either urgent or secret, nevertheless the Council of India, as constituted by the Act of 1858, was evidently designed to possess a large share in the determination of policy.

And beside this extraordinary institution for limiting the independence of a Secretary of State, there stood of course the normal and regular checks upon his authority. Queen Victoria had from the first doubted whether the existence of a council would prove compatible with the constitutional position of the new Minister; and she was determined that at all events this constitutional position should be duly recognized. Accordingly in her memorandum, dated September 4, 1858, she laid down the methods of business to be followed by the new office in its relations with the Crown. They were founded on the practice of the Foreign Office. Despatches from India were to be submitted to her on receipt; despatches to India were to be seen by her before being sent off; important measures were to be discussed with her before being brought into the Council; and her pleasure was to be taken before any communication was made to persons proposed for high office. The Crown was thus prepared to exercise its traditional moderating influence; and beside it there stood the authority of the High Court of Parliament, to which

the Secretary of State was responsible, in which he could at any time be required to explain and justify the policy he had adopted, in which he had to produce the Indian accounts, and before which he laid his annual report on the moral and material progress of India.

An observer of the early 'sixties would then almost certainly have inferred that the Secretary of State for India was hedged in by the same limitations as circumscribed the power of the other Secretaries of State, and that in some respects he was even more closely hedged in than they. His authority was regarded with suspicion, and special safeguards set up against its improper exercise. In fact, however, such expectations were entirely baseless. The interest aroused in Indian affairs by the Mutiny died away. For the most part the statutory obligations of Parliament were discharged in a purely formal manner; the decrees presented to it by the Secretary of State were registered; the annual accounts were debated languidly in the thinnest house of the session; the Reports on the moral and material progress of India lay unread, a neglect amply justified by the arid composition of all but the first few issues. The Houses of Parliament had in fact too much to do, in affairs of nearer moment, to spare time for subjects that demanded much preliminary study and investigation. As a rule you could count on the fingers of one hand the members of either House who had paid any special attention to Indian questions; and these members were as a rule faddists who carried little weight. Parliamentary control, as the authors

of the 1918 Report observe, cannot in fact be called a reality.

Nor with the best will in the world was the Sovereign better able to keep pace with the development of Indian business. Even the industry which the Prince Consort had bequeathed to Queen Victoria could not enable her to carry out the programme which she had laid down in 1858. Her interest remained undimmed, but her time was limited; and within twenty years the India Office was no longer submitting the papers called for in 1858, but only those relating to serious questions with the Native States or to the progress of affairs in Central Asia.

In fact then the ordinary constitutional checks upon a Minister's action were less operative upon the Secretary of State for India than upon any other member of the Cabinet; nor were the special restrictions set up in 1858 as effective as some at least had expected. Indeed, within a few years they had been successfully attacked and reduced. The Council of India had been set up in place of the East India Company; but when it attempted to justify this succession by drafting despatches, the Minister had torn them up and prepared new ones entirely contrary to its opinions.

Then, too, the independence conferred on the Council in 1858 was materially impaired by the Act of 1869. Thenceforth Councillors held office for a fixed term of ten years, only renewable at the pleasure of the Secretary of State; their privilege of co-opting to certain of the vacancies was taken away; their consent was no longer needed for the

appointment of members of the Viceroy's Council. Many good arguments were adduced in support of these changes; but the point with which we are here essentially concerned is to note that they elevated the Secretary of State's position. As Sir Charles Dilke observed in the House of Commons: "At the time the Council was appointed, the idea was to curb the power of the Secretary of State; that feeling had passed away, and it was now recognized on all hands that the Council should be a consultative and not a controlling body." The Act of 1869 thus marks a palpable reduction in the status of the Council. It is true that that body retained definite powers, notably financial. "No grant or appropriation of any part of [the Indian] revenues," says Ilbert, "or of any other property coming into the possession of the Secretary of State in Council by virtue of the Government of India Act, 1858, may be made without the concurrence of a majority of votes at a meeting of the Council of India." To those familiar with the importance of financial control such a provision seems to secure to the Council the final word on Indian policy; and such was doubtless the expectation of those who prepared and passed the Bill. But the control has not operated in the same manner as the financial control exercised by the House of Commons. It was in fact too great a power for so small and unrepresentative a body as the Council of India to assert effectively. For questions of high policy the Secretary of State is responsible not to his Council but to Parliament. If for instance he approves warlike preparations in India, it would not be

possible for the Council to refuse the funds necessary for that purpose, nor even to decide how much or how little should be allowed. Again, at the other end of the scale, many questions of expenditure are too minute to be considered at all in London. Consequently this financial control cannot be exerted at all in certain cases either against the Secretary of State or against the Governments in India; and as regards the intermediate cases it amounts to influence rather than control, for in the event of decided difference of opinion arising between the Secretary of State and his Council, the latter cannot push opposition to that extreme which alone would give it effective power. Its position is that of the very high official, who has much authority over detail but little over policy.

Thus on the whole the intentions of the statesmen of 1858 were never realized. They had anticipated a combined supervision over Indian affairs, shared between the Crown and Parliament and the Council of India. Instead of that, they had broken up the old dual organization, and concentrated power in a single person, provided with plenty of technical advice, in general escaping alike the influence of the Crown and the control of Parliament, and usually able to override or circumvent the specific powers vested in his Council. Instead of being the least powerful of all the Secretaries of State, he was freer than any of the others from external authority.

In a legal sense the changes of 1858 made no difference in the position of the Indian as regards the Home Government. The old Court and Board

had been as supreme as the new India Office; the despatches signed by the Directors as authoritative as those signed by the Secretary of State. But in a constitutional sense there was a considerable difference. Several circumstances combined to render the new home powers more effective than the old had been.

In the first place, the establishment of the new Secretaryship of itself implied a greater degree of influence. The holders of the new seals would be persons of greater weight in the Cabinet and of greater political consequence in Parliament than the former Presidents. The average occupant of Cannon Row had been a mediocrity; the average occupant of the India Office has been something more. It has been held by the Duke of Argyll, Lord Salisbury, Lord Hartington, Lord Randolph Churchill, Lord Morley—some eminent by character, some by talents, and some by both. Before the Mutiny the Governor-General had almost always been a bigger man than the President; that is not true of the later period. The change necessarily made for an increased degree of influence exercised from London over India.

In the second place, the former duality had been abolished. The President could no longer hold out promises of help in case the Directors attacked the Governor-General's conduct, nor could the Directors encourage a line of conduct which the President was known to dislike. The one authority now established was likely to become much more vigorous than the old by this removal of possibly conflicting powers; and here again was a reason

why the Home Government should count for more than formerly.

In the third place, while the Council of India was precluded from playing the Company's rôle, it was in its own sphere likely to display much greater activity than the Court of Directors had done. Many Directors had never set foot in India; many had other and important avocations; whereas nearly all the new Councillors had served in India, and none of them had anything else particular to do. It would be fully in accordance with human nature if they considered themselves as wise in Indian matters as the Government of India, and would regard as an error any departure from the system under which they had worked unless they themselves had initiated it. A Secretary of State strong in their support would evidently be a formidable opponent even to so distant a government as India.

And fourthly, the financial powers, apparently confided to the Council, actually fell into the Secretary of State's hands, and in them displayed their usual influence in determining policy. The expenditure of the Government of India in the past had rested very much with itself; it was now subject to the scrutiny and control of the Secretary of State. This probably was the most important constitutional change made in 1858. Materials are lacking to trace its influence in detail; but at one point during the Morley régime the Government of India was almost brought to a standstill by the exercise of this control.

The foregoing causes of the increased importance

of the Home Government resided in the changes of 1858 themselves. But in 1870 a further change took place that brought this new Government into touch with India in a manner which the old had never known. Ever since 1845 the establishment of a telegraph line between England and India had been under consideration. By 1857 nothing had been done but issue prospectuses. But under the pressure of the Mutiny the development of events was hastened. A line was constructed by way of Basra and Baghdad, thus linking up with the Turkish line to the latter city. But this worked imperfectly; long delays occurred in transmission; and at last in 1870 a direct line was completed by submarine cable by way of the Red Sea.

It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of this event. In both the economic and the political field it increased immeasurably the rapidity of reaction between the two countries. From the point of view of Government, the Home authorities were for the first time placed in a position from which they could issue detailed and positive orders. In the past the advantages of position had lain with the Government in India in being able to confront its superiors with accomplished facts. This ceased to be the case. Although the statute-book remained unaltered, the powers of the Government of India had been profoundly affected.

The results of all these changes speedily made themselves felt in the relations between the Secretary of State and the Governor-General. In 1858 it was agreed on all hands that the executive authority lay in India. "The Government in India," wrote

Lord Ripon, " ought, as it seems to me, to be made as much as possible the real executive of that country, and the functions of the Home Government should be restricted in practice within narrow limits." For these reasons, he thought, it might be as well that a Minister, chosen not for his knowledge, but for his influence and position in Parliament, should be subjected to the dilatory and checking influences of a Council. Northcote, some years later, described the Government set up in 1858 as " an executive machinery in India subject to a controlling machinery in England." But in fact these ideas were never fully realized, even at first. From its creation the new India Office was much more active than the old divided Government had been. It had not been in operation two years before the Council of India proposed to cut down the Governor-General's Councillors into Secretaries; and had that been done, the Council of India would have become the sole authoritative exponent of Indian official opinion. In the early 'sixties, a great deal of sharp criticism was sent home to the address of the India Office. Bartle Frere, for example, pointed out that the Secretary of State should content himself " with acting as the representative and colleague of the Viceroy in the Cabinet and Parliament, and as the exponent of the Viceroy's measure[s] to the English Parliament and people." The early working of the new machine involved much friction until the various parts had ground down into place. The initiation of administrative measures was particularly resented on the one side and claimed on the other, while,

as we shall see later, a determined attempt was made to legislate for India in London.

After the laying of the Red Sea cable the change naturally tended to become still more marked, and, as is well known, came to a head during the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook and the Secretaryship of Lord Salisbury. The particular subject of their differences was foreign policy, and the individual aspect of it will be dealt with later. But as regards its general aspect, Lord Cromer, who as Major Baring had served as private secretary to his cousin, Lord Northbrook, wrote a very valuable memorandum, which was printed in that statesman's biography. "There can be no doubt," he says, "that Lord Salisbury's idea was to conduct the Government of India to a very large extent by private correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. He was disposed to neglect, and I think to underrate, the value of the views of the Anglo-Indian officials. . . . This idea inevitably tended to bring the Viceroy into the same relation with the Secretary of State for India as that in which an Ambassador or Minister at a foreign court stands to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. . . . Lord Northbrook's general view was the exact opposite of all this, and I am strongly convinced that he was quite right. . . . He recognized the subordinate position of the Viceroy, but he held that Parliament had conferred certain rights, not only only on the Viceroy, but on his Council, which differentiated them in a very notable degree from subordinate officials."

Lord Salisbury's attitude was no doubt em-

phasized by his well-known and rooted distrust of the expert; but the change against which Lord Northbrook strove in vain must have been due as much to the circumstances of the time as to personal feelings and opinions. It was unabated by Salisbury's transfer from the India Office to the Foreign Office. It was as evident under the Government of Mr. Gladstone as it had been under that of Mr. Disraeli. Lord Ripon, who had been familiar with the practice of the India Office at an earlier period, complained, after his arrival in India as Viceroy, of the altered conditions. It had formerly been the rule, he said, to lay down principles which the Governor-General was allowed a large freedom in applying; but now the India Office passes orders on matters of detail as well as laying down policy. "I am not sure," he concludes, "that if I had known exactly how matters stood I should have come out here." Ten years later Lord Elgin was telegraphing to Sir Henry Fowler for instructions twice a day. The undue control freely alleged in the controversies that arose out of the administration of Lord Morley (whose own *Recollections* show him to have been the most domineering of the Secretaries of State), and out of the conduct of the early campaign in Mesopotamia, evidently has its roots deep in past years. In fact the new form of government established in 1858, and the subsequent development of communications led to unforeseen consequences, and transformed by accident the basis on which the Government of India had been originally constructed. Before the Mutiny, circumstances were such that in spite of its subordination the Govern-

ment of India could usually get its own way alike in small and in large matters; since the Mutiny, and particularly since 1870, the same feat—where any difference of opinion has arisen—has demanded boundless tact or a will of iron.

The extent to which the administrative powers of the Secretary of State have grown at the expense of the Viceroy may be illustrated by a few of the incidents of Lord Morley's rule at the India Office. He claimed, for example, complete liberty to correspond direct with any official in India. Minto naturally objected to this. He quoted the rule of the Colonial Office, that all correspondence with the Secretary of State should be forwarded through the Governor. "Nothing to my mind," he wrote, "is so disagreeable as the suspicion that a back-stairs correspondence is going on between one's own subordinates and officials of high rank belonging to some other department, with the chief of which one is oneself in direct official and private correspondence. I believe endless harm has been done by this. . . ." But in Morley's view, as his letters show, such opinions were contrary to that omnipotence which the Secretary of State should enjoy. He threatened to consult the Prime Minister. He was not a chance member of the Ministry, but the man responsible to Parliament for everything done or omitted by the whole Indian administration. He was never satisfied with what had been the regular course of procedure. He essayed a correspondence with Lord Kitchener, who let it drop. He forced a correspondence on another member of the Viceroy's Council; he welcomed

the correspondence which a third offered to him.

Another point of difference arose out of the appointment of Lieutenant-Governors. In 1858 this had been taken away from the Governor-General in Council and given to the Governor-General subject to the Crown's approval. This was clearly intended to vest the right of selection with the Viceroy, leaving a power of veto with the Secretary of State; Morley asserted a claim to a predominant voice in the matter. When his Under-Secretary publicly described the Viceroy as the Secretary of State's agent, Morley admitted the infelicity of the phrase, but asserted the soundness of the constitutional doctrine implied. When he sent out the Decentralization Commission to enquire what powers might be transferred from the Government of India to the provincial governments, he especially debarred it from considering the utility of the control exercised from the India Office; but, as wrote a close observer from behind the scenes, "that is where the evil starts. If the final authority is perpetually calling for detailed reports and is given to interfering in cases which are within the competence of the Government of India, and even of local governments to decide, no measure of decentralization . . . will have any practical effect." His perpetual interference and his attempts to grasp the whole of the Indian administration made the conduct of affairs peculiarly difficult. "No one for an instant," Minto wrote to a relative, "denies his supreme control, but that must be taken together with the powers given to the

Government of India by various Acts of Parliament, which evidently intended that the direct administration of India should be entrusted to the Government of India, always of course subject to the supreme control of the Secretary of State. But the present Secretary of State does not read the Acts in that way, and claims his right to interfere with and command every individual in India—direct. . . . Legally his position may be sound, but constitutionally it is impossible." Minto's comment fairly sums up the situation that had been created by circumstances and exaggerated by the peculiar character of Lord Morley himself.

In dealing with these matters I have hitherto regarded them only from a general point of view, and sought to show how circumstances by themselves enlarged the Secretary of State's powers of interfering with administration, and thus acquiring functions which formerly were lodged with the Government of India. But there is another aspect of the matter which must not be forgotten, though it cannot as yet be dealt with fully. I refer to the personal equation, which may for a time reverse the effects of circumstances or again vastly accelerate their working. All the increased influence of the Secretary of State may evidently be neutralized by his own indolence or the Viceroy's vigour. An illustration of the latter—at once familiar and notable—is afforded by Lord Curzon. No Viceroy since Lawrence has known so much about his business; none has been so conscious of his superior knowledge, so sure that he was right, so bent on making right prevail. He succeeded in reversing

for a time the whole tendency of affairs. An observer, so placed as to know well what was actually going forward and to compare it with the practice of the past, bears witness that Lord Curzon when Viceroy successfully revived the old claims of the Government of India to semi-independent power, that he claimed a right, not only to be consulted, but to be consulted on equal terms, and that, if the Secretary of State rejected his views, an appeal should lie to the Prime Minister or to the Cabinet at large. Nothing but the greatest energy could have succeeded in thus reversing the stream of events ; and the sudden termination of his government shows perhaps as clearly as anything could do how he had deranged the natural, but I think unhealthy, disposition of political forces. It is clear that the centre of the general balance of power had shifted from India to England, and could only be removed to the former by great and continuous effort.

It may seem paradoxical after this to assert that the political reforms of the close of our period, those of 1908 and 1919, were in the main originated in India and not in England; and it is true that without a Secretary of State heartily disposed to work in the same direction neither Lord Minto nor Lord Chelmsford could have succeeded in doing what they did. But the fact remains that, when we have made every allowance for the increased efficacy of the orders that issue from the India Office, the old discretionary power of the Governor-General has not altogether disappeared. I shall show in a later chapter that the reforms of 1908

owe quite as much to Lord Minto as to Lord Morley, and that perhaps—here I cannot speak with equal certainty—the principle of Dyarchy owes as much to Lord Chelmsford as to Mr. Montagu. The Secretary of State may be supreme, but the abler he is the more he feels the limits of his knowledge; and in such circumstances he is certain to lean upon the man who, technically his subordinate, is so much better placed than himself for knowing and estimating the factors of the situation. It is also clear that every step in constitutional progress brought into play new tendencies to counteract those that had transferred so much of the government of India from Calcutta to Whitehall, and thus tended to redress a situation which, as Minto said, had become constitutionally impossible.

CHAPTER II

THE GOVERNMENT IN INDIA

THE Mutiny Settlement left the Government of India unchanged in form. It still consisted, as it had done in the days of Warren Hastings, though then only called the Government of Bengal, of a Governor-General and Council. The Governor-General had seldom been chosen from the ranks of the Company's service; indeed, ever since the Regulating Act of 1773 the office has been permanently held by only three professional Indian administrators; and in the two cases which have occurred since 1786 experience has scarcely justified the departure from custom. Neither Shore nor Lawrence were really equal to the greatness of their office. Instead of these the men usually selected have been distinguished by a wide political and administrative knowledge rather than by any specially oriental qualifications. They have, like Cabinet Ministers, been amateurs, judging the problems of government by the criteria of common sense, and only following the advice of experts so far as those criteria warranted. With few exceptions they have justified their choice, bringing with them a width of outlook and an absence of prepossessions which are not naturally developed by the career of the professional administrator.

Usually good party-men, they have seldom belonged to the fanatics of their side.

This has been a necessary precaution. Except when foreign policy has been a dominant question, party politics have had little influence on Indian government; and a Viceroy appointed by one side has usually on a change of Government continued at his post. It is what Canning did in 1858, Northbrook in 1874, and Lord Reading twice in our own day. For it would be ridiculous to change the Viceroy because his party had been defeated on a question with which the Government of India has nothing to do, and to send out a new man to learn his work from the beginning in order to carry out a policy essentially similar to that which was guiding his predecessor.

The fact, however, differentiates the office of Viceroy from the Cabinet offices. Though not a professional administrator who is expected to be willing to carry out any orders that he may receive, and whose protests are never expected to be pushed to the point of resignation, the Viceroy nevertheless may find himself in an analogous position. He holds high political office, but on a tenure by which no other high political office is held. He has been appointed for a fixed term of five years ever since the Act of 1773.

The Executive Council with which he governed remained in 1858 what it had been in 1834. It comprised four ordinary members, three of whom must have been ten years in the Company's service, and one barrister, the Legal Member, with the Commander-in-Chief as an extraordinary member.

In 1861, the number of ordinary members was raised to five, and in 1874 to six. The ordinary members then comprised three covenanted servants of at least ten years' standing, the Legal Member, the Military Member, who was always a soldier of high rank, and one other who might or might not be a covenanted servant. Ever since the Directors' standing order of April, 1801, these members have been appointed, like the Governor-General, for a term of five years. As we have seen, they were under the Act of 1858 appointed by the Secretary of State in Council; but the participation of the Council of India was abolished in 1869, and they are now appointed by warrant under the Royal Sign Manual.

In 1860, a project was put forward for the abolition of this Council altogether. It was proposed to vest the Government of India solely in the person of the Viceroy, and to reduce the existing members to the status of secretaries. The origin and purpose of this plan still lie buried in the unpublished private correspondence of Canning and Wood; it appears, however, that it was accepted by a Committee of the Council of India, and was to have formed part of the Indian Councils Act of 1861.

Instead of this, however, the Council was enlarged by one, and, as we shall see, the Viceroy was given power to make rules for the conduct of business. To some extent this came to the same thing as the original proposal.

Thus neither the measures of 1858 nor those adopted since have materially affected the form of

the Government of India. But great changes have taken place in its methods of transacting business. In the past, with the exception of the Law Member appointed under the Act of 1833, the duties of the various members had been in no way specialized. They were supposed to work together as a council at the business of government, and the Company was strongly averse to anything that tended to attack the custom of collective deliberation.

The primitive routine of affairs was as follows: The Secretaries sent in circulation, in those mahogany boxes which in India correspond with the red boxes of the English Cabinet, all the papers as they were received. These were supposed to be read by each member in turn. A paper of any moment would probably occasion minutes from several if not from all the members, and unless they all agreed, which was unlikely, back the papers would go in circulation once more, so that each member should see what the others had written about his opinion. This process obviously might go on almost indefinitely, and was indeed a singularly ill-chosen mode of conducting business. Ill-humoured phrases come more readily from the pen than from the lips; and caustic replies are produced more easily at one's own writing-table than impromptu in the course of discussion. All this minuting not only wasted time and paper, but also provoked a frequent tone of bilious acrimony. Twice a week from 10 in the morning to 3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon the members met in Council. The secretaries attended in turn, each with his mountain of papers, reading them at length,

or else giving the abstract endorsed upon them, and hurriedly noting the decisions which the Council took on each.

Under this system the business of the Council was unending. Three whole days a week, Metcalfe reckoned, did not suffice for reading the papers that came to him in circulation; two whole days were passed in Council; and the remaining week day was not enough for writing minutes and revising despatches. What was worse, when business was brought before the Council in this undigested mass, when an estimate for repairing a barrack-roof might be succeeded by a declaration of war, it was unlikely that the Council's attention would be divided among the cases in due proportion to their real consequence.

Dalhousie did something to check this flow of ink and waste of time by directing that, where members differed on a case, it should always be brought into Council and discussed before being sent out again in circulation. The natural consequence was that in the great majority of questions members came to an agreement instead of exasperating each other by pen-and-ink misunderstandings.

However, as the business of Government constantly increased, this reform soon became inadequate; and a sweeping change in the methods of business was brought in by Canning, who, in 1859, on the first appointment of a special Finance Member, introduced the portfolio system, by assigning the business of one or more departments to a specific member as his particular charge, the Viceroy himself taking the Foreign Department. This

division was, however, of uncertain legality; so in 1861 the Indian Councils Act specifically authorized him to make rules for the conduct of business, and directed all orders made in accordance with such rules to be deemed the acts of the Governor-General in Council. Under rules thus authorized the modern system was introduced. The member and the secretary of a department are empowered to settle all minor business on their own authority; and thus other members, and the Council as a whole, are relieved of all the petty cases which formerly choked the progress of public business. Once every week each member has a regular meeting with the Viceroy, at which the more important matters are discussed, and either settled or referred for discussion to a full Council. In order to make sure that important questions are not being settled in the department without reference to the Viceroy, each secretary also has a weekly interview, in which he has the right of bringing forward any case which he considers demands the Viceroy's attention. This has an ugly appearance of going behind the member's back; the intention is, however, to give the Viceroy the opportunity of hearing the views of two experts, and not leaving him more or less at the mercy of a single one. This principle, it will be remembered, was powerfully urged by Lord Curzon and the civilian members of his Council against Lord Kitchener's proposal to abolish the Military Member of Council. The idea of a dual consultation runs through the whole structure of the Government of India, the only real breach in it being made when later on in 1907 Lord Morley

abolished the Military Supply Member, who had replaced the Military Member. The Commander-in-Chief thus became the only military adviser to the Governor-General in Council.

The great bulk of Government business is then settled either in the department concerned, or by the member in consultation with the Viceroy. There is, however, a residuum of cases that cannot thus be disposed of—either matters of general policy which the Viceroy wishes to be discussed in Council, or cases which he refers to the Council at the request of a member whom he has overruled. The Executive Council is usually stated to meet thus as a Cabinet once a week. At such meetings the decision of the majority prevails, unless the Viceroy decides to overrule his Council by the use of those powers which he has inherited from Lord Cornwallis. But these powers have been used very seldom since the Mutiny. Lytton was obliged to use them in order to overcome the opposition of Council to the exemption from duty of imported cotton goods. But ordinarily the Canning rules of business provide an easier method of avoiding opposition.

Whether or not designed to replace the scheme for abolishing the Council altogether, Canning's rules have undoubtedly reduced the importance of the Council, and increased the effective influence of the Viceroy over it. However, it must be borne in mind that even in his time it was no new thing for the Governor-General in his single person to exercise all the powers of the Government of India. When, in 1790, Lord Cornwallis went down to

Madras personally to conduct the war against Tipu Sultan, he was given by his Council the power of acting with as full authority as if he were still sitting with it in Calcutta. Such a delegation was held to exceed their powers, and an Enabling Act was passed to validate all that Cornwallis had done under this defective resolution; two years later the defect was specifically made good by the Charter Act of 1793, which declared that the Governor-General when absent from his Council may issue orders "of the same force as if made by the Governor-General in Council." Wellesley and Lord Hastings both took advantage of this provision. Then Amherst discovered the joys of Simla; Auckland paid more than one prolonged visit thither; and later Governors-General made a practice of quitting the plains of India during the hot weather. They went, not as nowadays accompanied by all their councillors, but merely with two or three secretaries—the modern practice was only introduced by Lawrence—and while thus absent they were supreme in every way. This exodus was regarded by the Council with quite as much disfavour as that with which Indian politicians regard the present custom. During such absences the Governor-General was bereaved of their advice, and able to bind them without their having the least say in the matter. The feeling inspired Kaye with those bitter epithets which he cast at Simla—"the cradle of more political insanity than any place within the limits of Hindustan."

We may fairly regard Canning's rules as a permanent means of avoiding that Council Govern-

ment which his predecessors could only escape by the expedient of leaving Calcutta; once they had been devised, the members of Council might be received up into Simla, and so the onslaughts of Kaye no longer find an echo in their hearts.

Next to these rules, as an element in the Viceroy's influence over his Council, must be reckoned a change that had taken place in 1853. In that year membership of the Governor-General's Council ceased to be the highest rank to which a covenanted servant could aspire; the pay of a councillor was reduced to £8,000 a year, that of a Lieutenant-Governor raised to £10,000. At that time there were only two Lieutenant-Governors—in Bengal and in Agra. Since then similar posts have been created in the Punjab (1859), in Burma (1897), in Eastern Bengal (1905). The fact is important in two ways. It has enabled the Viceroy to promote those councillors who most actively support his policy. But it has also tended in a subtle fashion to propagate that theory of the Indian Government which certainly underlay the Canning rules. Those rules assumed that nothing of importance was done by the Government of India without the personal consideration and approval of the Viceroy. Under them everything tended to be the act, not of the Council which legally constituted the Government, but of the Viceroy who legally was its president. His most important colleagues were therefore not those councillors who week by week brought up cases for his decision, but the Governors of the Presidencies and the Lieutenant-Governors elsewhere, who directly administered the provinces of

India. They, and not the Councillors of India, were, in Minto's words, the chief officers of the Viceroy. So that the Government of India came, during the period we are considering, to present this anomaly—that the Council, and Council form of government, while established by law and preserved in all external appearance, gradually declined, and a system in which all the powers of government were centred in the Viceroy, in great part silently replaced it, under the influence of the rules of business and of the Viceroy's powers of reward.

The tendency was emphasized and strengthened by the practice which first emerged so long ago as the 'seventies of conducting business by private communication between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. Some day it is likely that we shall be able to trace out the process in detail, for this correspondence must exist in duplicate among the private papers of the successive Viceroys and Secretaries of State. But though these still lie unpublished, clear traces of the practice have occasionally cropped up, from the memorandum of Lord Cromer which I have already quoted down to the Report of the Commission on the Mesopotamian scandals in 1917.

It is clear, then, that although the Government of India has not been changed in its outward form since the Mutiny, its inner working has been deeply modified. This has not been a legal change. No hint of it occurs in Ilbert's abstract of the law relating to the Government of India. It is rather one of those silent processes which are often going

forward behind the external forms of political institutions, and which signify a change in the balance of political power. In the present instance it was the growth of the English political element in the Government of India at the expense of the Anglo-Indian official.

Below the Government of India are the provincial governments. All through the period of which I am treating they consisted of two types—administration by a Governor-in-Council and by a Lieutenant-Governor. The first was an inheritance from the early days of the Company's rule, when the Indian factories were grouped under three independent presidencies, each governed by a President and Governor with the aid of a Council. These were the presidencies of Fort St. George, of Fort William in Bengal, and of Bombay. As Bengal gradually rose in commercial importance, and when Clive's victories first established there an extensive territorial power, that Government took the lead, and developed into the Government of India, whose political structure we have just been considering. The other two fell into a subordinate position, but, owing to undeveloped communications and the great distances of India, retained a certain degree of independence along with their original form of government. In Madras, which was the first of the two to acquire territorial importance, the practice of appointing the Governor from England appeared earlier even than it did in Bengal; the same custom later on was extended to Bombay; and although in neither was the rule followed so strictly as was the case with the much more important

office of Governor-General, it was followed in both with tolerable and increasing regularity. In both, the Councils were exclusively recruited from among the covenanted servants.

The third of the original presidencies, Bengal, suffered the penalty of its government's becoming the supreme Government of British India. For a long time it had no separate administration at all, and until 1833 the style of the supreme Government was "the Governor-General and Council of Bengal." But when British territory had extended in Northern India, when to Bengal and Behar were added Agra and the Doab, then the Punjab, the Central Provinces, and Oudh, the need of relieving the central government of the charge of directly administering extensive provinces became more and more apparent. In 1833 it was intended to expand the presidency system, and the Act of that year included provision for the establishment of a presidency of Agra; instead of that, however, the province was entrusted to a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen from among the Company's servants. Later on Bengal, the affairs of which had been nominally looked after by the senior member of the Governor-General's Council in his spare time, was also formed into a Lieutenant-Governorship; and that became the recognized form of organizing new provinces when they had outgrown the charge of a Chief Commissioner under the immediate orders of the Governor-General. In only one case—when Bengal was re-organized in 1911—had the system of a Governor-in-Council replaced that of a Lieutenant-Governor.

At first there had been a considerable degree of

difference between the powers exercised by a Governor and his Council and by a Lieutenant-Governor. The former were naturally much more ready to assert their rights. They possessed what the Lieutenant-Governor had never possessed, the privilege of communicating their views directly to the Home Government. But the difference lay rather in custom and prestige than in formal rights; and in 1833 the legal powers vested in the Government of India became absolute as against provincial governments of either type. All executive and all legislative powers were then concentrated in the Government of India, which merely allowed to its dependent governments such functions as were sanctioned by custom or convenience. No formal line had ever been drawn to limit the scope of its action, and until the very close of our period the central Government leant strongly to the view that no such line could be drawn with advantage.

Until 1858 the main protection of the provincial governments lay partly in their distance from the seat of the Supreme Government, and partly in the defective organization which obstructed the latter in discharging the enormous duties with which it was burdened. When it took a week or more for a letter to reach Madras or Bombay, a considerable amount of discretion must necessarily have been allowed; and when the Supreme Government was vastly overworked, it must often have given its assent to proposals which it had never duly considered. Thus whatever the legal distribution of power, a high degree of centralization was impracticable. But this state of things passed

away with the extension of the Indian telegraph system and the Indian railways. As regards the former, in 1855 Calcutta was connected with Peshawur and Bombay, and Bombay with Madras —some 3,000 miles of wire; in 1860 this had been extended to 11,000, and in 1880 to 20,000 miles. Within almost the same period the principal points in India were linked up by the railway. The few miles of rail existing in 1858 had by 1880 been extended to nearly 10,000 miles, though even then, and for many years afterwards, no line ran direct from Calcutta to Madras. This no doubt explains why Madras felt the growing pressure less than the other provincial governments.

This development of communications acted in India in much the same way as the laying of the cable did on the relations between the Home and the Indian authorities. While the rules of business enabled the Government to transact business much more rapidly, the rail and telegraph brought a larger share of public business within their reach. The conditions of modern centralization had been established. Hence we find the growth of a strong tendency to establish one uniform system of administration throughout India, to set up universal laws, or, where permanent legislation was unsuitable, universal regulations.

This attempt was not new in Indian, or even in Anglo-Indian, history. The Bengal Government, in the first flush of its predominance, had attempted to impose on all the territory under the Company's dominion the peculiar system evolved by Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow. The attempt

had on the whole been a failure. Even the masterful spirit of Wellesley could not annihilate time and space, or annul the effects of slow communications; and his immediate successors were not the men to solve a problem which had baffled him. So that neither the revenue system nor the laws of Bengal had been extensively adopted outside that province; and indeed during the forty years which preceded the Mutiny, the wide territories which had fallen to the Company by conquest or annexation had tended to develop independent types of administration. In 1858 the various provinces presented the widest diversities in district management, in the collection of the revenues, in the conduct of justice, and in the law itself.

The most notable of these diversities was offered by the contrast between the Regulation and the Non-regulation Provinces. The first group was composed of Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and Agra. In each of the presidency towns English law was administered by a Supreme Court; and in the subordinate territories elaborate series of regulations, which, although loosely and inaccurately drafted, yet were formal pieces of legislation, were administered by the district courts, which, though dependent on the Company's government, were completely independent, and generally very jealous, of the district officials.

The second group comprised the territories acquired by the Company after 1818—Sind, the Punjab, Nagpur, Oudh, Lower Burma. Here little formal legislation had taken place. Law still remained what it had been under the Indian princes

whom the Company had displaced, a mixture of ill-defined custom and executive order. In general, notably in Oudh and the Punjab, criminal codes had been set up which in simplicity, in logic, and in suitability, far surpassed the queer compound of Quranic injunction and English rules which passed for criminal law in the Regulation Provinces. In this respect the Non-regulation Provinces were the more advanced of the two. But in respect of civil law they were much the more backward, for all the civil law they had was a mass of standing orders, despatches and minutes, where, as Maine said, you might be unable to decide whether a paragraph was intended to point a sarcasm or to convey an injunction.

In organization, too, the Non-regulation Provinces differed widely from the others. In the latter, while the collector of a district had control of the police, and a certain control over the administration of criminal justice, the principal criminal courts and all the civil courts were not only exempt from but also disposed to be jealous of his influence. In the Non-regulation Provinces, however, such a separation of the executive and judicial duties was unknown. The Deputy Commissioner at the head of a district, and the Commissioner at the head of the group of districts that formed a division, exercised as many powers as a *subahdar* under a Moghul or a Maratha prince. He collected the revenue, he carried into execution all administrative orders, he tried criminals, and he decided civil causes. He thus embodied a simple but vigorous type of government, depending indeed for its virtues upon

the qualities of the individual, but well-adapted to the prevailing type of society, and preserving the closest possible touch with the people. These patriarchal officials spent most of their time under canvas or in the open air, and upon every new-comer, as he took his place in the service, was deeply impressed the prime duty of accessibility, of knowing the people of his district, of always being ready to see and hear them, to discuss their grievances, and listen to their complaints.

In this respect, as well as in the union of powers, the Punjab Deputy Commissioner offered a complete contrast to the Bengal Collector. The Regulation system, of which Bengal was the extreme example, was built up upon principles the exact opposite of those on which the Lawrences had worked in the Punjab. The great object of Cornwallis and Barlow had been to establish a rule of law; the Lawrences had aimed at a rule of men. The first depended on passing detailed regulations and establishing courts to punish breaches of them; the second depended on selecting individuals and trusting within certain very general limits to their common sense. The first simplified and fixed the revenue management so as to bring the revenue collector into contact with as few persons as possible; the second aimed at securing for the revenue official the widest possible knowledge of the people and of their conditions of life. The result was that the Deputy Commissioner knew every village, and the headman of every village within his jurisdiction; while the Magistrate-Collector did not know how many villages lay within his district, he did not know

what crops they grew, he did not know what rents they paid, he only knew that he had to account every year with a specific number of zemindars for a fixed amount of revenue. The two provinces just mentioned offered in 1858 the most remarkable example to be found in British India of variations in administrative systems and ideas. But similar variations in a lesser degree existed everywhere. You could never infer the methods followed in one province from those followed in another.

By 1918 much of this elasticity of system, or absence of system, had disappeared. A general, though still very incomplete process of assimilation had been carried out. The Bengal system of administration had in some respects been made to resemble that of the Punjab, and the Punjab had been brought more into line with Bengal. For example, the great difference in law which had marked out the Non-regulation from the Regulation Provinces had been almost obliterated. This had been achieved by a free use of the general legislative powers vested in the Government of India. From 1861 onwards it displayed a great, sometimes almost a feverish, legislative activity, passing many general Acts besides the famous codes—the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Civil Procedure Code. These constituted great and noteworthy reforms. The antiquated laws and cumbrous procedure of the Regulation Provinces were thus simplified by rational legislation, based in great part, so far as criminal law and process went, upon the practice of the Non-regulation Provinces; while the latter were endowed, after

some mistakes and misunderstandings, with positive civil laws to replace the executive orders which had hitherto served in their stead. And further, although under the Act of 1861 the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras, and the Province of Bengal were invested with subordinate legislative powers, the Government of India remained the sole legislative organ for the Non-regulation Provinces, so that the particular laws passed for these all tended to reflect one common policy. Thus general and particular laws alike helped in this process towards legislative uniformity.

This drew on behind it a corresponding tendency towards administrative uniformity. The first process on the whole made the Regulation Provinces more nearly resemble the Non-regulation Provinces; but the second imposed something like the Regulation administrative system on the others. This was felt in many ways. For instance, the personal rule which had been so marked a feature of the Non-regulation system passed away. The Deputy Commissioner in his capacity of executive officer found his executive conduct limited by positive law; and in his capacity of judge he found the same limiting and controlling his judgments. The change was expressed by Maine with his usual lucidity and point. If a Lieutenant-Governor of the later period wished to suppress gambling he would ask the Government of India to pass a law, whereas in the earlier days he would merely have given instructions to his police. And with the disappearance of personal rule went also the dissolution of the powers formerly united in the

person of the Deputy Commissioner. Separate judges were appointed, separate courts established, and though this process was not carried as far as in Bengal, the peculiar character of the Non-regulation Provinces was entirely obliterated.

The administrative department least affected by this unifying tendency was that of Revenue. The peculiar features of the Bengal Permanent Settlement, of the Madras and Bombay ryotwari systems, of the village settlements of Northern India, suffered no change. These were indeed rooted too deeply in the habits and conditions of the various regions to be unified by even a reforming Government; and the utmost attempted in this department by the Government of India was to establish rules to limit the amount of the revenue-demand, and the degree in which that demand might be enhanced at a resettlement.

The new departments, however, which sprang up to conduct the ever-widening activities of Government, served largely to assist the growth of a uniform administrative policy. The broad tendency has been to entrust branch after branch of administration, as each grew to importance, to a specialized department, each manned by its own separate staff. In 1858, for instance, the district police were under the control of the regular district officials; but Canning decided to re-organize them into a distinct department, under a separate departmental chief. Education similarly passed under the management of a separate group of officials; so did Agriculture, and so on. All these developments took place in the name of, and were justified

by considerations of efficiency. The argument can hardly be contested. Specialized departments, unless conducted with great corruption, must always attain a much higher degree of departmental efficiency than can be reached by mere general administrators. But the change was accompanied by two others, which at the time were not so clearly realized. The influence of the district officers was reduced, and the influence of the Government of India was enlarged.

For these new departments stood on quite a different footing from the old Revenue departments. The latter had grown up in the old days when communication was slow and difficult, and when the influence of the Government of India was hampered in its exercise, not only by distance, but also by that indolence which marks the absence of public opinion. But the new developments had from the first been sheltered by the fostering care of the central Government, protected by its rules, organized according to its instructions, based upon its policy. The activities of these new departments furnished the subject of innumerable references, despatches, minutes, and resolutions; and their general policy was dictated from Calcutta and Simla in a higher degree, and was less inspired by the different circumstances of the several provinces, than had been the case with the development of the Revenue system. This led to the pursuit of uniformity, not perhaps for its own sake, but because a specific policy had found favour in the Imperial Secretariat. It was much easier to require a provincial government to adopt a scheme already prepared and

invested with the sanction of authority than to discuss intelligently what alterations in a policy approved for one province should be made to adapt it to the special circumstances of another. Even a single province such as Bengal was too large and diverse for its government to pay full attention to the individual needs of particular localities. Occasionally, and with great reluctance it would permit special legislation for the Chota Nagpur division with its primitive tribes; but the fact proved only the existence, and not the satisfaction of the need. And Bengal, with its 150,000 square miles of territory, and its 70 or 80 millions of population, is but a single province of India.

Finally when Lord Curzon created Inspectors-General of various departments in order to clinch and confirm the control of the central authority over the policy of the local governments, the latter became very restive indeed. Their views were pointedly expressed in a statement sent in by the Government of Bombay to the Decentralization Commission. "All this is done," they say, "in the name of efficiency; but the efficiency is unreal. Schemes and systems affecting to establish uniformity throughout the continent of India may appear complete and harmonious on paper . . . but when they clash with discordant local conditions, they must inevitably lead to inefficiency of administration, and to what is much worse than inefficiency, to popular discontent."

Ever since its first establishment the Government of India had lived in chronic controversy with the provincial governments. The tendency above

described helped to continue and emphasize that state of things. Discussions were no longer conducted with the external asperity which had characterized them in the 18th century, but they probably generated almost as much inward warmth. "I fear," wrote Sir Bartle Frere to Lord Mayo, when the latter was setting out for India, "you will find the relations between the Supreme and the Local Governments in India very uncomfortable and unsatisfactory, to use the mildest term. . . . It will task all your powers to ensure the obedience of your own people in the Government of India to any orders you may issue with a view to diminish the present incessant meddling and interference. The tendency to meddle is almost universal in men trained in a departmental secretariat, and irresistible by those who are invested with authority nearly absolute."

The power of the Government of India depended legally on the provisions of the Act of 1833, which required the provincial governments to obey the orders of the Governor-General in Council, and to keep him constantly and punctually informed of their proceedings. The practical means employed to carry this power into effect was the establishment of a singularly stringent control of provincial finances—the weapon, it will be observed, that proved so powerful in combination with the telegraph in altering the relations of the Secretary of State and the Governor-General. In India all taxes were collected in the name of the Supreme Government, though by the agency of the provincial governments; and all expenditure above a tiny

maximum needed the sanction of the higher authorities. The exercise of this control, however, before the days of improved communications was necessarily irregular and imperfect, vexatious, as a critic of those times observed, without being effective, for it imposed on the central authority a detailed scrutiny which could not really be carried out.

Wilson, the first Finance Member of the Viceroy's Council, proposed to modify this. In introducing the system of formal budgets, he intended to enlarge the provincial liberty of action by according leave to vary the detail of a budget so long as the amounts assigned to each major head of expenditure were not exceeded, and the general rules observed. After his death, however, the old system was restored, and during Lawrence's Vice-royalty the provincial governments were debarred from varying the smallest detail set down in their respective budgets without the express sanction of the Government of India. This system set a premium upon extravagance. It created the strongest temptation to budget on so liberal a scale as to make sure that Government would not be embarrassed by unforeseen events; the central Government was in no position to estimate the real needs of the various provinces; the more a province demanded, the more it was likely to get, irrespective of the revenue produced within its limits or of its necessities as compared with other provinces.

The first step to remedy these palpable evils was taken by Lord Mayo in 1870. He assigned to certain budget heads, such as Education, Police, Roads and Buildings, lump sums, to be expended

as the provincial governments deemed best, subject to the general rules of the Civil Account Code, but under no circumstances to be increased except by savings made under another head, or by the proceeds of taxes imposed locally ; and the grants thus made ceased automatically to lapse to the central Government if not expended within the current year. This gave the provincial governments an interest in economy, which they had altogether lacked under the old system. Between 1877 and 1879 Lytton added to this measure by extending it to other heads of expenditure and transferring to the provincial income certain minor heads of revenue—excise, for example, and the licence-tax—under the condition that any increase in the production of these heads should be shared between the provincial government and the Government of India. Ripon in 1882 completed this classification of revenue heads between the central and the provincial authorities; and Lord Curzon in 1904 revised the classification so as to give the provincial governments a fairer share of those sources of revenue which were likely to expand, and at the same time declared that this arrangement would not be disturbed save in the case of grave imperial necessity.

In respect of financial control, it is clear enough that the powers of the provincial governments were very considerably increased after 1870. But it is also clear that this tendency coincided with a growing closeness of control in respect of policy. The two movements, in appearance contradictory, were in fact compensatory. The extension of effective

power, produced by improved communications, permitted the relaxation of a financial control which could only be maintained at the cost of financial efficiency; and further, when the Government of India was, under the pressure of English ideas, extending the sphere of its activities, when it was developing education, sanitation, local self-government, statistics, archæology, when it was devising new laws, when it was confronted with new currency problems, and engrossed in foreign policy, its relaxation of control over provincial finance was more a matter of exhaustion than of self-denial.

In spite then of the measures of financial decentralization which were brought into effect, and while the Governor-General was complaining of the increasing interference of the Secretary of State, the local governments were complaining of the increased interference of the Government of India, and the heads of districts were complaining of the increased interference of the local governments. The influence of quick communication was running through the whole fabric of the Indian Government. The Collector or Deputy Commissioner ceased to be the paternal and imposing figure of 1858. We have already seen how the Deputy Commissioner had lost much of his judicial power, and how his action had been limited by law; but the change went further than that, and affected all provinces, Regulation and Non-regulation alike. The old discretionary power formerly enjoyed by the head of a district disappeared. He had to be perpetually referring to the local government for orders, just

as that body had to refer to the Government of India, and the latter to the Secretary of State. Then, too, the growth of the new departments impaired that general control of district administration which he had exercised; and, most important of all, the growth of Government activity involved him in a great quantity of correspondence, demanding the compilation of returns and statistics, and all the apparatus of a modern government, so that the nature of his functions was gradually tending to be contracted from the administration of a district to the management of an office. With the development of this change disappeared the old personal intercourse with the people, the old leisurely tours. Everywhere outside the Bombay Presidency, English became the current language of the collector's office; and so vanished the old familiarity with the vernaculars, born of daily use. Administration became more and more regular, more and more centralized, more and more an affair of paper, of minutes, and returns and precedents. The district officer was, in fact, losing his resemblance to the *subahdars* and *tarafdars* whom he had displaced, and becoming a civil servant of the European type. Here, too, was a victory of the European over the old Indian political elements.

CHAPTER III

ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

If we turn from the changes that circumstances have produced within the forms of Indian institutions, to survey the administrative policy that has been pursued by the Government, we shall find there also constant evidence of the same forces which have been silently at work elsewhere. The briefest account can hardly fail to display the extent to which the policy of Government has been affected by the new pressure of the moral, economic, and political ideas of the West, and by the new and closer contact established by the changed conditions of the world. This, be it noted, was a change not in kind but in degree. From the first the European had carried Eastwards with him his own ideas of moral, economic and political conduct. The slave trade still flourished in the Empire at large after it had been forbidden in India; and slavery itself became illegal in India long before the slaves of Jamaica were emancipated. Sati and human sacrifices were put down, the revenues derived from pilgrims, from prostitutes and from gamblers were abandoned, the benefits of unshackled commerce and free communications within a country were perceived and sought after, long before the development of steam and electricity had brought London

and Calcutta within days and hours of each other. But in the days of slower travel, European ideas and standards tended to relax eastwards of the Cape. They were not, and indeed they could not be, pursued with the same energy and continuity of effort.

In later chapters I shall seek to illustrate the way in which the shrinkage of the world affected the foreign policy of the Government of India, and the political views alike of the Government and of the people. Here I shall content myself with illustrating its influence in various ways on administrative policy.

(1) *Opium.*—The most obvious illustration of the moral influence of the West is afforded by the case of the Opium Revenue. This had long been a State monopoly, and from time immemorial had contributed to the State finances. Part was consumed in India itself, but it had for centuries formed a considerable item of Indian exports. It met with a ready sale in the Straits, and was always welcome in China, where it was valued as of finer quality than what could be grown locally. The mandarins were naturally anxious to make their money of this situation by levying heavy duties. Like the English duties on wines and spirits in the 18th century, these led to smuggling and reprisals. The Indian opium clippers were the fastest vessels in the Eastern seas; but now and then one was caught. The seizure of the *Lorcha* led to the Chinese War of 1842, which missionary circles attacked as a war to compel the Chinese to receive opium. Gradually a party grew up in

England which denounced the use of the drug as immoral, and demanded the complete suppression of its cultivation in India. In 1893 a Royal Commission was appointed to enquire into the matter. It found that opium in the East was very much what alcohol was in the West, a good servant, but a bad master. This was true enough, but unwelcome to those who considered that all men should be confined because some abuse their liberty; and it was the less readily credited because opium has the same exaggerated effect on Western men as European spirits on Orientals, perhaps in both cases attributable to a lack of inherited immunity. The whole agitation seemed very ridiculous to men who had seen how the Rajput prized old opium of a good season with that discerning and appreciative moderation with which their own fathers prized a vintage port. But nevertheless the party prevailed so far as to bring about an agreement with China, guaranteeing a decrease in the Indian export from 1908, and by inference the ultimate extinction of a large part of the Opium Revenue. There was too much force in the acid comment that Great Britain was displaying her benevolence at the expense of India.

(2) *Excise.*—Closely allied with this question is that of the Excise policy of Government, for the same school of English opinion that would prohibit opium would prohibit also alcohol and hemp, which like opium raise the question whether it is better to prohibit liquor and thus incur all the dangers of illicit consumption, or to tolerate it under regulation, while taxing it as a luxury. To judge

by the very conflicting reports from the United States, the administration of a prohibitive system raises in the early years at least as many problems as it solves.

The Excise Revenue in India is, like the Opium Revenue, inherited from past governments, and is administered on lines as severe as those prevailing in England, though the varying circumstances of the different provinces have necessitated varying methods of administration. The general object is to raise as much revenue as possible without encouraging illicit traffic. The principal alcoholic liquors consumed are spirits, distilled from molasses, palm juice, or rice, and toddy, the fermented juice of the toddy-palm. As regards the first, two methods are in use—the central-distillery system, by which manufacture is limited to certain large distilleries, while the right of retailing spirits is farmed out separately, either for a single shop, or for a defined area; and the out-still system, by which the rights to manufacture and sell country-spirits in a particular area are sold together annually by auction.

The object of Government has been similar in the case of hemp, the use and effects of which were examined by a Commission in 1893. They have sought to regulate and control the use of the drug, by the imposition of excise duties and licensing the retail trade. In Burma, however, where its use has never prevailed, the production and consumption of hemp have been altogether prohibited.


These excise revenues are interesting, not only to the sociologist, but also to the student of economic

conditions, for in India as in England the immediate effect of a rise in prosperity among the poorest and most ignorant classes is always an increased consumption of these popular luxuries.

(3) *Factory Legislation.* — The foregoing are attempts, entirely in the spirit of English administration, to improve moral and social conditions by indirect means. But direct measures have also been used in many cases—in the regulation of factory labour, for example. Attention was first drawn to this subject by the condition of the hands in the cotton factories of Bombay, where the Indian mill-owners were displaying the same disregard for their operatives' welfare as had been shown by the same class in England before they were compelled to mend their ways by legislation. In 1881 an Act was passed limiting the employment of children. Ten years later a more comprehensive measure was brought into force, widening the definition of a factory, limiting the hours of work for women as well as children, and giving power to the local governments to make rules regarding the water-supply, ventilation and cleanliness of factories. This was based on the report of a Commission which had sat in the previous year. Another Commission sat in 1908, with the result that the law was further amended.

(4) *Sanitation.*—Beside these activities should be set down the efforts, though inadequate, made to improve the sanitary conditions of Indian life. These date from 1863, when a Royal Commission, investigating the health of the Army in India was struck by the influence of the insanitary conditions

in which the whole population lived. This led in 1864 to the appointment of Sanitary Boards in each Presidency, primarily to watch over the conditions of health of the Presidency Armies, but secondarily for the general care of public health. Gradually other measures were introduced, and in 1888 Sanitary Boards were formed in each province to superintend the sanitary work of the local self-government authorities. The need of reform, both in the towns and rural areas was great, and in most places, except the larger cities, remains considerable. Sir John Strachey reminds us how, within his memory, the sewage of Calcutta was left to rot in pestilential ditches or was thrown into the Hugli to float up and down with every tide, along with the corpses of the city, while the river, thus polluted, afforded the principal supply of water for every purpose. At the same period in Rangoon there were no lamps, no water-supply except the river, no drains except surface drains by the roadside, and no system of conservancy. In the great cities these evils have fairly been encountered, because in them funds could be raised by local taxation, and loans from Government, to carry out the more necessary works. But in the lesser towns funds for sanitary purposes have usually been lacking; and in the villages this problem has been more difficult still. There the essential need is education, and although primary education includes instruction in hygiene, and in many parts special efforts have been made by the distribution of leaflets and oral instruction, yet in many, probably in nearly all, rural areas the villages are still completely indifferent



70
80
90
100
30
20
10
INDIA
Sketch Map illustrating the
Mean Annual Rainfall
Over 60 inches
20 50 "
Under 20 "
0
500 Miles

to the advantages of ventilation in their homes, and purity in their water-supply, not realizing how cholera, malaria and typhoid are promoted by the stagnant pools that collect round and in their villages, and by the pollution of their village-tanks in which they bathe, water their cattle, and draw water for their own consumption.

(5) *Famine Policy.*—The most serious of the social efforts made by Government have been directed to alleviating the consequences of famine, which periodically attacks India as it has attacked every country principally dependent on agriculture and lacking good communications. Here, as in other ways, we find Government continuing the efforts made in the past, but with higher ideals and a higher sense of its responsibilities, evidently inspired by the humanitarian character of modern political thought, and spurred on by the humanitarian sympathy displayed in Europe.

Much of Indian agriculture depends upon the periodic rains, which the south-west monsoon bears across Western and Northern India in the months of June, July and August, and which the north-east monsoon carries to the east coast districts of Madras in the last quarter of the year. These seldom fail altogether; but certain parts of India are liable to be severely affected by their partial failure or irregular distribution. The Deccan is one of the two regions most liable to drought; the other is the block of territory formed by Rajputana, and the Western and Southern part of the United Provinces.

The effects of an extensive drought in India are

comparable to those which follow in an industrial country on a wide-spread dislocation of industry, such, for instance, as the American Civil War produced in the English cotton industry. Great masses of the population may be deprived of the means of earning their livelihood, and must either starve or be relieved. The traditional measures for encountering famine in India were the pro-prohibition of exporting grain, the punishment of those who hoarded grain, and the distribution of relief. But neither the political organization, nor the public resources, nor the state of communications enabled the rulers of India before the middle of the 19th century to take measures at all adequate to control the consequences of prolonged and wide-spread drought. Of the earlier famines we possess little detailed and statistical information; but Muslim chroniclers and European observers concur in drawing a grievous picture of the roadsides lined with corpses, and of wretches in their despair, like shipwrecked men at sea, devouring those weaker than themselves.

It was freely alleged early in the 20th century, at the close of a cycle of famines of great severity, that these had become more frequent and severe under the British rule; but we possess so much exact knowledge of the later famines and so little of the early ones, that reasoned comparison is impossible; and the whole tendency of economic change, in India as in other parts of the world, is clearly to mitigate their consequences. Famine, though sometimes wide-spread, is never universal; the development of communications implies the

means of carrying supplies where they are required; the development of a great export trade in grain implies that there is a surplus available when needed for other purposes ; and the extension of irrigation implies a reduction of the area liable to famine.

In 1860-61 occurred a famine in the North-West (now the United) Provinces and Rajputana. It reached its greatest severity in the region round Delhi and Agra, but affected altogether some 48,000 square miles, and a population of 19 million. It was met by large relief works combined with the issue of food to those who were unable to work.

This was followed in 1866-67 by a famine on the borders of Madras and Bengal, in Orissa and Ganjam. In the latter district it was dealt with successfully; but in Orissa it was wholly unexpected. Warnings were ignored as mere alarmist reports. The officials had had no experience of dealing with famine. When in May, 1866, its presence was suddenly realized, the south-west monsoon winds prevented the sailing vessels at Calcutta from reaching the Orissa coast; and land communication consisted of a single road broken by unbridged rivers. By great efforts 10,000 tons of rice had been thrown in by the following November, but in the interval multitudes had died. It was, says the great Famine Report, the least efficiently and most extravagantly managed famine on record.

This was almost immediately followed, in 1868-69, by a famine that afflicted Western India, centring in the Rajput states of Udaipur and Bikanir, but stretching also into the North-West

Provinces and other British territory adjoining. The small British district of Ajmir was crowded out with refugees; and the Rajput states possessed neither the wealth nor the organization required for controlling the famine. This was the occasion on which Sir William Muir at Agra issued his famous order that "every district officer would be held personally responsible that no deaths occurred from starvation which could have been avoided by any exertion or arrangement on his part or that of his subordinates."

No further severe famine occurred for nearly ten years, but in 1873-74 there was a failure of crops in Behar. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal considered that it would be enough if the export of rice by sea were restricted; but the Government of India, remembering the complete failure of the Bengal authorities correctly to gauge the situation in Orissa, insisted on a great importation of grain from Burma. 480,000 tons of rice were thus brought into the province, and not three-quarters of it was ever used, while the vessels sailing up the Hugli with it met vessels carrying Bengal rice abroad. The Orissa and the Behar famines both illustrated the relative weakness of that system of district administration bequeathed to the province by Cornwallis. The district officers, with their limited contact with the people, and their lack of channels of information afforded elsewhere by the lower Revenue officials, were in truth in no position to judge the economic condition of their districts, or to estimate either the extent or the probable effects of a failure of the crops. As the Lieutenant-

Governor, Sir George Campbell, had observed just before the Behar Famine scare : " We do not know what districts produce more than they consume, what districts hoard food, and what districts export food. . . . Less than two years ago . . . the revenue officers of Behar were reluctantly obliged to confess that they could give no statistics of the area under the plough, of the irrigated lands, of the different kinds of crops." The result was that in Orissa a million persons were left to die, while in Behar six and a half million pounds sterling—a sum equal to the total previous expenditure on famines since 1800—was expended on a famine of unusual brevity and lightness.

Down to this time famines had been met with a growing spirit of responsibility; but no definite policy had yet been evolved for their treatment. The next visitation—the great Deccan Famine of 1876-78, which embraced the Deccan districts of Bombay, the southern parts of Hyderabad, almost the whole of Mysore and considerable regions of Madras, covering altogether some 200,000 square miles of territory, and threatening a population of 36 million—revealed too clearly the evils consequent on a lack of method and the absence of declared plans. Its administration exhibited great variations in laxity and strictness. In Bombay great relief-works were set about at once, and close scrutiny applied to the grant of gratuitous relief. But in Mysore, then under British administration, and in Madras, attempts were made to encounter an almost overwhelming disaster on the principles that had been applied to the scarcity in Behar, until the

Viceroy Lytton had visited the scene in person and secured the adoption of the methods employed in Bombay, which he perceived were less wasteful not only of the resources of the State, but also of human life. He also resolved that famine conditions should be thoroughly investigated and a definite policy laid down.

The result was the Famine Commission which sat, with the engineer, General Richard Strachey, as President, from 1878 to 1880, and whose recommendations were embodied in the Famine Code of 1883. Three main principles were then adopted. In the first place, if the provincial governments waited until famine was upon them, the hurried search for relief works was unlikely to produce schemes of permanent benefit. Instead of that schemes were to be thought out beforehand and pigeon-holed all ready for use when need arose; and on the execution of these schemes able-bodied persons needing relief were to be employed at a wage sufficient to maintain them in health. In the second place, gratuitous relief should be afforded only to the impotent poor. And in the third place, since famines had been proved by experience to be recurrent dangers of such magnitude as to threaten the finances with complete dislocation, regular financial provision should be made to meet them. This was what was called "Famine Insurance." Under this scheme the annual budget was to include a sum of a crore and a half of rupees, to be raised by taxation in addition to the ordinary recurring needs of Government; and the sums thus raised were to be employed partly in avoiding debt,

so as to conserve Indian credit against a time when heavy borrowing might become necessary, and partly in the construction of protective works—railways and canals—which could not be expected to pay well enough to merit construction in the ordinary course of things, but which would serve to render famine less severe in the regions peculiarly exposed to it.

Nearly twenty years passed before another great famine brought these plans to the test of experience. But at last the rains, which had been short in 1895, failed totally in 1896, and famine once more raged in Central India from Rajputana to Western Bengal, and from the United Provinces to Madras, to be followed in 1899-1900 by another over the greater part of the same area, but extending more to west and north, including in its sweep the Punjab, Gujarat and Baroda. This affected more than twice the area of the Great Deccan Famine, and almost double the population.

Both these were followed by commissions of enquiry, the first under Sir James Lyall, the second under Sir Anthony Macdonnell. Both on the whole affirmed the principles of 1883; but both also filled in gaps which had then been overlooked. The Commission of 1898, for instance, called attention to the difficulty that had been experienced in the Central Provinces of relieving the primitive hill-tribes through their refusal of relief on the ordinary terms; and broke new ground in recommending that weavers should in future receive relief in their own craft. The Commission of 1901 made proposals for preventing the great mortality

of cattle which had always accompanied a famine and obstructed the recovery of the people.

The gradual elaboration of these measures betrays on all sides the influence of modern ideas applied with all the increased resources of the modern state.

(6) *Irrigation.*—Closely allied with this is the modern extension of those irrigation systems, which have been inherited from Hindu India. Such, for instance, is that extensive system of tank irrigation which still remains in practical use all over the Deccan and Southern India, and of which the traces still survive in Rajputana and Central India; and the indigenous system of canals and reservoirs irrigating five million acres in Bengal, and large areas in the Punjab and Sind.

In this direction, however, the Company showed little activity or enterprise. Baird Smith was indeed allowed to reconstruct the Jamna Canal, and Cotton to extend the ancient works at the head of the Cauvery delta, and to construct new works on the Godavari. But the Company would not commit itself to any system of state-irrigation. What was done had to be done out of revenue; and so the larger schemes of modern times were impracticable.

Attempts were made to enlist private capital in the work; and two companies—the Madras Irrigation Company and the East India Irrigation and Canal Company—were formed, the first to execute Cotton's Tangabhadra project, the second to carry out the same engineer's Orissa Canal scheme. But both proved failures, and brought the policy of guaranteed companies to an early end.

A new policy, destined to be peculiarly fruitful in its results, was inaugurated under Lawrence. This was to raise loans for irrigation works that were likely to pay their own way. It led gradually to the accomplishment of great engineering schemes, though even yet the limit of profitable expenditure is far from having been reached. These have been directed mainly to impounding and distributing river water; the most noteworthy successes have been achieved in the Punjab and in Sind, where yet greater schemes are now in progress; and as a consequence of these efforts the area irrigated by canals increased with great rapidity, rising from about six million acres all told in 1880 to twelve million irrigated by the larger productive works alone in 1902, and nearly nineteen million in 1919.

(7) *Railways.*—Modern engineering science has not created, but only extended irrigation ; it has the sole credit of the railway. Before the Mutiny three short lines, leading inland from the three Presidency towns were already under experimental construction; and the initial railway development followed the plan laid down by Dalhousie, for a line from Calcutta to Lahore, with a second branching off it to Bombay, a third from Bombay to Madras, and a fourth from Madras to the Malabar Coast. By the end of 1859 private companies had been formed to carry out these and other projects involving 5,000 miles of rail, with a state guarantee that, if their net profits fell short of 5 *per cent.*, the balance should be found out of the public revenues. The other principal conditions were that any surplus profits should be shared half-yearly with the Govern-

ment, that Government should have the right of purchasing the railways at a fixed rate at the end of 25 years, and that Government should have the right of controlling the management and the finance of the lines.

The early history of these ventures was full of mishaps. They were planned on a needless scale of solidity, on a broad gauge, with accessory conveniences needless for either safety or efficiency. They were constructed in short on the model of the English railways, instead of being lightly built like the American railways in undeveloped regions. The Government officials charged with the duty of supervision were unfamiliar with railway construction, and were obsessed alike by their conscious ignorance and by the need of a conscientious supervision. Progress was slow and costly. Before they were finished, these guaranteed lines had cost £17,000 a mile, or nearly double the original estimate. Consequently it was a long time before they began to earn their guaranteed rate of interest; and even then Government found that the half-yearly division of surplus profits involved a bad bargain, because in the busy six months of the year, when the railways made more than their 5 per cent., Government only obtained half the surplus, and in the slack six months, when there was always a deficit, they had to bear the whole of the deficiency; so that, even in years when the railways really did earn a surplus on the whole, Government had to pay more than they received under the agreements. By 1869 the charges amounted under this system to a million and a half sterling a year.

These heavy costs, concurring with a period of financial embarrassments, produced a strong reaction against the guaranteed system; and, after repeated requests from the Government of India, the Secretary of State was induced to assent to a trial of State-construction. But famines, war, and the need of strategic railways diverted such large funds from ordinary railway extension that recourse was had once more to the guarantee system, under a new name—State Lines worked by Companies—and on easier terms. More than 4,000 miles were constructed under this system. In 1893 a further plan was tried—of seeking to encourage feeder railways, not by a definite guarantee, but by the offer of a rebate on the traffic which they brought on to the main lines; and after various revisions of the terms, a considerable number of light feeder railways were promoted on this basis.

By these various means some 36,000 miles of railway have altogether been constructed, at a total capital outlay of about 350 millions sterling. Until the beginning of the 20th century Government secured no return on its outlays. But as the original contracts fell in, Government was able to renew them on more favourable terms, and at last a Railway Revenue began to appear.

For a long time the Government's concern in the Indian railways was controlled by a branch of the Public Works Secretariat with several consulting engineers under it. In 1879 a Director-General of Railways was created; but this office was still a part of the Secretariat, which thus continued in control of railway policy until 1905, when, on the

principle that the Indian railways should be managed by business men on commercial principles, the railway branch of the Public Works Secretariat was abolished, and the Railway Board established in its stead. But this new body still remained much under the control of the Department of Commerce and Industry to which it was attached.

(8) *Forests*.—Another entirely new branch of administration is the Forest Department. From time immemorial the Indian Governments had regarded forests in no other light than as a source of revenue. That, too, was the Company's attitude. The sandalwood of Malabar and the teak of Burma were valuable as Government monopolies, but no attention was paid to the conservation of forests as a whole.

Indeed the influence of forests on climate, their moderating effects, the way in which they store up the heavy tropical rains, preventing them from merely rushing destructively down the hill-slopes, was little understood; and the fact that on a large scale forests constitute an important climatic influence was for long scarcely realized. The facts were known, but the conclusions were not drawn. This was even more the case in England than on the Continent. The science of forestry was developed in Germany and France; and was ignored in England until a comparatively recent date.

Early forest policy was thus merely one of exploitation. The first Forest Officer was Captain Watson, appointed Conservator of Forests in Malabar in 1806, who protected the teak forests by declaring teak a Government monopoly. In

1827, after the annexation of Tenasserim, the teak of Burma attracted attention; but the methods adopted merely consisted in the annual sale of so many thousand feet to contractors. In 1847, Dr. Gibson was appointed Conservator of Forests in Bombay; in 1856 a similar post was created at Madras for Dr. Cleghorn; but their protests against the policy that was being pursued did not succeed in inducing their respective governments to modify it. At length, in 1864, Dr. Dietrich Brandis, who had been procured from Germany in 1856 to superintend the forests of the newly-annexed province of Pegu, was appointed Inspector-General of Forests by the Government of India. His appointment marks a new departure in policy. The Indian Forest Act was passed in 1865, and amended in 1878; and later Acts were passed applying specially to the forests of Madras and Burma. A separate department charged with the care and maintenance of the Indian forests has come into being, and employs something like 20,000 persons, while in 1878 a special school was established for their training at Dehra Dun.

The area thus brought under a special law and administered by a separate department is upwards of 100,000 square miles, not quite a ninth part of British India. It is now far from being equally distributed. Bengal and the Punjab include considerable areas of waste, but little forest; in the Central Provinces and Madras something more and something less than a fifth respectively is so classified; in Bombay, less than a tenth.

In some provinces, such as Burma, where the

population is scanty, this has made little difference to the people at large. But where the population is beginning to press upon the resources of the soil, the Forest problem has offered the dilemma of restricting the activities of the people or allowing them for the sake of present convenience to do themselves ultimate certain and preventable harm. Few things are so generally unpopular as an endeavour to make men prefer a future to a present advantage; and in parts of India the Forest policy of Government has been persistently misunderstood and condemned.

The protection of forest areas from cattle, for example, has been very unpopular, especially where cultivation has begun to contract the wide areas of waste formerly available for grazing. Yet nothing is more ruinous to forestry. Cattle devour the seedlings as they spring up ; goats devour the young shoots of the maturer trees. Moreover, when the Forest Department was formed and the forests taken over, they were for the most part in a ruinous condition; the more valuable timber had been removed, and the remainder "maltreated by axe and fire." Much improvement, however, has been secured in these areas by a compromise between the needs of the forests and the needs of the neighbouring people, mainly by way of opening and closing areas to certain classes of animals. Of the 100,000 square miles of forest, a third only—lying mainly in Madras and the Central Provinces—is closed to goats, and about the same proportion to sheep and cattle. In times of famine, however, these restrictions are relaxed.

Besides the ordinary agricultural population residing on the outskirts of the Forest areas, the Forest officers have to deal with a great number of primitive tribes residing within the Forest areas themselves—the Nagas of Assam, the Karens and Kachinis of Burma, the Chodras and Dankhas of Bombay, the Santals of Chota Nagpur, the Kondhs of Northern Madras. Some of these were peculiarly destructive, because in their half-nomad, half-settled mode of life, they would burn down a patch of forest for their cultivation, moving on and burning down a new patch when the fertility of the former was beginning to decline. Such practices have had of necessity to be repressed; but even here efforts have been made to render the change as little irksome as may be; and in some of the Burmese forest areas shifting cultivation is allowed on condition that teak is sown with the field crop.

(9) *Salt.*—The Forest Department, like the Railways, was a wholly new enterprise. The Salt Department, like the Opium and Irrigation, is an inheritance from the past; but like them also has undergone new influences. It had always been taxed, and the revenues had been raised either by way of monopoly or by transit dues; and this mixed method still survived in 1858. In Bengal there was a monopoly leased to agencies in the coast districts; in Madras it was much the same; in Bombay the duty was collected by means of an excise system established in 1837; while along the border of the North-West Provinces ran the great Customs Line, erected in 1834 to replace innumerable small customs stations, and designed to collect the duty

on the salt from the salt lakes of Rajputana. It was a huge cactus hedge, strengthened in parts with stone walls, guarded by nearly 13,000 men, and stretching along a distance of over 2,300 miles.

The first part of this complicated and antiquated system to be reformed was that of Bengal. In 1863 the monopoly was replaced by import duties coupled with an internal excise. This was a material reform, because the great volumes of fresh water pouring into the head of the Bay render it unsuitable for salt-evaporation. The manufacture ceased at once; and the needs of the population were supplied from abroad at half the former prices.

Elsewhere the Government manufacture has on the whole extended. It has been reintroduced in Bombay, where the salt factories on the Runn of Cutch are Government factories; and in the Punjab the mines of the Salt Range are worked by Government. But the great extension of this system, and the main reform of the salt administration, consisted in the acquisition by Government of the principal Rajputana sources, and the abolition of the Customs Line.

This process began in 1870, when the Government took a lease of the Sambhar Lake; in 1874, as the salt-trade had by then practically confined itself to the railway, 760 miles of the Line were abandoned. Then, in 1878, Lytton acquired the remaining Rajputana sources, and entered into treaties with the Rajput states. In the next year the whole Line was abandoned.

At the same time measures were taken to equalize the salt duty throughout India. The duties in the

North were lowered, those in Madras and Bombay were raised, till in 1882 a uniform rate of two rupees a maund had been established in all the provinces except Burma.

With the subsequent variations in the rate of the duty we are not here concerned; but the Salt Department itself, it is curious to note, still preserves evident marks of the old days when the Government of Bengal directly ruled the recent conquests in upper India though only supervising the administration of the other presidencies; for the Governments of Bombay and Madras administer the salt revenues in their respective provinces; while the manufacture and control in Northern India are conducted by the Northern India Salt Department immediately under the Finance Department of the Government of India.

(10) *Army Administration.*—Another department which long bore the marks of the primitive organization of British India was the Army. Originally each presidency had had its separate military forces under its separate commander. Stringer Lawrence in 1746 had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the Company's forces, but was only empowered to exercise his command in person; and as the three armies developed in the later part of the 18th century, they developed independently, under their three separate commanders-in-chief. They were also in the main locally recruited. In spite of the traditional belief to the contrary, the great bulk of Madras Sepoys were recruited in Southern India; the Bombay army found greater difficulty in following out this practice, but was discouraged from

seeking Indian recruits in the North; the Bengal Sepoys were from almost the first recruited in Behar and Oudh. Each Presidency army included European units recruited by the Company; and besides these there were always a certain number of Royal regiments in the country, to supplement the Company's military forces.

In the course of time, while the Bombay and Madras armies remained on the whole under the management of their local governments, the Bengal army became peculiarly the army of the Central Government, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army was the head of all the military forces in British India, thus repeating that faulty organization by which central authorities were charged alike with general and with local functions; and although the Bengal Army was on the whole composed of better military material than the other two, its organization and discipline steadily deteriorated in the twenty years preceding the Mutiny. Ill-judged imperial policy reduced the numbers of Europeans serving in India. Finally an ill-judged piece of military reform gave occasion for the great military revolt, in the course of which almost the whole of the Bengal Army was destroyed.

The military reorganization which followed showed how deeply this lesson had been taken to heart. The Bengal Sepoys had been almost entirely recruited from one region; they had belonged almost exclusively to the higher castes; the European forces had been too small to provide an adequate balance; the division of the armies had prevented the revolt running right through the military

system. Accordingly we find the Presidency armies continued, the European element strengthened, and the greatest care taken to avoid the preponderance of any single race or caste.

Thus by 1863 the Europeans serving in India numbered 65,000, the Sepoys 140,000; the first had been increased, the second diminished, by half. The proportion then established of something less than one to two was roughly maintained right down to 1914. Further, the local European units which had been maintained by the Company were taken over, but their old character disappeared. They became liable to serve wherever ordered. This caused much dissatisfaction—what was at the time called "The White Mutiny"—and 10,000 of the Company's soldiers refused the new terms and took their discharge. In the reorganized force the artillery was exclusively European.

As regards the Sepoys, little change at first took place in the Madras and Bombay armies; but the old predominance of the Upper India Brahman and Rajput in the Bengal Army was removed by a considerable recruitment of the Sikhs and Gurkhas who had fought so well against the Hindustanis in the Mutiny campaigns. The Commission which had considered the question of Army reorganization had recommended that Sepoy battalions in future should be recruited on a mixed basis, so that every unit, and every company of every unit, should include men of all races, castes and creeds. This was the system on which the earliest Sepoy regiments had been formed and recruited; and which Clive had recommended for

Bengal. It is also a system to which some experienced officers, as a result of their observations during the late war, would like to revert. But in India during the period that followed the Mutiny opinion strongly ran the other way—in favour of what was to be called the "class" system. The first mark of this was the drafting of Punjabis out of Hindustani regiments and *vice versa*; while the troops and companies of the Punjab Frontier Force were converted from mixed into class organizations.

Then came the alarm of the Russian advance in Central Asia. The independent khanates of that region were swallowed up. Russia became conterminous with Afghanistan; and after the Second Afghan War, continued her efforts, pressing on the Northern Afghan frontier, building strategic railways, and laying up stores of railway material. The Panjdeh crisis, when war seemed imminent and a force of 65,000 men was mobilized by the Indian Government, led to the immediate increase of the Indian Army by 10,000 Europeans and 20,000 Indians.

From this time until the negotiation of the Convention with Russia in 1907, the problem of increasing the efficiency and improving the organization of the Army was the object of constant thought and experiment. In such times, when every rupee was needed for practical purposes, and when the existence of the Presidency armies evidently impeded the concentration of forces in the event of war, it was not likely that that expensive and anomalous organization would be suffered to continue. It was ended by an Act of 1893, which came into force

in 1895. The Indian Army then passed under a single control.

The first organization that was substituted for the Presidency armies was a fourfold territorial division—the Punjab, Bengal, Madras and Bombay commands, each under a lieutenant-general. But though this removed the anomaly of the Indian Commander-in-Chief's having no authority over great masses of troops in India, and broke up the Bengal Army, which was too large and scattered over too great an area for a single command, it still left the organization in time of peace unrelated to the organization in time of war. Under Lord Kitchener a further reorganization took place intended to remedy this defect. The Indian troops were formed into three army corps, and nine divisions, so that the generals commanding were responsible for training the same units that they would command in the field in the event of war.

This reform of the organization of the army was accompanied by a considerable change in its composition. The Russian threat made it all the more expedient to have the ranks of the army filled with the very best military material that could be obtained in India. Accordingly there began a process in 1893 of replacing races which had shown themselves less apt for war by those which had displayed greater warlike talent. In general this involved the substitution of northern for southern races, and of Gurkhas, Pathans and Sikhs for Hindustanis. In this process the regiments raised in Madras were the most deeply affected. In 1881, of the eighteen regiments reduced, eight had been

Madras regiments. In 1893, Sikhs, Gurkhas and other Northerners were substituted for the men in the eight Madras units serving in Burma. Soon after this the recruitment of Telugus was discontinued; and in the course of the reforms begun in 1904, twelve more Madras battalions disappeared, leaving only thirteen recruited within the Presidency. The Bombay troops underwent a similar, but less drastic, process.

One other very important change took place to which allusion must here be made. From 1861 down to the disappearance of the Presidency armies, the officer through whom was exercised the supreme control of the Government of India over the different bodies was the Military Member of Council. He was always an officer of either the English or the Indian Army, and he controlled the Military Department of the Government of India Secretariat. But the Commander-in-Chief was always an Extraordinary Member of Council, he took precedence next after the Viceroy, and he was necessarily superior in rank to the Military Member. This somewhat anomalous position was accentuated when in 1895 the Presidency armies disappeared, and all the military forces in India were placed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. There were then two great bureaux—the Military Secretariat and Army Headquarters—each dealing with Army administration as a whole, each corresponding with and impeding the other; and besides this reduplication, the system involved the peculiarity that when the Commander-in-Chief proposed a scheme, it was in the first instance sent for examina-

tion and criticism to an officer, the Military Member, of lower rank and inferior status.

When Lord Kitchener became Commander-in-Chief during the Government of Lord Curzon, he attacked this system as a military solecism, involving, moreover, great expense and delay. The Viceroy and his Council defended it, for two main reasons. In the first place, they argued, the transference of the Military Member's functions would involve excessive centralization, and would in time of war lay upon the Commander-in-Chief duties greater than any single man could discharge; in the second place, they declared that it would subvert the constitution of the Government by making it entirely dependent on the Commander-in-Chief for military advice, thus imperilling the control of the civil over the military authorities.

It was indeed true that the reform proposed by Kitchener would break into that system built up by Canning, under which in all matters the Viceroy was provided with a double set of technical advisers in every department of Government. But this argument appealed little to the Secretary of State of the day, whose financial control would not be impaired, and who in military affairs could always consult his military secretary or yet higher military opinion in England; while the other argument did not seem to counterbalance the economy and avoidance of friction and delay on which Kitchener dwelt. However on his side it was conceded that the Commander-in-Chief should be relieved of those branches of Army administration which were less directly concerned with military training and

operations. Such branches were the supply and storage of provisions, clothing and the like; the supply and registration of transport, ordnance, medical stores, and horses; these, together with the control of the large military contracts which they involved, were made over to a department specially formed for this purpose, called the Military Supply Department, and, like the old Military Department, under the control of a military officer of high rank as an ordinary member of Council. This compromise was accepted by Lord Curzon; but the selection of the officer to control the new department involved insuperable difficulties; and at last the decision of the Secretary of State was conveyed in such unusual terms that the Viceroy resigned.

This took place in 1906; and the compromise did not long survive the energetic Governor-General who had secured it. In 1907 the new department was abolished; and the Commander-in-Chief remained the one responsible authority for Army administration under the Government of India. Here as elsewhere we find the same tendency towards centralization, and the same anxiety for efficiency, induced by the growing pressure of the external world in every aspect of affairs.

(11) *Currency.*—What Army policy illustrates in the field of external politics, currency policy illustrates in the field of external economics. It has been determined by streams of events occurring outside India, and it has itself contributed to that economic interdependency which characterizes the modern world.

In the old days India was not economically isolated; but the channels of influence were so narrow that the forces of action and reaction were limited in scope. They were for instance too weak to produce any real approximation in the general price-levels of Europe and Asia. The points of economic contact were too few. And this remained very much the case until the great modern expansion of Indian foreign trade, which may be dated from the opening of the Suez Canal in 1870. That brought Indian agricultural produce in general into the European market, thus establishing contact between India as a whole and the outside world.

But that contact was still counteracted by the lack of a common currency standard. The currency of India in the 18th century had been mixed gold and silver, with a preponderance of silver in the North, of gold in the South. But early in the 19th century gold, being undervalued, passed out of effective circulation, and the currency then consisted essentially of the rupee. Anyone possessing silver could carry it to the mints for coinage. The discoveries of gold in the middle of the century at first tended to reverse this state of things. With the decline in the value of gold, gold coins began once more to appear in India, and in the 'sixties half-hearted attempts were made to encourage its circulation. But this position was speedily reversed. The production of silver suddenly rose. The annual value of the produce of the silver mines, which in the 'fifties had only averaged seven million sterling, and in the 'sixties ten million, increased in the 'seventies to seventeen million.

Its price therefore dropped; the fall was accentuated by a decrease in its use as currency in Europe; and the gold which had begun to circulate in India disappeared again. And so, at the moment when Indian commerce first came into effective touch with European commerce, the standard of value in India was silver, and in England was gold.

Two important consequences followed from this position. The last quarter of the 19th century was marked in Europe by an almost continuous fall in general prices; but at the beginning of the period the general level of Indian prices was far below that prevailing in Europe. The ordinary result of economic contact would have been two-fold—in the first place the Indian price-level would have been dragged up towards that established in Europe, and in the second place it would have followed it in the later part of its fall. But the difference in the standards of value seems to have permitted the adjustment between the two price-levels to take place with much less disturbance of Indian conditions. The gold-price of commodities and the gold-price of silver were falling simultaneously. So that wheat from Karachi or cotton from Bombay, or jute and rice from Calcutta might exchange for much less gold than they had formerly done, but the gold which they fetched procured much more silver than formerly; thus Indian produce tended all the time to remain at an approximately even value as measured in rupees, liable only to those internal causes of variation to which it would in any circumstances have been exposed. By these means the adjustment of the Indian and European price-

levels brought about by the swiftly developing contact between the two regions, was accomplished with a minimum of disturbance in Indian conditions. Indeed it passed almost unnoticed.

The case was very different with the other consequence flowing from the same source. As the value of silver fell, the gold-value of the rupee necessarily fell with it; the payments annually made in England by the Indian Government for pensions and leave-allowances, for the maintenance of the India Office, for the purchase of stores, for the discharge of interest in sterling loans, and so on, were increased proportionately. In 1873 you could sell rupee bills in London at 1s. 10¾d.; in 1883 you could only get 1s. 7½d.; and in 1893 only 1s. 2½d., while shortly afterwards the rate actually fell for a brief time below 1s. The Home charges therefore came to cost the Indian tax-payer nearly twice as much as they had done before. The fall of a penny in the exchange meant that about a crore of rupees had to be found to meet the difference. Nor was additional taxation the only disadvantage. These perpetual changes disorganized Indian finance, because they could not be foreseen or estimated, while they reduced the benefits of sterling loans by automatically increasing the cost of the interest that had to be paid on them.

After having in vain sought to persuade the statesmen and financiers of Europe to agree to a universal policy of bimetallism, which it was thought might secure stability in the relative values of gold and silver, it was at last decided in 1893, after the matter had been investigated by the Herschell

Committee, to establish the gold standard in India, so as to bring these fluctuations to an end. It was at first intended to bring this into effect by means of circulating gold in India; but it was gradually perceived that by controlling the coinage of rupees, and by a process of selling sterling when the exchange fell, and by selling rupees when it rose, the gold-value of the rupee could in all ordinary circumstances be maintained within a variation of ¼d. This system was gradually developed between 1893 and 1907; and worked effectively until the war occasioned such a violent dislocation of the economic framework that the delicate poise of the mechanism was for the time being destroyed.

But from the close of the 19th century, when the rate of 1s. 4d. had been established, there was a free interplay between Indian and European prices. By this time the movement which had been steadily lowering the European price-level had spent its force, and was succeeded by another of an exactly opposite direction. This at once made itself felt in India, where a period of stable was followed by one of rising prices, with all the results of uneasiness and discontent that such movements always generate among wage-earners and the classes that live on fixed salaries. It was surely no accident that it coincided with a time of swiftly gathering political unrest.


(12) *General Remarks.*—The foregoing hasty survey of the tendencies of administrative policy in India shows in how many directions the activities of the Government were influenced from without. The rising standards of governmental responsibility

threatened and reduced the Opium Revenue, affected Excise administration, brought about interference with the conditions of factory labour, promoted attempts to improve the sanitary condition of the people, and stimulated the endeavours to render famine less terrible. The same influences, coupled with the development of engineering skill and modern tendencies of economic thought, led to that material activity in digging canals and building railways which have transformed great areas of the country, and intimately affected the social and political conditions of life. The last remnants of the system by which India was divided out among a thousand conflicting interests were abolished. The near approach of a foreign enemy remodelled the Army. The near approach of the foreign merchant revolutionized the currency.

It is for the politician rather than for the historian to attempt to strike the balance of good and evil in the tendency of which all these are varying manifestations. But it was clearly broad, deep, and powerful, stretching from one end of India to the other, and leaving no class untouched.

BOOK II

Foreign Policy



Sketch Map of
AFGHANISTAN
and
NEIGHBOURING
COUNTRIES
0 100 200 Miles
RUSSIAN TURKESTAN
CASPIAN SEA
Tashkent
R. Jaxartes
Bokhara
Samarkand
R. Oxus
R. Atrek
Merv
R. Murghab
Sarakhs
Panjdeh
Hari Rud
Herat
Kabul
Peshawur
R. Indus
PERSIA
AFGHANISTAN
Qandahar
KOHJAK PASS
Quetta
BOLAN PASS
Lahore
R. Sutlej
INDIA
BALUCHISTAN

CHAPTER IV

THE POLICY OF MASTERLY INACTIVITY

THE general effect of the changes noted in the previous chapters was to produce a progressive increase in the effective influence exercised by European conditions and ideas over Indian policy. It is shown alike in domestic affairs, in the relations with the Indian princes, and in the foreign policy properly so called of the Government of India. I propose in this and the two following chapters to illustrate the way in which the last of these heads reflects this external influence, and then to consider its effects upon the relations with the Native Princes.

(1) *Central Asia.*—For over a century India had been a stake in the European game; but till the 19th century it had been a stake that could only be played for at sea. Napoleon first conceived the idea of approaching the East overland, and thus evading the irresistible force of the British fleets; and this conception long floated vaguely before the eyes of Russian statesmen. Russia was indeed the only European power well situated for such an attempt; but even in her case it was evidently a complicated business. It involved the occupation of great tracts in themselves scarcely worth occupying, and the creation of means of transport which

probably would never pay. However, considerable political advantages were offered by a process which involved, not necessarily the conquest of, but the approach to India. The British Empire had been vulnerable only by sea routes ; but the establishment of a European power within striking distance of India would change all this and bring England within reach of the blows of a merely military state. In other words it would enable Russia to influence English policy in Europe by threats in Asia.

This was a danger to which England was peculiarly sensitive. It had been shown so early as 1809 by Minto's embassies to the Sikhs, the Afghans, and the Persians ; a generation later the same apprehensions had led to the First Afghan War. It is noteworthy that this foolish business affords the one supreme example of Home influence on Indian foreign policy in the days before the Mutiny. It was followed by a lull in English anxieties. The Emperor Nicholas had visited Queen Victoria in 1844 ; and this visit had been the occasion of an entente between the two powers. It was then agreed to leave the Khanates of Central Asia as a zone of neutrality between the two empires. The struggle between Russian and English diplomatists at Teheran was stayed ; and nothing more was heard of Russian agents at Kabul. But the events which led to the Crimean War in 1854 once more set English and Russian policy at cross purposes. The Russians, thwarted at Constantinople, took their revenge by resuming their advance through Central Asia. The great portent of the Mutiny

made the plan appear more promising to them, more alarming in English eyes ; and the North-West frontier question became less a matter of administration than one of high policy.

Beyond the narrow plain which forms the western portion of the Indus Valley lies the maze of hills separating India from Afghanistan. They often rise to 15,000 or 17,000 feet, and are intersected by deep, narrow tortuous valleys, overhung by precipitous heights. Their climate is severe, passing from the extremes of cold to the extremes of heat ; but in spring the valleys abound in scents and flowers which have recalled his English home to many an English officer. These are pierced by two main passes besides many lesser ones—on the north the Khyber, leading to Peshawur, and over 300 miles southward the stony passages of the Kohjak and the Bolan, with Quetta perched between them.

These hills had long formed a no-man's land between Afghan and British territory, inhabited by Muslim tribes with a formidable history of marauding independence. They had beset Moghul armies marching without avail to defend Qandahar from Persian attack or to repress the turbulence of the Governors of Kabul. When Sikh replaced Moghul in the Punjab, tribal independence was reinforced by religious animosity ; and the history of Sikh rule beyond the Indus had been one of incessant forays and revenge.

In a military sense the existence of this independent tract offered many disadvantages, although military opinion was much divided as to the best

policy to be adopted. All the passes were in the hands of the tribes. If, then, the Government of India were faced with a prospect of serious attack from the North-West, it would be placed in a grave dilemma. Either its armies would have to force dangerous passes and advance far from their base in order to meet the enemy beyond the Indian frontiers, or they would have to run the political danger of allowing Indian soil to be invaded while they awaited attack, with a great river in their rear, attempting to guard a line a thousand miles long, open at points too numerous and far apart to be effectively defended.

Beyond these hills lay Afghanistan, a sort of Asiatic Switzerland, with fertile plains intersected by great masses of hills—easy to overrun but very difficult to hold, and very difficult to influence, although it was always threatened with dynastic upheavals and Persian intrigue.

Beyond Afghanistan again you come to the valleys of the Oxus and the Jaxartes, which flow North-West towards the Sea of Aral. The wide infertile plains, broken here and there by patches of cultivation where water is to be had, were inhabited by Turkoman tribes, as savage and fanatic as those of the Indian frontier, but yet more primitive, for they were still principally nomads. "A Turkoman on horseback knows neither father nor mother," said one proverb: "Where there is a city there are no wolves, where there are Turkomans there is no peace," said another. Here also were dismembered fragments of old empires—the khanates of Khiva, of Bokhara, of Samarqand—

once famous centres of Muslim learning and greatness. Liberal statesmen loved to describe how their misgovernment had turned once flourishing regions into sand and desert. But this was unjust. In no other part of the Islamic world were there so many schools, such troops of students. And their decay was due, not to the misconduct of their rulers, but to the inexorable processes of nature —the dessication of Central Asia.

Beyond these again lay the power of Russia. She was in many ways well formed for Asiatic conquest, alike in manners, organization, ideas, and policy. The Emperor in extent of power and mode of using it was indistinguishable from an Asiatic monarch ; in Russia, as in Moghul India, the great mass of society was divided between the village-community and the court-nobles ; the Orthodox ritual bore evident kinship to Eastern rites ; so that a Russian invader bore with him none of those startling contrasts in modes of thought and political ideas which marked the progress of the Englishman in the East.

(2) *The Afghan Succession.*—In Afghanistan was reigning Dost 'Ali who had been driven from his throne by Auckland and restored to it by Ellenborough. Since then the relations between Afghanistan and England had notably improved. A treaty of friendship had been made in 1855 ; and two years later help in arms and money had been given the Dost against Persia at the same time that an expedition under Outram was sent to the Persian Gulf. At last in 1863 Dost 'Ali died a few days after he had conquered Herat from the independent

chief who had held it. The Afghan succession was normally regulated by war. In the present case twelve out of the Amir's sixteen sons took part in the struggle which was prolonged and doubtful. For four years alternate princes divided in various proportions the provinces of Afghanistan, until at last in 1868 Sher 'Ali, the late Amir's third son and chosen heir, succeeded in slaying or driving away all his rivals, and established himself as Amir of all Afghanistan.

Every Afghan prince must needs share the primitive nature of his people, and indeed requires a vein of ferocity capable of daunting a singularly ferocious race. Sher 'Ali was no exception. In him the vein of ferocity lay very near the surface, and had been developed by the fraternal wars from which he had just emerged. On one occasion in 1865, when a rival brother had been killed in battle, he ordered his servants to "Cast away the body of this dog," and to summon his favourite son to offer his congratulations on the victory. Then, seeing another corpse being borne towards him, "Who is this other dog?" he asked. And when he saw it was the body of the son whose presence he had just demanded, he rent his clothes and cast dust upon his head. He was indeed a man destined to the sport of ironical circumstance, to be first rebuffed and then betrayed by the powers to whom he offered his alliance.

(3) *Masterly Inactivity.*—While all this was going forward the Indian Government had pursued that policy of drift which an imprudent admirer christened the "Policy of Masterly Inactivity"—a description

ironically adopted by its opponents. In 1862, when Dost 'Ali had attacked Herat, Lord Elgin wrote : " I am very much averse to any interference on our part in the quarrel which is now on foot in Afghanistan ; and indeed I do not very well see my way as to how such interference can be managed without entailing responsibilities which we may regret at a later period. . . . I own that I am strongly of opinion that our true policy is to leave these kinds of neighbours as much as possible alone. . . . We should only speak when we have a case of self-interest so clear that we can speak with determination, and follow up our talk if necessary with a blow." He therefore limited the expression of his displeasure to recalling our agent stationed at Kabul. This, he said, would commit us to nothing while sufficiently marking our disapproval. " It is very desirable," he added, " that we should be free to accept the *status in quo*, whatever it may be." But the measure had its disadvantages also. The Government of India became dependent on the gossip of the frontier bazaars for all its knowledge of what was going forward. Unable to forecast the probable event of the contest, it not imprudently clung to the strictest neutrality. In 1866 the decision was announced in the following words : " My Friend, the relations of this Government are with the actual rulers of Afghanistan. If Your Highness is able to consolidate Your Highness's power in Kabul, and is sincerely desirous of being a friend and ally of the British Government, I shall be ready to accept Your Highness as such." Accord-

ingly in the following year one brother was recognized as Amir of Kabul, and another of Herat; and when in 1868 Sher 'Ali was really undisputed master of the whole country, the Government of India lent him the support of its recognition, sent him money, and promised him more. The cynical policy of flying to the help of the victor had often been pursued with great success; but never before had it been announced as a principle of public conduct.

These proceedings, which are associated with the career of Lord Lawrence, were bitterly attacked and fiercely defended. The defence may briefly be stated as follows: That we were bound by treaty not to interfere; that every reasonable object was secured by doing nothing; and that interference would simply throw the Afghans into the arms of Persia or Russia. As against this it was urged with much force that abstention was not really practicable. Even Lawrence himself was prepared to intervene when there was a possibility of intervention by Persia or Russia. In 1867 the principal rivals both applied to Russia for help, and one made offers to Persia. On this news Lawrence considered that if there were any likelihood of Herat being delivered over to Persia, "we should openly assist the party at Kabul, if at the time being that party should appear to be in a condition likely, with such assistance, to hold its position." In 1868 he himself did interfere by the despatch of material aid to Sher 'Ali. Nor did it in any way secure our objects—if we really wanted a strong and friendly Afghanistan—to look on while rivals tore

their patrimony to pieces and contracted friendships with foreign powers in default of the aid which we refused, for the weaker side was sure to seek foreign aid, whether we interfered or not.

The blunt fact was that Lawrence, being unable to decide which horse would win, abstained from betting and denounced it as immoral. The real fault lay with his lack of information and lack of insight. His critics urged with force that he was a poor reader of the future ; and recalled how, on the day that the Sikhs crossed the Satlej, in December, 1845, he had recorded his opinion that they never would attack the British ; how sure in 1855 he had been that Persia would never attack Herat ; how confidently in 1857 he had anticipated no resistance at Delhi ; and how a little later he had been prepared to hand Peshawur over to Afghanistan.

(4) *The Russian Advance.*—Meanwhile the Russians had been steadily creeping towards the Northern Afghan frontier. In 1864 they touched the fringe of Khokand, Bokhara, and Khiva ; in 1866 they reduced Bokhara to the position of a tributary ally ; in 1867 they formed the new Russian province of Russian Turkestan, and moved their base forward a thousand miles from Orenburg to Tashkend ; in 1868 they swallowed Samarqand, and in 1872 they swallowed Khiva. There was no apparent reason why this process should stop before they reached the outposts of British India.

In that case they would have controlled the

entire trade of Central Asia, for the overland Indo-Persian trade passed by way of Herat. But more important than this was the ease with which such close contact would have enabled the Russians to influence British policy. A divergence of public interests in Europe would have been the sign for the despatch of Russian agents into India, to promote frontier troubles and tribal risings, and foment intrigues at the courts of Native states. In the event of war large detachments of the English army must have lain along the Indian frontier to await the coming of a foe who might invade in force or more probably attempt raids which if successful would throw India into confusion, disorganize the administration, and destroy the Government's prestige on which the quiet conduct of Indian affairs has always depended. As Lord Curzon remarked, Russia would be able to keep England quiet in Europe by finding occupation for her in Asia.

The Russian advance affords a striking illustration of the way in which public policy and individual ambition sometimes work together. Russian Turkestan was a military province, under the command of military officers under the control of the War Office. The Governors and their subordinates desired promotion, orders, and rewards, which they could secure by brilliant actions against the Turkoman tribes ; so that motives were never lacking for an advance. At the same time this military control enabled the Russian Foreign Office to deny, to delay, to explain away, to utilize such achievements, according to circumstances, in

a manner evidently prophetic of the Soviet Government and the Third International. '

About 1870 the political positions of the English and the Russian Governments in Central Asia were, as Rawlinson observed, strikingly similar. The extreme Russian military post, Samarqand, beyond the Jaxartes, corresponded with the extreme English military post, Peshawur, beyond the Indus; the allied state of Bokhara corresponded with the allied state of Afghanistan; and the first had semi-dependent neighbours on the north bank of the Oxus, while the latter had similar dependencies on the south bank of that river. The English therefore proposed that a neutral zone should be established between the two powers. This meant in effect the revival of the terms agreed on in 1844. The Emperor at once declared himself highly gratified; but his pleasure must have been due to a misapprehension, real or assumed. The Russian conception of a neutral zone had greatly changed since the Nesselrode memorandum had lapsed. The English proposed to neutralize the region lying on either side of the Oxus between Bokhara and Afghanistan; the Russians proposed Afghanistan itself. As this would have meant a retrocession on the part of England with further scope for advance on the part of Russia, the proposal bore no fruit save an illusory declaration on the part of Russia that Afghanistan lay outside the sphere of her influence.

Indeed the settlement of Anglo-Russian relations in Asia depended on the settlement of Anglo-Russian differences in Europe, a fact which Lawrence

overlooked in demanding that the Central Asian question should be settled in Europe, and which the Home Government overlooked in expecting its problems to be solved for it in India.

To what extent this Russian advance constituted a serious threat to India long remained a question of severe controversy. It still remains a question of much more than academic interest. Ever since the question first emerged, there have always been, and there are still, those who dwell on the greatness of Russian preparations which can have no other object, on the assemblage of their troops, the accumulation of their material of war ; while on the contrary others have urged the greatness of the distances to be traversed, the natural obstacles they offer, the enormous difficulties of the operations. But two things amid all these matters of uncertainty are fairly clear. One is that the belief in the reality of the Russian threat has been and still remains wide-spread. Half a century ago it was a common topic of conversation, as Frere observed, in every assemblage of chiefs from Tabriz to Peshawur ; and such speculations as these, whether well-founded or ill, have their influence and consequences. The other is that in 1860, as later, the Russian organization was scarcely adequate for any distant blow. Always mined (as Salisbury wrote) by revolution, always on the brink of bankruptcy, a campaign in Afghanistan was as likely to end in disaster as one in Manchuria. The Russians have never yet scored any great military success except against an invader in the heart of their country. With an unwarlike population, and corrupt officials,

they were not, and probably still are not, powerful in a military sense, but nevertheless a most dangerous enemy, in the way of stirring up discontent by intrigue at the courts of princes or propaganda among the body of the people.

CHAPTER V

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR

(1) *Alienation of Sher 'Ali.*—While the English Cabinet was making futile attempts to reach an understanding with Russia, the Government of India was making equally futile attempts to make friends with Sher 'Ali in Afghanistan. Between 1863 and 1876 the situation had in fact been transformed—Russia had advanced within striking distance of the Amir, and the Amir had slipped through our fingers. We have seen how the proceedings of Lawrence during the Afghan struggle for succession could scarcely have predisposed the new Amir to view our conduct with favour. The acutest Afghan observer of these events preferred seeking shelter with the Russians when he was driven out of Afghanistan, for, as he said: "I had never seen the benefit of English friendship." Sher 'Ali himself declared that the English had looked to nothing but their own interests. "Whose-soever side they see strongest for the time being," said he, "they turn to him as their friend." It was the Afghan translation of Lawrence's letters and despatches. But once Sher 'Ali had established himself, numerous attempts were made to secure

his goodwill. Lawrence gave him a subsidy; Mayo continued the subsidy and gave him a meeting at Ambala.

The meeting at Ambala in 1869 is usually represented as having won over Sher 'Ali to our side, at all events for the moment. But oriental potentates are usually hard to judge; and it is possible that Sher 'Ali was less pleased than he was believed to be, and thought he had secured more than was intended. He had been disposed, in his fear of Russian aggression, to admit British officers to parts of Afghanistan, though not into Kabul; and he had asked for two promises—one that the Government of India would recognize no other person as Amir, and the other that they would help him in case of any foreign —i.e., Russian—attack. What he got was a letter which was intended to quiet his apprehensions without going to these lengths. It declared that the attempts of any rivals would be viewed "with severe displeasure" and that Government would endeavour to strengthen the Amir's position. This letter was drafted in English, but it had to be translated into the diplomatic language of Afghanistan—into Persian. Now in Persian, words are very apt to carry a somewhat vague and ill-defined significance; and it is hard to be plain without at the same time being discourteous. It is therefore better adapted for a diplomacy where the negotiators are bent on overreaching each other than where they desire to formulate a document which can be strictly interpreted according to European diplomatic usage. It is likely that the Persian version of Mayo's letter

was capable of a wider interpretation than had been intended.

The Russian occupation of Khiva in 1872 renewed the Amir's alarm, and in the following year he sent one of his ministers to Simla to secure an unequivocal guarantee against Russian attack. Lord Northbrook was in favour of giving this, on the condition of the Amir's binding himself to follow our advice ; but the English Cabinet refused. At that time Mr. Gladstone was Prime Minister, and the Duke of Argyll Secretary of State for India. They were not prepared to go so far. Inspired by Lawrence they replied that there was no need for any formal guarantee, but that Sher 'Ali might be told we would abide by our settled policy. Sher 'Ali must be forgiven if he reflected that this settled policy was to decline help until it was no longer needed.

About the same time other causes of offence arose. The English were so ill-advised as to arbitrate between Afghanistan and Persia in the matter of their boundaries in Seistan. This was undertaken with the excellent design of bringing about peace between two neighbours ; but the result of the arbitration was to convince Sher 'Ali that he could not expect partiality from the British. Then Northbrook sent a letter and presents direct to the chief of Wakhan instead of through the medium of the Amir. This was not, of course, so intended, but it bore a strong appearance of a desire to withdraw the chief from his dependence on Afghanistan. Again the same Viceroy addressed a letter to Sher 'Ali on behalf of the son, Yakub, whom he had

imprisoned ; it was interpreted as showing a desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Worst of all, when Sher 'Ali announced his son 'Abdullah Jan as his chosen heir, Northbrook refused to recognize him as such. And the answer was "designedly couched," as the Viceroy wrote, "as nearly as circumstances admit in the same language as that in which in 1858 the Punjab Government were instructed to reply to the letter from Dost Mahomed Khan intimating the selection of Shere 'Ali as heir apparent." The Amir was not unlikely to understand the identity of language as covering an identity of intention, and signifying that 'Abdullah Jan would receive no more assistance from the English in securing his succession to the throne of Afghanistan than he himself had. All these things were done with the best intentions in the world ; but good intentions are no satisfactory substitute for intelligence.

Meanwhile the Russian authorities had been displaying a much more accurate sense of the situation. They had admitted that Afghanistan was beyond their sphere of influence, but that had not prevented the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan from opening a correspondence with the Amir. In 1870 General Kaufmann wrote to say that 'Abd-ur-rahman, the Amir's nephew, who had taken refuge at Tashkend, would not receive any assistance against the Amir. Sher 'Ali was at first not a little perturbed by receiving such a letter from those he had ever regarded as enemies. He sent it to India for translation and advice. Mayo, however, assured him that such letters

rightly viewed were a source of satisfaction and confidence. Other letters followed, also submitted to the Government of India until Northbrook informed the Amir that he did not share the other's dissatisfaction at their growing frequency. After this there were no more references. In 1874, when Northbrook refused to recognize 'Abdullah Jan as heir, Kaufmann did so at once. When the Duke of Edinburgh married a Russian princess, Kaufmann seized the occasion to dwell on this alliance between the two Royal Families, and declare that it would strengthen and confirm the friendship between the Emperor and the Amir. In 1875 not only was there a frequent exchange of letters, but also agents began to appear; and it was stated that during that year there was always some agent at Kabul recognized by the Amir as an agent of Russia. When the British Ambassador remonstrated at St. Petersburg, he was encountered first with blank denials, and then with excuses—the letters were not letters of business, but merely letters of compliment. What, one wonders, would St. Petersburg have thought of letters of compliment exchanged between the Governor-General of India and the Khan of Bokhara?

In Europe indeed more than one attempt had been made to reach an understanding; but they had all been unfortunate. For instance, in 1873, Count Schuvaloff, a prominent advocate of friendship between the two powers, visited England with special assurances from the Emperor that he was not going to retain possession of Khiva; it became a Russian province under the thinnest of disguises.

In 1874 the Foreign Minister declared that the Emperor had forbidden in the most peremptory terms any enterprise directed against the Tekke Turkomans ; but in the same year was constituted a trans-Caspian Government under General Lomakin who busied himself with intrigue among the Turkoman tribes, and of whom the English Government were induced to complain.

Perhaps the most curious and illuminating of the diplomatic conversations of this period was that which took place between Lytton and Schuvaloff, just before the former's departure to take up office as Viceroy. Schuvaloff dwelt upon the advantages that would result from direct communication between the Governors-General of Russian Turkestan and British India, and from the development of a friendlier spirit between the two powers, who, if united, could easily crush their Muslim enemies. The real foe of both Russia and England, he declared, was Islam. In summing up his conclusions to Salisbury, Lytton wrote : " The Russian Government has established those means of direct, convenient and safe communication which Sher 'Ali refuses to us, and which we are afraid of proposing to him, although we openly subsidize His Highness. At the same time the Russian Chancellor holds us responsible as a matter of course for the exercise of an authority over the Amir which we neither possess nor know how to acquire." Affairs were evidently moving towards a crisis. Both sides were convinced that the other sooner or later would attempt to absorb Afghanistan, and both sides were resolved not to be caught napping.

(2) *The European Crisis.*—All this Russian activity in Afghanistan was in the first instance an intelligent anticipation of a future when the friendship of Sher 'Ali might be worth having. But it soon assumed a much more serious aspect, for circumstances began to arise in Europe which at one time threatened to create the very situation contemplated. In 1875 the troubles long brewing between the Sultan and his Christian subjects produced the rebellion of Bosnia and Hertzgovina. On May 13th, 1876, Russia and Germany signed the Berlin Memorandum proposing common intervention by the European powers. The Conservatives had then come into office in England; Disraeli refused to accept the Berlin Memorandum, so this project for settling the Near Eastern question came to nothing. As the situation developed it became more threatening, and at one time in the following autumn the Cabinet thought it was within three weeks of a declaration of war. However, that crisis passed, and a new attempt was made at the close of the year, when Lord Salisbury (who had quitted the India Office for the Foreign Office) went to Constantinople, where, after conferring with the Russian Ambassador, he came to an agreement, which this time the Turks refused to accept. This Salisbury thought a great pity, from the Indian point of view, for at the moment the Russians seemed disposed to concede the point for which we had long striven. "I was proceeding," he writes, "on these bases—abandonment of all claim to political influence in Kashgar, promise on both sides not to communicate without

leave with Bockara on the one hand and Kabul on the other—neutralization of Merve with regulated systems of chastisement of Turkomans when necessary. . . . If peace could have been made here (he concludes), I think the Emperor would have been very anxious to make everything secure by settling all difficulties on our Indian frontier." But it was not to be; and on the breakdown of negotiations the Russians prepared for separate action. War followed on May 21st, 1877, between Russia and Turkey; the Russian successes aroused the liveliest fears in London for the fate of Constantinople; and whatever division of opinion might exist as to the degree of danger involved in the Russian advance in Central Asia, it was universally agreed that Constantinople in Russian hands would give that power predominance in the Eastern Mediterranean, and so command over the shortest sea-route to India, Australia and the Far East. As Bismarck truly said, the Suez Canal was the neck of the British Empire. A vote of six millions was obtained, a fleet was sent to Constantinople, and Indian troops brought to Malta. When Russia forced upon the Turks the Treaty of San Stephano the British Government issued a circular criticizing its terms. But now the tone of the English Cabinet was much more pacific than it had been in 1876. It was agreed on May 30th, 1878, to refer the matter to a European conference. The Congress of Berlin accordingly sat from June 13th to July 13th, and at last achieved a temporary solution of the European question.

(3) *The Forward Policy.*—Thus from 1875 down

to the middle of 1878 Anglo-Russian relations were in a progressive state of tension. The Russians were naturally anxious to secure the best possible position for either putting pressure on or engaging in actual hostilities against England. Kaufmann's activities in Afghanistan had been based at first on an intelligent anticipation, and later on the evident possibility of war.

Meanwhile the English had been busily considering how best to counteract the Russian moves. At this time the Indian Government had an Indian agent at Kabul, but nowhere else; his reports to the Indian Government on the one hand and his representations to the Amir on the other, did not seem satisfactory to Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India in 1875. His reports neither confirmed nor denied various information from other Central Asian sources; and although the Secretary of State was strongly disposed to make little of the danger of a Russian invasion of India, he was exceedingly anxious to have full and early accounts of Afghan affairs. The evil, he wrote, was not merely formal; it placed "upon our frontier a thick covert behind which any amount of hostile intrigue and conspiracy might be masked." He regarded the danger as likely to take one of three forms. Either the Russians might secure an ascendancy over the Amir, or internal disorder—never very remote in Afghanistan—might enable the Russians to establish an influence over successful and rebellious chiefs, or the Afghans might come into collision with the frontier forces of Russia. Of these the last two he reckoned as very possible

indeed ; and in any of these cases early information was a matter of great importance. "The case is quite conceivable in which Her Majesty's Government may be able by early diplomatic action to arrest proceedings which a few weeks or even days later will have passed beyond the power of even the Government of St. Petersburg to control." Therefore, he argued, the Government should take immediate steps to secure the reception by the Amir of a British agent to be stationed preferably at Herat, and to serve as the channel of speedy and accurate information.

The proposal evoked much opposition in India. Lord Northbrook and most of his Council considered—quite rightly as the event showed—that such proposals were certain of rejection and should not be made. But if in this respect they proved wiser than the Secretary of State, they ignored, as men usually will ignore, the inconvenient fact that this situation had been brought about by the clumsy and unintelligent way in which they and their predecessors had handled the matter. It was, as Lytton said with much truth, not a question of letting well alone, but of letting bad alone. Lord Salisbury insisted on his view being adopted ; Lord Northbrook came home for the benefit of his health ; and Lord Lytton was sent out expressly to carry into effect the foreign policy of the Home Government. It was the first emergent instance of the transfer of power brought about by the Red Sea cable.

The new Government was authorized to offer terms which Sher 'Ali had formerly showed to be

dear in his eyes. His subsidy was to be increased, 'Abdullah Jan recognized as his heir, and his territory guaranteed against foreign attack, if only he would accept the proffered envoy. Had such an offer only been made earlier, it would almost certainly have been accepted. It conceded the essential demands made at the Simla Conference in 1873, and it avoided two of the blunders which in the time of Northbrook had raised Sher 'Ali's anger. But it was now too late. Sher 'Ali declined, declaring that the English were already bound to protect him against Russia, and that if he accepted an English envoy, he would have to accept a Russian too. A conference between one of his Ministers and the British Commissioner of Peshawur came to nothing. Either the Amir was already leaning to the Russian side, or the developing situation in Europe, with its latent possibility of an Anglo-Russian war, disposed him to imitate Lawrence's behaviour during his own dynastic struggle, and to wait and see. He forgot how great dexterity is needed to maintain that attitude in the face of stronger and resolute powers; and indeed the Government of India had hitherto shown few signs of resolution.

(4) *Quetta.*—The attempts to negotiate with the Afghans thus failed; but, even if Government could do nothing there, there was still no obstacle to action on the frontier. The weakness of the position was that Government's authority ceased at the entrance to all the passes. This situation at all events was to be brought to a close.

Quetta, it will be remembered, stands between

the Bolan and the Kohjak Passes, which lead into the open country south of Qandahar. It possesses two great features of importance. It blocks one of the two main avenues into India, and it offers an easy advance on to the flank of an attack proceeding by the Khyber, the other main gate of the North-West frontier. It was in the possession of the Khan of Khelat, a chieftain who, by the treaty of 1854, had agreed to allow the British to place cantonments in his country when and where they deemed necessary. As the Afghan situation developed, more and more attention was paid to Quetta. Its occupation had been strongly urged by General John Jacob—the eponym of Jacobabad—in 1856. Ten years later the idea had been revived by Sir Bartle Frere, and rejected byLawrence. Ten years later still it was accepted by Salisbury and Lytton, as a countercheck to Russian movements and a warning to Sher 'Ali that the Government of India if not regarded as a friend, might act as an enemy. The occupation was bitterly opposed by the Council of India. The more excitable members inflicted long visits on the Secretary of State and positively stamped about the room in their endeavours to dissuade him. But their teeth had long been drawn. The occupation was ordered and executed. Lord Salisbury regarded it as "the father of the Central Asian Mission of the future." The English agent there was intended to collect information, and if need were to try conclusions with English rupees against Russian roubles in the diwan and zanana.

As against this view it was declared that the

occupation of Quetta was a plain threat to the Amir, and that it would infallibly throw him into the arms of Russia. When the Afghan war actually broke out, the friends of Lawrence and the political opponents of Lytton and Salisbury would have been more than human had they not joined in a chorus of "I told you so." The historian, however, may take a quieter view. He will remember that the situation in the Near East was in no way affected by the occupation of Quetta, and that the Afghan war really sprang out of the clash of interests—real or supposed—of the English and the Russians at Constantinople.

(5) *The Russian Mission.*—In the course of the diplomatic struggle in Europe, the attitude of the two powers chiefly concerned had undergone a marked revolution. At first the English were the more bellicose. As we have seen, in the autumn of 1876 the Cabinet thought itself within three weeks of war, and enquired of Lytton whether in that case he could undertake a campaign in Central Asia. Contrary to the opinions of the Indian Commander-in-Chief and the Military Member, the Viceroy contemplated a move "from Peshawur to Balk straight upon Tashkend." But it was not this that led to war with Sher 'Ali. So long as war with Russia continued likely, hostilities with Afghanistan were the last thing Lytton wished for. "An Afghan war," he wrote, "is precisely what Russia would wish to see us engaged in, and . . . by engaging in it we should only be playing her game for her." Moreover, in 1877 the English attitude became much more peaceable. Even when the

likelihood of an attack by Russia on Turkey became apparent, and it was thought that the Russians would proceed along the Asiatic rather than the European side of the Black Sea, this fact was not allowed to constitute an argument for war. It did not really matter to us, Salisbury wrote, whether Erzerum or Kizil Arvat were held by Hottentots or Esquimaux. In 1877 the only contingency on that side which the Cabinet regarded as requiring action in Central Asia was the case of the Russians occupying Merv ; this was to be countered by an advance to Qandahar or Herat. But the case did not arise ; and the crisis of 1878 was produced by the threat to Constantinople, not to India. This time it was the Russians who prepared to support their designs in Europe by action in the Middle East. When therefore in the early summer of 1878, English and Russian relations were almost at breaking point, when the British flag in the Golden Horn defied the Russians to advance, and when the armies of the Queen were assembling to meet them if they did, Sher 'Ali, possibly much against his will, received that Russian mission fear of which he had used as an excuse for not receiving an envoy of the Government of India. The Russian War Office prepared its rejoinder to the movement of the English fleets and the assemblage of British troops. From Tashkend there marched one column of 20,000 men towards the Afghan frontier, and another towards the Pamirs and Kashmir. At the same time, and on the very day that the Congress of Berlin met, Colonel Stolietoff was despatched to Kabul bearing a letter

from Kaufmann. "Be it known to you," wrote the Governor-General to the Amir, "that in these days the relations between the British Government and ours with regard to your kingdom require deep consideration. As I am unable to communicate my opinion verbally to you, I have deputed my agent, Major-General Stolietoff. . . . He will inform you of all that is hidden in my mind. I hope you will . . . believe him as you would myself." It was the regular Eastern gambit in the game of intrigue.

This was in exact accordance with the plan formulated by Skobeleff in the previous year. In the first place the Amir was to be won over or replaced by his nephew 'Abd-ur-rahman, then a refugee at Tashkend, and whom Kaufmann did actually invite to accompany the Russian columns. The invading forces would halt at Kabul, and there organize (in Skobeleff's words) "masses of Asiatic cavalry which to a cry of blood and booty might be launched into India as a vanguard, thus renewing the times of Timur. . . ."

While then the statesmen of Europe were reluctantly coming to a settlement at Berlin, the Russians were actively preparing for the event of war. It is very possible that Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, acted on instructions in which the Russian Foreign Office had little share; and indeed Russian policy in Europe and Asia at that moment betrayed the same lack of co-ordination as our own was to do in the following months. The envoy, Stolietoff, proceeded to Kabul, which he reached on July 22nd, brushing aside the half-hearted protests of Sher 'Ali, and at Kabul he

negotiated a treaty to which the Amir refers as follows in a letter which on August 23rd, he addressed to Kaufmann : ". . . He (Stolietoff) has reduced to writing the verbal representations the object of which was to strengthen the friendly relations between the illustrious Government of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and the God-granted Government of Afghanistan, and made it over to me." He seems to have received a guarantee against foreign attack, but not to have been asked to participate in the projected attack on India, because in the interval between the envoy's despatch and his entrance into Kabul, the latter had received orders from Tashkend not to go so far in his promises and measures as had been originally intended. Could Kaufmann have foreseen the issue of the Berlin Congress, he would no doubt, never have sent Stolietoff. Luck, indeed, ran against the Russians at this time. The envoy once on Afghan soil could not be recalled without visible humiliation ; but once there his promises, moderated as they were, encouraged Sher 'Ali to reject the English overtures ; and so a prince who had been alienated from the English by their own errors was at a moment when help was impossible, brought into conflict with them by the errors of the Russians.

(6) *The Chamberlain Mission.*—Now, if ever, was the time for bringing Afghanistan to book, when the European crisis was past, when Russia no longer desired to see English resources involved in an Afghan war, when Russian help was no longer available for Sher 'Ali, when he might be taught

how far he could rely upon Russian promises, and when the Russians themselves had provided an excellent excuse, for the Stolietoff mission had cut away Sher 'Ali's ground for declining to receive an English envoy. Lytton, with the approval of the Home authorities, at once repeated the former demand. His letter reached Kabul on August 17th, the day on which died the Amir's favourite son, 'Abdullah Jan. This event was seized on as a pretext for putting off the answer. But Stolietoff was still in Kabul; and the paternal grief which delayed the answer to Lord Lytton did not preclude the Amir from conferring in Durbar with the Russian envoy. Yakub afterwards informed Roberts that Stolietoff with great unwisdom urged the Amir to do everything in his power to keep the proposed mission at a distance, while he himself proceeded to Tashkend to secure official intervention by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. Thus encouraged Sher 'Ali returned no answer. In order to bring matters to a definite issue Lytton sent Neville Chamberlain with a small escort through the Khyber. He was stopped at 'Ali Masjid. Sher 'Ali had acted on Stolietoff's advice; and, as Lytton said, it was no longer possible to describe him as an honoured but capricious friend.

In the long tangle of error and miscalculation which makes up the history of the Central Asia question, either Lytton or Kaufmann has usually been chosen out as the villain of the piece. Both blundered; but both blundered because their instructions did not sufficiently represent the European situation, and the swift changes of

European policy. Lytton's main mistake lay in sending Chamberlain with a small escort into the Khyber, where he was likely to be opposed, instead of with a large one from Quetta, whence he could much more easily have circumvented opposition; and the Viceroy made the further error of taking diplomatic action before he was ready to support his policy by force. Competent observers thought that Chamberlain's mission would have had much more chance of being received if it had been supported by an assemblage of troops on the frontier than it had when backed only by moral influences. Sher 'Ali was misled by the apparent absence of preparation to compel compliance; and the English Cabinet had, it seems, taken it for granted that the mission would be accompanied by an effective force.

The net result was a situation which the English Cabinet found vastly embarrassing. Their foreign policy had on the whole been very unpopular. Public feeling had been roused to a great pitch of indignation at the idea of supporting the Turks, guilty of Bulgarian atrocities; and Mr. Gladstone's moral fervour had enabled him fully to exploit this vein of sentiment. Beaconsfield and Salisbury had indeed succeeded in avoiding the war that at one moment had seemed so likely, both in London and St. Petersburg, in Tashkend and Calcutta; but the Russians still had not evacuated the Balkans, in accordance with the Treaty of Berlin, and it was most inconvenient to see another war looming up in so sensitive a region as Central Asia. Both Beaconsfield and Salisbury felt this strongly. Both would have been satisfied for the moment with the

Russian explanation that the Stolietoff mission had been a measure only adopted on the near view of war, and both were highly indignant with Lytton for sending his envoy before the discussions still proceeding with Russia had been completed. Indeed, Beaconsfield in a later conversation with Count Schuvaloff, informed him that he had wished to temporize with Sher 'Ali, but that his hand had been forced "by the inopportune haste of the Indian Government." The remark made future answer more difficult to the point which the Russians had always put forward in defence of their own indiscretions—that they were the unauthorized actions of local officials.

(7) *The War.*—Meanwhile Lytton assembled troops and recommended action. Long and stormy meetings of the Cabinet took place on October 25th and 30th. Lord Cairns and others objected that they could see no *casus belli*. Lord Salisbury complained that Lytton was forcing Government's hand. Beaconsfield proposed a plan that had been suggested to him by Salisbury, namely, the occupation of the Khurram Valley, as a "material guarantee," not as an act of war, which would have required the immediate assemblage of Parliament. This plan would perhaps have been adopted, but for the Secretary of State for India, Lord Cranbrook, who declared that this proposal would look more like timidity than moderation, that war was inevitable, that it would be best to meet it without delay, and that he would not take the responsibility for any other course. This declaration carried the Cabinet, not so much because Lord Cranbrook

was indispensable, but because his resignation would produce a bad effect outside and betray dissensions in a Government already uncertain of popular support. It was therefore decided to strengthen the English position by giving the Amir one more chance. Accordingly, in a letter dated November 2nd, Lytton demanded an apology and an answer accepting the proposed mission by the 20th. No answer came; and two British columns entered Afghanistan by the Khurram and the Kohjak Passes.

All this time Sher 'Ali had been waiting for the expected Russian help. At last, in October, he addressed a letter to Kaufmann enclosing another for the Emperor pointing out what was in fact the case, that the growth of friendly relations between Afghanistan and Russia had angered the English, and that since the Russian Mission had "strung the pearls of friendly sentiments on the thread of statement" they had become more hostile than ever, and at last were attacking him. Kaufmann replied that Sher 'Ali had better make the best terms he could. The letter, so different in tone from what he had hoped, reached Sher 'Ali shortly before the English ultimatum expired; but annoyance only led him to address Lytton in a tone of complaint. He was now to pay the penalty for the miscalculations of the Russian War Office, and its anxiety to have all things ready to move the instant the diplomatists asked for their passports.

The campaign, which opened in November, 1878, was short and brilliant. Roberts forced the Khurram Pass; Stewart occupied Qandahar;

Sher 'Ali fled into Turkestan and died; his son, Yakub, opened negotiations; and on May 26th, 1879, was signed the Treaty of Gandamak, which placed Afghan foreign relations under British control, admitted a British envoy to Kabul, and assigned to the British the district of Pishin as a bridgehead beyond the passes in consideration of a subsidy of six lakhs a year. The English seemed to have secured all they had desired. The peace was as moderate as the war had been successful. The Cabinet was delighted. Even Salisbury, who had been Lytton's severest critic, declared that his conduct had much facilitated the negotiations with Russia. Soldiers, however, doubted whether these negotiations had not been premature, and whether the Afghans really felt that they had been beaten. If that were so, the more brilliant the treaty, the less likely its faithful observance; and the choice of Kabul as the residence of the English agent was dubious and ill-omened. Lytton had intended to propose some other place, such as Herat; but when Yakub himself expressly chose Kabul, no satisfactory ground was discovered for opposing his wishes.

In itself the settlement was good and might perhaps have proved permanent but for the personal qualities of the Amir and the envoy. They were not the right men for their respective posts. Yakub had made some military reputation for himself by his defence of Herat during the wars of Sher 'Ali. But those who met him regarded him as shifty, unstable, lacking in character. "Sometimes," wrote Cavagnari, who had negotiated the treaty,

"I fancy that his intellect is weak, and he certainly is of a changeable temperament. . . . Some of [his] proposals indicate such a want of knowledge of state business that it is impossible not to feel anxious about his ability to manage the affairs of his kingdom in future." The defects of the envoy, Major Cavagnari, were just the opposite. He was a clever, energetic, imperious man, more fitted for war than diplomacy, more likely to do well in a position requiring action than in one demanding a high degree of tact and delicacy.

He reached Kabul on July 24th, 1879, and was well received; the Amir's band even tried to play "God save the Queen." But he soon found himself regarded with suspicion. Yakub feared he would intrigue with the discontented nobles of whom there were plenty. Visitors to the Embassy were discouraged. The Afghan guard had orders to report the names of all who went thither. The envoy procured its removal, and urged Lytton to sanction the establishment of a dispensary, which would afford a decent excuse for those who came to see him. His activity led him to dictate, or at all events to appear to dictate, to the Amir. Early on September 3rd he was massacred by riotous troops. The degree of Yakub's complicity was never ascertained; the Amir can neither be acquitted of complicity nor convicted of design; but if it was not he who brought about the murder in quick disgust at the situation in which he found himself, it was instigated by dynastic enemies eager to see him hopelessly embroiled with his English protectors.

This disaster threw Afghan affairs once more into confusion. "The web of policy," wrote Lytton, "has been rudely shattered." Roberts once more marched to Kabul at the head of his troops and maintained himself there, despite Afghan attacks; and in June of the next year he effected his famous march to relieve Qandahar, thought to be endangered by the disaster of Maiwand. But though British military predominance was thus maintained, it seemed that the policy of Gandamak must be abandoned. Lytton had hoped to consolidate Afghanistan under an Amir strong in British support; Yakub had failed; and there was at the moment no other eligible candidate. The alternative policy was that of disintegration. The region in which we were most interested was Qandahar, control of which meant at all times easy access to the Hindu Kush and its passes along the line of the Helmund. It was decided, therefore, to recognize a chief who seemed to have some prospect of establishing himself at Qandahar, and to support him by establishing a cantonment at Pishin.

(8) *The Settlement with 'Abd-ur-rahman.*—However, after this decision had been taken, but before Roberts' march to Qandahar, there returned to Afghanistan Sher 'Ali's long-exiled nephew, 'Abd-ur-rahman. He was at this time about 40; and as a young man he had taken an active though thankless part in the dynastic wars of 1864-68. He was decidedly the most able man whom the Barukzai family had produced since Dost 'Ali. Throughout his long exile of twelve years he had from his residence at Samarqand kept a close watch on the

progress of Afghan affairs. In 1878 Kaufmann had meant to establish him as Amir in case Sher 'Ali proved intractable; and now, after the ruin of his plans, the Russian Governor-General saw no better scheme than to allow the refugee's return. Accordingly 'Abd-ur-rahman borrowed 2,000 sovereigns, bought 100 horses, and set out on a Friday. The day after he was favoured with a sign. As he rode along, he heard the sound of a multitude of horsemen following him, who presently joined his ranks and then passed on ahead. "By this," he said, "I reasoned that God had cleared my way for me," and would either overthrow the English or turn their hearts. He quickly got into touch with the English authorities, and was negotiating for his recognition as Amir when Lytton was replaced by a new Viceroy.

The Beaconsfield Government had fallen on April 28th, 1880; and Cranbrook and Lytton had been replaced by Hartington as Secretary of State and Ripon as Viceroy. The change had turned much on foreign policy. On reaching India Ripon ransacked the records of his predecessor in the hope of finding something discreditable; he believed Lytton had been sent out with the deliberate intention of annexing Afghanistan; nothing was too wild for him to credit; but his own policy was such as Lytton himself would have recommended. He came to terms with 'Abd-ur-rahman; he secured control of the foreign relations of Afghanistan; he retained Pishin. It is true that he abandoned the demand for a British envoy, but the control of foreign relations made that the

less necessary. Ripon's own party was loud in denunciation. The Queen's Speech in 1881 formally announced the speedy retrocession of Pishin. But Ripon was able to persuade the Secretary of State of the need of keeping it. Like Lytton, he held that it was necessary to be able either to support or control the Amir; like Lytton he held that a strong position at Pishin was the best vantage-ground from which the observance and maintenance of any treaty with the Amir could be secured; and that the abandonment of Pishin would in all probability be followed in ten years' time by another Afghan war. He even gave a strong hint that he would rather resign his office than overrule his Council in such a cause. At last, therefore, the matter was quietly dropped.

The Second Afghan War has frequently been condemned as a war of aggression, and as a war that failed of its object. But as we recede from party strife and the desirability of a party triumph, it becomes possible to survey the matter more judicially than either Gladstone or Beaconsfield could do. It was clearly a war to which many had contributed. As a background we have the anxiety of both England and Russia for predominance in Afghanistan, based in England on Imperial, in Russia on European considerations. We have Lawrence and Northbrook making little of that anxiety, and directing their policy as though the conditions were those of the previous century; we have Kaufmann eagerly taking advantage of the opening offered; we have Salisbury and Lytton striving to recover the lost ground. All this evidently

pointed to a time when a crisis in Europe would cause more active Russian interference, and when England would have to fight unless she was content to see Afghanistan fall into the condition of Bokhara and Khiva. Nor was the war fruitless, though it was marked by misfortune. The Russianized Amir was expelled ; the new Amir had lived long enough in Turkestan to have learnt to prefer his less active neighbour ; further, the war indicated what should never have been in doubt, that there were limits to our patience ; and it secured the Afghan alliance for more than a generation.

CHAPTER VI

THE REVOLUTION OF ALLIANCES

THE later history of Indian foreign policy is much more complicated than the episodes which we have hitherto been considering, and reflects more closely than ever the European political situation. Until the Second Afghan War Russia was the antagonist on whom our eyes were fixed; but in the 'eighties France, under the restless guidance of Jules Ferry, resumed for a while her ancient rôle of rival in the colonial world, while German ambitions too, made themselves felt, though, so far as India was concerned, rather through their influence on Russian and French and Turkish policy than as a direct force. The Government of India thus was compelled to look to the safety not only of the North-West frontier towards Afghanistan, but also to that of the South-East towards Burma and Indo-China, and to that of the North towards Tibet, until in the early years of the 20th century, England, France and Russia agreed to sink their remoter differences in preparation for the struggle of 1914. So that, though the ensuing years down to the outbreak of the Anglo-German war were characterized by a lull not unlike that which followed on the Afghan War of 1839, they formed but a preparatory

period for the threat of Germany in Europe and of Pan-Islam in Asia.

The events of the period from 1880 to 1918 group themselves round four major episodes. The first series includes the events in Central Asia leading up to the Panjdeh crisis, and the delimitation of the Russo-Afghan frontier; the second, the growth of Anglo-French dissensions leading to the annexation of Upper Burma; the third, the resumption of the forward policy on the North and North-West leading to the Tibet expedition; and the fourth, the resolution of these particular difficulties, first by an understanding with France, and then by an understanding with Russia, but involving the appearance of another source of external danger.

1. *The European Situation.*—The first two of these series of events were almost simultaneous, and in part related, for the crisis in each developed out of European rather than Asiatic causes. At this time Europe was peculiarly full of cross-currents. Germany was uncertain of the friendship of Austria, and certain of the hostility of France; while both France and Germany were eager to secure as much of Africa as possible, and Germany was casting covetous eyes over the Pacific, so that England, already at feud with Russia over Constantinople and Central Asia, found herself involved in difficulties with the other two great European powers as well. Of the three opponents, the most astute was Germany, under the masterful control of Bismarck; and although he valued colonies lighter than the bones of a single Pomeranian

grenadier, he had no scruples in encouraging both France and Russia to keep England busy so as to secure greater freedom of action for himself. France under Jules Ferry needed little encouragement; and Russia was reassured as to her European frontiers by the secret treaty concluded with Bismarck in 1884, while British policy was embarrassed by emergent questions in New Guinea, at Angra Pequena, in Madagascar, and above all in Egypt, where it had to encounter not only French counteraction, but also the formidable Mahdist movement. These circumstances formed the background alike of the events leading to the Panjdeh crisis, and of those leading to the Third Burmese War.

2. *Merv.*—In Central Asia the Russians were acutely conscious of the set-back they had received owing to the precipitancy of Stolietoff's negotiations at Kabul with their promises or understandings that could not be fulfilled; and the Government at Tashkend continued to increase its expenditure, and to push forward its frontiers until at last it began to encroach on what had till then been regarded as Afghan territory. The method of progress continued to be the same as before. Russian measures always professed to be inspired by the need of protecting and developing trade, although the Government of Turkestan was purely military, and though Russian generals were never distinguished for their interest in commerce; and their advances were always due to pure accident, always unforeseen by those who carried them into effect, always explicable as the natural result of

the neighbourhood of nomadic tribes, and the consequent impossibility of a fixed frontier, always innocent of political motive though usually coinciding with a political crisis.

The occupation of Merv notably illustrates these peculiar features. Merv is an oasis lying some hundred and fifty miles south-west of the Oxus, and about the same distance from the Zulfiqar Pass on the way to Herat. In former days it had been a place of importance, where Alp Arslan had set up his capital and Jenghiz Khan had pillaged. The dessication of Central Asia had diminished its extent and fertility, but it was generally regarded as a stage on the way towards Herat, therefore still deemed of great political importance. The English made more than one representation on the subject at St. Petersburg; and the Russians gave more than one assurance. In 1881, Sir Charles Dilke announced that Kaufmann had been replaced as Governor-General of Turkestan by a less progressive general; and in the following year De Giers assured the British Ambassador that Russia had no intention whatever at present of advancing towards Sarakhs or Merv. "... The influence of Russia was entirely devoted," he said, "to the establishment of a firm and permanent peace in that region." However, in curious contradiction to the statements of the Russian Foreign Office, the authorities of Tashkend were already in communication with the chiefs of Merv. On December 22nd, 1881, had been signed a treaty by which Persia handed over to Russian control territory lying westward of the oasis, which thus was threat-

ened with encirclement ; and at the very moment of De Giers' assurances, a Russian agent, Alikanoff, was at Merv, with a merchant's caravan conducting secret negotiations. In 1884, when Sudan affairs were attracting great attention and the treaty with Germany had been signed, His Imperial Majesty resolved to accept the allegiance which the chiefs of Merv were said to have offered him. The offer was described as unsolicited ; and the whole business as an act of the local administration brought about by circumstances without any political premeditation. Gladstone's Government protested. It felt that these overmastering circumstances must have been brought about by the local administration. But its protests met the fate that empty protests have always encountered. In Lord Curzon's words, "The flame of diplomatic protest blazed fiercely forth in England, but after a momentary combustion was, as usual, extinguished by a flood of excuses from the inexhaustible reservoirs of the Neva." When the Russian War Office produced a map showing the Russian frontier in close proximity to Herat, the Russian Foreign Office surpassed itself in innocent disclaimers.

3. *Panjdeh.*—However, our anxiety and representations about Central Asia were not wholly fruitless, though in truth the fruit was small and sour. Ripon as Governor-General had urged on the Cabinet the importance of obtaining a formal treaty with Russia securing Afghanistan from the influence of its intrigues. The Cabinet did not agree, probably because it recognized the difficulty of composing English and Russian policy in

Europe, and suggested as an alternative encouraging Persia to occupy Merv. Ripon had small difficulty in showing that this expedient was worthless. Hartington rejoined from the India Office, then why not occupy and fortify Herat ourselves? It is not a little curious to find such a proposal flowing from the pen of a statesman who, if he had found a letter of Lytton's advocating such a course, would have demanded the head of that unfortunate Viceroy on a charger. Hartington himself realized the inconsistency, and hastily withdrew his proposal by the next mail; but in the end the discussions led to conversations between Granville, the Foreign Secretary, and Lobanoff, the Russian Ambassador. The general principle of delimiting the Russo-Afghan boundaries was admitted without difficulty. Lumsden and Zelenoi were named respectively as chiefs of the two commissions; but considerable differences emerged as to what was and what was not Afghan territory, and what territorial rights had been gained by the Russians in virtue of occupying Merv. They claimed all the territory over which the Sarik Turkomans had been wont to graze their flocks. This would have given them Shugnan, Maimena and Panjdeh. The Turkomans had been accustomed to pay tribute to Kabul, but were very willing to deny it; the Russians claimed that the Afghans were demanding territory which they might perhaps have held a couple of centuries earlier; and as soon as Lumsden had set out for his post, the Russians announced that their Commissioner was too ill to proceed, that the idea of leaving the Commission to enquire into large

differences was preposterous, and that before anything could be done on the spot, a narrower zone must be defined in Europe to form the limit of the Commissions' enquiries. While the English Commissioner was waiting in North Afghanistan for his Russian colleague, Russian officers were pushing forward to convert their claims into realities. They occupied the Zulfiqar Pass, and were close to Panjdeh when it was occupied by Afghan troops.

Thus in the early part of 1885 Russian and Afghan troops were actually facing each other. The Russian military party was highly indignant at the idea of submitting Russian claims to a Boundary Commission; and the General on the spot, Romanoff, was keenly looking out for a pretext for attacking the Afghans. On March 30th a collision took place; the Afghans were expelled from Panjdeh with some loss, and the telegraph line from Meshed to Teheran was interrupted—by an odd coincidence—at this very moment, so that the English reports on the occurrence were materially delayed.


At this time the Amir, 'Abd-ur-rahman, was at Rawul-pindi conferring with the new Viceroy, Lord Dufferin. He showed less emotion than Lord Dufferin had expected; but though the Viceroy was an experienced and skilful diplomatist, he failed in this case to divine what was passing in the other's mind. The great refusal of the English Government to appeal from this insult to arms greatly lowered English character in the Amir's mind, but it would evidently have been madness to fight without

English aid, and, as the Amir said, "I was not a man to get excited, and therefore took the matter calmly as a lesson for the future." Never, perhaps, was Mr. Gladstone's peculiar talent for getting out of a difficulty more evidently displayed than in his management of the crisis. The aggressive, and, indeed, studiously insolent nature of the Russian conduct, roused deep feeling in England, while in Russia the military party had the ear of the Emperor. But Gladstone placated the British war-party by asking for a vote of eleven million pounds; he placated the Emperor by proposing to refer the question to the arbitration of the King of Denmark. The credit lapsed; the Emperor agreed to the arbitration on condition (it is said) that it should never be held; Panjdeh was forgotten in the horrors of Khartoum; and the Russians agreed to retire from the Zulfiqar Pass where they had no business on condition of retaining Panjdeh to which they had no right. After this the Boundary Commission was allowed to meet, and the Northern boundary of Afghanistan was laid down. Thus, as 'Abd-ur-rahman wrote with polite irony, "The knots that were tied with regard to the Afghan frontier were untied with the tips of the fingers of excellent measures."

4. *The Annexation of Upper Burma.*—Probably both the admirer and the critic of Gladstone would agree in saying (each with his different inflection) that his policy in this affair was not glorious but safe. The troubles ending with the annexation of Upper Burma came to a head during the ministry of his successor, Lord Salisbury, while Lord Randolph

Churchill was Secretary of State for India; and perhaps the same epithets may be applied here also. There were, besides, other and much closer resemblances. The definite idea underlying the whole of the British foreign policy in India, ever since the British first attained a predominance in that region, has been to keep other European powers at arm's length; and this was the motive that came into play in Burma as well as in Afghanistan in the mid 'eighties of the last century.

Our earlier difficulties on the South-East had been of an entirely different nature. Amherst and Dalhousie, in their respective wars with the Burmese Kingdom, had been driven on by Burmese attempts to encroach on British rights or on the rights of British allies. The Golden Foot in his barbaric seclusion had no means of estimating the relative powers of his own State and that which he attacked; and while the Government of India could at all times have afforded to smile at his impotent attempts, it had not seemed wise to allow an exaggerated idea of its patience to spread abroad. Thus the Burmese King had lost the districts of Tenasserim and Aracan in 1826, and of Pegu thirty years later. He had, however, never condescended to recognize the second loss; and even when in 1862 he had entered into a treaty of friendship with the Government of India, no reference had been made to the territory recently transferred by force of arms. About this time, however, another event had occurred, destined to invest Burma with greater political importance than it intrinsically possessed. In 1858 the French and Spanish had entered on a war with the so-called



CHINA
UPPER BURMA
MANDALAY
HANOI
PEGU
Rangoon
SIAM
INDO CHINA
BANGKOK
BAY OF BENGAL
Gulf of Siam
Saigon
SOUTH CHINA SEA
R. Salwin
R. Mekong
Sketch Map of
BURMA
and
NEIGHBOURING
COUNTRIES
1 Aroccan acquired 1827
2 Tennosserim " 1827
3 Pegu " 1852
0 100 200 300 Miles

Emperor of Annam on account of the ill-treatment of Christians and missionaries in his dominions. The French thus acquired provinces which have grown into Indo-China ; the gradual extension of their influence brought them into ultimate proximity to Upper Burma, as the independent kingdom was called ; and this led to attempts on the part of the French to develop further relations. When a treaty had been negotiated at Paris in 1873, the agent, sent to Mandalay in 1874 to secure the ratification of the Golden Foot, took upon himself to sign a new convention of so objectionable a character that the English Government at once intervened and secured its disavowal.

For the moment this alarm led to nothing further. But several difficulties emerged with the Burmese themselves. For instance, there were troubles over the trade monopolies which the King established, greatly to the injury of English traders at Rangoon ; and though a treaty was made in 1867 by which the King promised to abolish them all, save those in kerosine—earth-oil, as it was then called—teak and gems, yet another cause of difference appeared. The English Resident at Mandalay had always been required to take off his shoes and sit in the Royal presence, with his feet behind him. In 1875 orders were given to discontinue this practice, and thereafter the Resident was never admitted to the Palace, and had to transact all his business through the Ministers. In 1878, when King Thibaw succeeded to the throne, the accession was celebrated by the violent removal of all likely rivals ; and the English expressions of displeasure at this primitive

conduct led shortly after to the withdrawal of the Resident altogether from Mandalay. Thibaw was not even a vigorous king, as his conduct on his accession would have suggested. His Government fell into confusion. The old Royal monopolies were revived and extended. Negotiations were more than once attempted at Mandalay and by means of missions to Calcutta ; but all attempts to reach an understanding broke against the adamantine self-conceit of the Golden Foot.

In these circumstances, the idea of seeking French help, and of playing off the Eastern against the Western neighbour was obvious and inevitable. Burmese missions proceeded to France in 1878 and 1883, and the latter concluded a new treaty. The English Cabinet made representations at Paris. We had special interests in Upper Burma which we could not allow to be jeopardized. The French answer was polite but unconvincing. Our relations with France were at this time embittered by numerous colonial differences. The two nations were, in fact, quarrelling about the Upper Niger, and the administration of Egypt. In Madagascar in 1883 a series of unfortunate incidents had taken place, the French admiral ordering the British flag to be hauled down, boarding a British vessel, and confining a British missionary. The encouragement given to Burmese intrigue was therefore regarded as another illustration of the same aggressive spirit. In 1885—the coincidence with the Russian troubles is striking—rumours spread abroad of French concessions in Burma. There was to be a railway built from Mandalay into French territory ; there

was to be a French bank, intended it would seem, for the profitless business of lending money to King Thibaw ; there was to be a fleet of French steamers on the Irawaddy. Some concessions had undoubtedly been made to French citizens with the active, though possibly unauthorized, concurrence of the French Consul. The English view of all this was that " the establishment by France of a dominant and exclusive influence in Upper Burma would involve such serious consequences to our own Burmese possessions and to India, that it should be prevented even at the risk of hostilities with Mandalay."

Just at this time, when the Government of India was regarding his conduct with such strong disfavour, Thibaw (like Sher 'Ali in like circumstances) felt strong enough to give his powerful neighbour material cause of offence. He imposed a fine of ten lakhs on the Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation —a punishment attributed to an offer made by or through the French Consul to take over the Corporation lease of the teak forests. Dufferin, the Viceroy, demanded an enquiry. The demand was refused. An ultimatum was issued which expired on November 10th, 1886 ; on the 28th of that month Thibaw surrendered himself to the English troops, and the Kingdom of Burma was merged in the Indian Empire.

5. *Frontier Policy.*—Thus British India had been threatened on both sides with inconveniently near European neighbours. However, to tell the truth, the South-Eastern threat had been rather in the nature of a temporary annoyance than a permanent

danger; but the North-Western threat was an undoubted menace that needed constant attention and was not susceptible of the simple remedy that Dufferin and Churchill applied in Burma. The Conservative administrations that determined British policy in the last decade of the nineteenth century were well aware of this; and their management of affairs, as might have been anticipated from the fate of Burma, was characterized by a much firmer tone than that of the Gladstonian administration. They displayed much anxiety, for instance, to secure the best attainable position from which to repel any attack by Russia, and to reduce the importance of Russian intrigues in Afghanistan or elsewhere. This meant a complete transformation of frontier policy, such as Lytton had contemplated but been unable to carry out. Hitherto the only forward move had been the occupation of Quetta, and there still remained a belt of some 25,000 square miles of tribal lands controlled by neither the Amir nor the Government of India, and touching at its Northern end on Russian territory. A forward policy involved a definite settlement of the Afghan boundaries on the side of India, the reduction of the tribal lands (so far as possible) to order, and the construction of strategic railways. This new policy was defined and introduced, though not completed, by Lord Lansdowne who was Governor-General from 1888 to 1893, and Lord Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army at that time.

The first of their objects—the settlement of the Afghan frontier—was not immediately secured. The Amir, 'Abd-ur-rahman regarded British activity

on the frontier with suspicion ; and he was besides much engaged with a rebellion on the part of his son, Ishaq Khan ; so that the first proposal, made in 1888, fell through. It was then proposed to send Lord Roberts, in 1892 ; but in this case the Amir regarded the envoy with suspicion, and contrived to evade his reception. In the following year, however, the mission of Sir Mortimer Durand succeeded in laying down a line to separate Afghan and Indian influence ; the concession was bought by raising the Amir's subsidy from twelve to eighteen lakhs a year, and the Amir agreed not to interfere with the tribes on the Indian side of the line—notably the Afridis in the Khyber, the Waziris, and the tribes in the regions of Swat, Bajaur, Dir and Chitral running up to the Russian territory in the Pamirs. In the same year a formal protectorate was declared over Gilgit and Chitral in order to block the attempts at Russian penetration which seemed probable.

At first this activity led to several frontier campaigns—in 1895 there was the Chitral affair, and in 1897 the serious outbreak which involved the operations of the Malakand Field Force against the Mohmands and the Tirah compaign against the Afridis. But gradually the situation quieted down. This process was much assisted by an improved distribution of the regular military forces. These had been scattered about somewhat at haphazard, frequently in small detachments in isolated or almost isolated posts. Under Lord Curzon's Government these were concentrated in reserve, while the advanced posts were occupied by tribal levies. This

was a great improvement, though, in fact, it was scarcely the complete success that it was claimed to be; and when the tribal levies failed to perform their duties, or the Khyber Rifles developed a habit of shooting their Adjutant, the outside world heard nothing of it. "There is a great deal to be said," Minto wrote to the Secretary of State, "for the system [Lord Curzon] inaugurated, which was a substitution of tribal levies for regular trooops, in the hope of interesting the tribes themselves in the defence of the frontier. But neither the border police nor the levies have been capable of filling the position from which the troops were withdrawn"; and he goes on to point out that when a large force of troops had had to be employed against the Mahsuds, the campaign had been called, not an expedition, but a blockade.

The improved distribution of forces was accompanied and facilitated by the construction of strategic railways—to Dargai at the foot of the Malakand, to Jamrud at the entrance to the Khyber; and to Thal, at the mouth of the Khurram Valley, though these by no means exhausted the demands of the military authorities.

And, lastly, the trans-Indus districts were separated from the Punjab and formed into the North-West Frontier Province administered by a Chief Commissioner immediately under the orders of the Governor-General. This, like so much else that was done on the frontier, was based on projects originally devised by Jacob, Frere, Green and Lytton. Lytton's plan had had a much wider scope, and would have involved placing both sections

of the frontier—Pathan and Baluch—under one authority. Lord Curzon's scheme was limited to the northern section. In itself it was an excellent measure. While the administration of the Punjab was rapidly assuming the regular, formal and report-ridden character of the older British provinces, it was but wise to exempt from these changes the exposed districts where a vigorous executive remained an essential need, and where the personality of the administrator counted for much more than laws and regulations.

6. *Tibet.*—While the North-West was being prepared against a Russian attack, the same insidious danger was scented from a line farther to the East, where the territory of Buddhist Tibet marched with the Indian border among the hills. Under the nominal suzerainty of China, the country was really a theocracy. The Government was supposed to reside in the principal religious functionary called the Dalai Lama, whose soul at death was believed to be instantly reincarnate in the body of some child born at that time. Thus the death of a Dalai Lama was always the signal for a regency, conducted by a council of principal Lamas. Such a system, on the whole, much reduced the young Dalai Lama's chances of ever growing up ; and throughout the nineteenth century his soul was almost entirely restricted to animating the bodies of the very young. About 1898, however, the existing vehicle of the Dalai Lama's soul succeeded in overthrowing the council and growing up. This must be mainly attributed to the fact that he had fallen under the influence of Dorjieff, a Russian Buddhist, to whom

his protégé's survival was an evident condition of his own power.

The revolution, for it was no less, was followed by Tibetan missions to Russia. These were sent in 1898, in 1900, in 1901. About the same time it was alleged that the Russians had entered into a secret convention with China on the subject of Tibet. Diplomatic enquiries elicited diplomatic denials of all political action. It is indeed conceivable that the Russian statements were true. But it was entirely consistent with experience elsewhere to regard them as something less than the whole truth.

These suspicions, natural in themselves, could not be cleared away by information from Tibet, for we had no agents there, and all intercourse was sedulously declined. Attempts were made to reach an understanding directly; attempts were made through the Chinese officials at Lhasa; attempts were made through the Chinese Government at Pekin. A trade agreement was made, and a place selected as a mart of exchange between the two countries; but the Tibetans forbade their people to go near it. Boundary pillars were set up; the Tibetans threw them down. At last Lord Curzon considered that the situation only could be met by sending a mission with a sufficient escort to Lhasa. After prolonged discussion it was sent under Colonel Younghusband in 1904. At one point the Tibetans attempted to stop its progress; they were repulsed with heavy and regrettable loss; the mission entered Lhasa on August 3rd, and a treaty was made under which a commercial agent was to be maintained at Lhasa, an indemnity of seventy-five lakhs paid at the rate of

one lakh a year, and the Chumbi Valley occupied till the payments had been completed. In making these terms Colonel Younghusband exceeded his instructions, though the error lay far more in the ignorance with which the instructions had been drawn than in the solution he had adopted. This was recognized in India more clearly than in England, and produced a lively dispute between the Governor-General and the Secretary of State, in which the Secretary of State had the last word.

7. *The German Menace.*—The expedition to Tibet marks the temporary disappearance of this particular phase of Indian foreign policy, for about this time the German menace began to overshadow Europe. In India it seemed remote ; and it was some time before political opinions could adjust themselves to the new circumstances. Indeed, it took a long time in London, where the pressure of events was much closer. But even in India there were signs and portents. There was, for example, the Baghdad Railway scheme, towards which neither party could really define its policy. In India itself it was odd to find the German Consul-General, belonging, not to the consular, but to the diplomatic service, with an establishment like that of a great embassy, with its attachés, military and otherwise, not at all in keeping with the humble rôle of a Consul.

Already in 1893 we had begun to clear up our differences with France, for that year marks the opening of the discussions which succeeded in 1896 in terminating our disputes in Further India. But 1904, the year of Younghusband's appearance in

Lhasa, was the turning year of the new policy. England and France in that year renewed their declarations of amity; and King Edward met M. Isvolsky at Copenhagen. The attainment of an understanding with Russia was a long and difficult process, and was not completed until the Convention of August 31st, 1907, by which Persia was divided into zones of interest, England agreed not to change the status of the Amir and Russia to communicate with him through English channels, and both countries promised to refrain from interference in Tibet.

The attainment of the object had been so far as possible resisted by German diplomacy. It was also a matter on which the English and Indian authorities had held very different views and failed to convince or persuade one another. In 1906, when the matter first reached the stage of formal negotiations, the Indian view was that Russia should explicitly recognize Afghanistan as outside her sphere of interests, and agree to conduct all her relations with that country through British channels; that she should agree to make no further extensions of her strategic railways, already felt to be so directly menacing; that she should promise to abstain from all interference in Tibet; and that she should recognize our preponderating interests in Southern Persia and the Persian Gulf. Minto further pointed out that unless he was authorized to discuss the project with the Amir, Habib-ul-lah, who had succeeded his father, 'Abd-ur-rahman in 1901, the proceedings would almost certainly arouse Afghan suspicion and perhaps Afghan hostility.

The last suggestion was wholly rejected, as likely to delay and perhaps to ruin negotiations that in any case were certain to be long and difficult ; and other English proposals also aroused outspoken criticisms in the Indian Foreign Department. For instance, it was proposed, and no efforts in India could get rid of the clause, that the Russian and Afghan frontier authorities should discuss and settle local and non-political matters. The history of the recent past strongly suggested that this was opening a very dangerous door to political intrigue. Who would guarantee that the intercourse would be limited to non-political subjects ? And besides, such a proposal was contrary to the declared wishes of the Amir. He might, as Minto said, be quite willing to wink at such communications when really necessary, but that was a very different thing from his sanctioning them in accordance with an agreement between Russia and Great Britain, in which he had never been consulted.

Then again there was a proposal that neither England nor Russia should extend their strategic railways for a period of ten years. Even if observed with the utmost fidelity it was disadvantageous, because the Russian scheme was practically complete, the English one was not, and so the Russians were getting something for nothing, while the agreement would obstruct the development of frontier railways with all their civilizing influences, and hinder the formation of protection not only against Russian, but also against Pan-Islamic schemes.

This was dropped ; and a still more astonishing clause, to the effect that, in the event of any change

in the political status of Afghanistan, the two Governments would enter into a friendly interchange of views, greatly modified. Such a proposal bore evident marks of having been framed in Europe. Its adoption must have been fatal to English friendship with the Amir, to whom it could have borne no other meaning than that his two great neighbours at a convenient season would unite to despoil him. Instead of this was adopted the much less harmful declaration that England had no intention of changing the political status of her ally.

Even so, Minto had a great, and in a narrow sense, a justified distrust of the Convention and the policy which underlay it. "I do not believe," he wrote, "that she (Russia) is capable of controlling the movements of her frontier officers in those regions . . . and whatever bargain she may enter into with us, I have no doubt that her officers will continue to perfect their various forms of advance on the frontiers of India." And again, "I wouldn't bargain with Russia in Central Asia on any account —she has too many opportunities of getting the best of us, and the risks of a mistake are too great." At the very time the negotiations were going forward, the Russian authorities at Tashkend were demanding of the Amir the reason of his recent visit to India. It is true that Minto looked at the matter in that narrower aspect which alone was visible in Asia at the time. "This country cannot have two foreign policies," Morley replied; but the latter seems himself neither to have explained nor indeed to have understood the meaning of the

alternative policy which he forced upon the Government of India, and which was founded on European and not Asiatic conditions. He repeats again and again that he is not member of the Potsdam Party; but he sneers at men who suspected Germany of designs on the Persian Gulf and at the Foreign Office for seeing the German finger in every pie. All this is entirely in keeping with that attitude of mind which dictated his resignation of office in 1914; but it illustrates also the curious manner in which even Cabinet Ministers with the best and latest information before them, may misapprehend alike the meaning of the circumstances around them, and the meaning of their own conduct.

Even the most skilful foreign policy is more usually a choice of evils than the selection of advantages. In the present case the prospective need of a European coalition involved Indian policy in new difficulties. The Muslim peoples had felt the influence of telegraph and railway like other sections of the world. They had steadily been growing more and more conscious of their religion as a bond of union against the progress of the Western powers; and had inclined more and more to regard the Sultan of Turkey as their leader, as the Shadow of God and Khalif of the age. The hostility between Russia and the Turks was unabated; and thus the growing differences between the old allies England and Turkey, arising out of the vehement and possibly one-sided humanitarianism of Mr. Gladstone and the later Radicals, were confined and strengthened. German influence replaced British at Constantinople. India's Muslim neighbours, especially the Afghans,

were inclined in the same direction. The Amir had not been consulted before the Convention of 1907 had been settled; and he regarded this union of his two great neighbours with a natural suspicion. This was not the fault of the Government of India, which had put forward his claim to be consulted. It was not the fault of the Foreign Office which had been willing that the Amir should be consulted before the final seal was put to the treaty. It was the fault of the Secretary of State for India, who, with characteristic narrowness, insisted that there was no need because the Russian Convention involved no departure from the treaty which the Amir had accepted in 1905. He seems to have overlooked the fact that the Convention introduced a new and unexpected element into the conditions under which the Amir's treaty had been signed.

This aspect of affairs was an ever-growing source of anxiety to the Government of India. At the very time that the Home Government were contemplating a proposal to Russia to suspend the construction of strategic railways, and when a little later Morley was refusing funds for their construction, Pan-Islam was peculiarly active; emissaries were passing between the Sultan and Afghanistan, and the Amir was preparing not only to re-arm his forces with the latest rifles but also to develop the local facilities for the manufacture of artillery.

Further, in Afghanistan, the position of the Amir was not too secure. Habib-ul-lah, though he imitated his father's severity of administration, had nothing of 'Abd-ur-rahman's talent for government.

He was, like many another inferior Eastern prince, deeply bitten by the craze of Western modernism. He even tried to dress the ladies of his *zanana* in the fashions he had seen in Calcutta. This kind of thing gave him great unpopularity, especially when it contrasted with the bitter fanaticism and violent anti-British sentiments of his brother, Nasr-ul-lah. So the Amir's authority in his own country was always liable to come into conflict with a force over which he had little influence. The plot which ended his life in 1919 was not the first to be framed with that intention ; and there was a growing tendency in Afghanistan to identify the Amir with the English alliance, and the English alliance with religious laxity.


The tendency thus set up was accentuated by the events of the German War. Open hostilities with Turkey necessarily deepened the rising feeling of opposition between the British Empire and the Muslims ; the support given to the family of the Sharif of Mecca marked out Great Britain as the special friend of those who were regarded by most Muslim pilgrims as their enemies, oppressors, and plunderers ; the revolution in Russia destroyed the alliance for which the friendship of Islam had been bartered ; and so the period closes with a foreign situation far more complicated and difficult than the Government of India had ever had to face before, supported by neither Russia nor Islam, and threatened with internal reactions in sympathy with the new Islamic fervour.

CHAPTER VII

THE NATIVE STATES

The Foreign Department of the Government of India is not exclusively concerned with what we now regard as foreign affairs. It also manages the relations between the Government of India and the Native States. This union of essentially different functions points back to the time when the Native States really were external powers, and the relations with Hyderabad really were of the same nature as the relations with the Sikhs or with Afghanistan. The transformation of their former into their present status began, like much else in Anglo-Indian history, with the administration of Lord Hastings ; but in great part it has been the work of the last two generations. In no branch of affairs has the development of policy been more evident. It was much less anomalous in 1858 to class the Indian princes with foreign states than it is to-day ; and indeed the anomaly has at last been officially recognized, for the department has now been subdivided, with separate secretaries for each of the two great branches of the Viceroy's special and personal duties as Foreign Member of Council.

In 1858 the Native States were still isolated units. Their duties and the reciprocal obligations of the Government of India towards them were recorded in



INDIA
Map showing the
PRINCIPAL
NATIVE STATES
1 Travancore
2 Cochin
3 Mysore
4 Kolhapur
5 Sawantwari
6 Hyderabad
7 Baroda
8 Indore
9 Bhopal
10 Udaipur
11 Gwalior
12 Jodhpur
13 Jaipur
14 Bikanir
15 Patiala
16 Manipur
17 Kashmir
0
500 Miles
70
80
90
100
30
20
10

separate treaties, of which one party claimed and the other exacted the most literal and precise interpretation. Where no treaty existed, no rights could be presumed. So late as 1869 a Parliamentary Under-Secretary could describe the attitude of a chief, the Nawab of Janjira, with whom the only treaty was an obsolete agreement to make joint war on pirates, as "partly courteous, partly apprehensive, partly repellent. This attitude (he went on) our authorities respect, never interfering except when absolutely forced to do so. Although Jungera is so near Bombay, its rude independence is not tempered by the presence of a British resident." Some of the more important states, such as Oudh and Nagpore, had recently been absorbed in British India. Their future was ill-assured, their loyalty doubted, the policy pursued towards them uncertain, and at times almost capricious. But since 1858 no native states have been absorbed; many of them have afforded ready help against external enemies; and although the relations between them and the Government of India are still invested with great secrecy, it is clear that the course of policy has become more orderly and regular.

(1) *The Sanads of Adoption.*—In no respect is this clearer than in the question of succession. The Company's practice had varied widely. In the early 19th century, when the Company's power was new, the generally recognized principle was that the succession was an internal matter which in itself did not interest the Company. The writings of the generation of Munro and Elphinstone show how general this idea was. In the words of the latter,

"The succession, I conceive, was an internal affair in which the British Government could not interfere unless in a case which might affect the foreign relations of the state, or the general tranquillity of the country." When in 1825 Metcalfe recorded a minute expressing incidentally an opinion that it was the business of the Government of India to regulate the successions to Native States, the Company promptly disavowed the principle. The Directors denied alike the right or the duty of judging the validity of princes' titles to succeed. But gradually a change set in. In 1834 the Company was ordering that on the failure of natural heirs, consent should be given to the adoption of an heir only "as a special mark of approbation." Later on Dalhousie at once narrowed the application and intensified the employment of this principle by formulating the Doctrine of Lapse, under which chiefs specially dependent on the Company, as for example those who had been restored to their thrones after conquest, like Nagpur, or those created by an act of the British Government, like Mysore or Satara, were not entitled to make good by adoption the lack of sons to carry on their rule.

But much criticism, to which the Mutiny was thought to add point, was aroused by the vigour with which in the latter days of the Company's rule state after state—some under this doctrine, others for different reasons—was swept away, Moreover, from the first the Queen was greatly interested in the Princes of India. The Proclamation of 1858, drawn and redrawn under her particular directions, contained a clause declaring that the sovereign desired

no further annexations of Indian territory. But it was felt that this was not enough. In the past self-denying principles had been laid down with the utmost formality—by the act of 1784, for instance—but had been broken through by the strong force of circumstances. Something more was thought needful to allay the anxiety of Indian princes regarding the matter of successions; and finally the device of issuing special *sanads*—the Indian equivalent of letters patent—was adopted. These were issued to certain selected states, about 140 in all. They were drafted in two forms—one for Hindu, and the other for Muslim princes. The first sanctioned the practice of adoption by the Prince himself—thus excluding the legitimacy of adoption by a widow after her husband's death—where necessary to secure a successor. The second recognized any succession that "may be legitimate according to Muhammadan law." Both forms, however, declared these boons conditional on the loyalty of the Princes to the Crown and to their treaty engagements. It was not even then resolved that annexation was to be a thing of the past.

But while Government thus forwent the claims that had formerly been put forward to escheatment under certain conditions, it has asserted its paramount authority in the matter of successions in no uncertain way. On that point, as we have seen, the Company in its earlier days put forward no pretensions. Later on, however, notably in the Holkar succession of 1843, the doctrine was firmly declared that where a prince died without a son, real or adoptive, only the Government of India could

select and appoint his successor. Under the Crown the principle has been expounded in wider terms. "The succession to a Native State is invalid," wrote the Government of India in 1884, "until it receives in some form the sanction of the British authorities." Almost the same terms were used by the Secretary of State in 1891. "Every succession," he wrote, "must be recognized by the British Government, and no succession is valid until recognition has been given." The Government of the Crown has then relaxed the practice but developed and strengthened the theory of the Company's Government. It no longer supersedes a Native State on default of heirs; but apparently even the most regular descent does not by itself constitute more than a claim to the most favourable consideration of the Government, and in theory an interregnum occurs on each demise, and lasts until the decision of Government has been expressed.

(2) *Annexation.*—But failure of natural heirs had not constituted the only occasion on which native states had lapsed. Rulers had been deposed for misconduct—either the persistent misgovernment of their subjects or breach of their obligations to the paramount power. An example of the first is afforded by Oudh, of the second by Sind.

The deposition of Indian princes for such reasons had provoked nearly as much comment as the Doctrine of Lapse itself, and the Queen was especially anxious that her Government should not be the occasion of controversies such as had marked the past. In 1859 she was demanding of the Secretary of State whether means could not be found for

dealing in a more judicial manner with cases in which a native state was threatened with sequestration, in order to "secure the Queen from acts being done in her name which might not be entirely justifiable, morally as well as legally." In the following year, when Canning objected to the measures which Sir Charles Wood proposed with this object, she suggested that Canning himself should be asked to indicate a more suitable plan.

I do not know what answer was returned ; but it seems reasonable to suppose that the procedure followed in the Gaikwar's case in 1874-5 was the result of this correspondence. At all events it was the first illustration of judicial methods being applied to these political cases.

The Gaikwar's case was briefly as follows : The ruling prince, Mulhar Rao, was incompetent if not (as is more likely) insane. His state, misgoverned by his predecessors as well as by himself, was rapidly falling into great disorder. A Commission of inquiry held in 1874 found him guilty of ill-treating his late brother's relatives, of torturing women, and of extorting money from the wealthy merchants of his state. In the following year he was accused of attempting to poison the Resident, Colonel Phayre. A mixed court was then constituted to try him on this charge. It consisted of three British officials along with the Maharajahs of Gwalior and Jaipur, Sir Dinkar Rao and Sir Salar Jang. This court could not reach a unanimous decision ; but the Gaikwar was deposed on the charge of misgovernment.

Nor was the novel type of procedure the only

departure from precedent afforded by the case. Under the Company Baroda would probably have been annexed like the Carnatic in 1801 or Oudh in 1856. But Baroda was not annexed; instead of that the Government of India selected a young kinsman of the Gaikwar, declared him to be the successor of the deposed prince, and chose Sir Madhava Rao to administer the state during the boy's minority. This was a most significant departure, and one well calculated to earn the gratitude of every Indian chief. As Holkar said to Daly when discussing this very episode before Government had declared its intentions, "The person for the time being is little; the state with its rights is the point for consideration." The Gaikwar's case suggests that even in a case of flagrant misgovernment, the individual may be punished for his faults, but the state will not be extinguished.

The matter is put in a still more striking light by the Manipur rebellion of 1891. Manipur is a small and unimportant state, lying up among the hills of Assam. The chief was expelled from his territory by a rebellion. The Commissioner of Assam was sent with a small escort to enquire and to arrest the principal rebel. In the course of this duty he was murdered. The rebellion was thus extended against the Paramount Power itself. In earlier days annexation would have followed as a matter of course. It was the penalty inflicted on the Rajah of Coorg and the Nawab of Kurnool for the like offence. But in 1890 circumstances and policy were different. The chief who had been expelled was deposed as unfit to rule; the *Senapati*

who had headed the rebels was hanged for the murder of the Commissioner ; and the chief's son was established in his father's room.

Again, once the Company laid its hands upon territory it seldom relinquished it. Territory assigned for the payment of subsidiary forces, in commutation of tribute, in settlement of a long-accumulating debt, passed for ever into the Company's hands. But there was one state which stood in a unique condition. The Hindu state of Mysore was a standing monument to the moderation of the Company and the complications of policy at a moment of triumph, when Wellesley overthrew Tipu Sultan. The treaty which the Governor-General imposed upon the young ruler whom he set up in 1799 was unlike any others, marking Wellesley's peculiar and entirely justified abhorrence of the situation in which he found himself in regard to those two legacies of early British policy, Oudh and the Carnatic. He was not going to create a new state only to widen the area of misrule under English protection. Therefore he not only required the young Rajah to accept a subsidiary force, and in case of war to contribute such a sum as should appear reasonable to the Governor-General in Council of Fort William, but he also decreed that the Company should retain a right of re-entry into Mysore if its finances fell into disorder, and that His Highness should "pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the Company's Government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him."

The anticipated case arose. The Rajah's mis-

conduct drove his subjects to rebellion. In 1831 administration of his state was assumed and conducted by Cubbon with a success like that of Malcolm in Central India, or of Jenkins in Nagpur. In 1868 the errant Rajah died, leaving behind him no natural son, but a boy whom he had adopted in spite of the firm refusal of Government to sanction such adoption. Had he died at any time between 1840 and the Mutiny, his state would certainly have lapsed, and become an additional group of districts in the Presidency of Madras. That was the clear significance of the Governor-General's refusal to permit adoption. But in 1868 Northcote and Lawrence decided that the state should be preserved; the unauthorized adoption was approved and Government undertook to establish the boy as Rajah if, when he reached manhood, he were found competent for the duties. Finally, in 1881, Hartington and Ripon carried this promise into effect. Both the great English parties thus concurred in the rendition of Mysore.

In short, the practice of Government since 1858 furnishes a body of precedent showing that the policy of annexation has become practically obsolete. It no longer follows on the failure of natural heirs, for the Doctrine of Lapse has been expressly abandoned in the Sanads of Adoption. It no longer follows on a course of misconduct, for the precedent of Oudh is cancelled by the case of Baroda. It no longer follows automatically on prolonged occupation of state territory, nor is it even the penalty exacted for rebellion. The promise of the Queen's Proclamation has been fulfilled to the letter. "We

desire," she said, " no extension of our territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment upon those of others." While the Amir of Kabul and the King of Burma have suffered in various degrees the penalty of war, no Indian state has been abolished.

(3) *Internal Interference.*—This change of policy was regarded by the Indian Princes with deserved gratitude. " Now that annexation is at an end," said Sindia, " we breathe freely, even when our failings are probed and our shortcomings discussed." But as Sindia's remark suggests, freedom from the danger of annexation was not obtained without payment ; and the change of policy was double.

Since the Mutiny the system of Native States has been so constant, so little touched by the violent effects of war, that we have few of those landmarks of policy which the treaties of the earlier period offer. We have indeed only one document at all comparable with the treaties of Wellesley and Lord Hastings. That is the Instrument of Transfer in which Ripon declared the conditions under which he restored Mysore to the Maharajah in 1881.

A comparison of this document, which the reader will find printed at length in Lee-Warner's admirable work on the Native States of India, with Wellesley's treaty of Seringapatam by which the Hindu dynasty was re-established, is peculiarly instructive. In both we find the native state sub-

jected to a tribute, in the earlier case for the maintenance of a subsidiary force, in the later for the general military purposes of the Indian Government. In both interference with other states is prohibited. In both the Maharajah is restricted from employing Europeans without the sanction of the Supreme Government. In both the Supreme Government is authorized to establish its military forces in any part of the state it thinks proper. Both reserve a right of re-entry to the Supreme Government. Both require the Maharajah to conform to the advice which the Governor-General in Council may offer him in respect to the administration of his state. But whereas Wellesley required that "the friends and enemies of either of the contracting parties should be considered as the friends and enemies of both," Ripon demanded that the Maharajah should "at all times remain faithful in allegiance and subordination to Her Majesty"; Wellesley's right of re-entry was intended to secure the financial stability of the state and the regular payment of the tribute; Ripon's was designed to cover not only that but also "the good government of the people of Mysore"; Ripon specifically declared no succession to be valid until it had been recognized by the Governor-General in Council; Wellesley never mentioned the question of succession. Ripon defined the purpose of the Maharajah's forces as the maintenance of internal order, and limited them to the strength declared by the Governor-General in Council to be sufficient for that purpose; Wellesley laid down neither criterion nor limit.

And besides these differences we find a whole new series of provisions in the later document designed to secure the co-operation of the dependent state with the Supreme Government in many matters of administration—telegraphs and railways, the manufacture of salt and opium, the extradition of criminals, the use of the currency of British India.

We must return to other aspects of this interesting document on a later page. But the immediate point to note is the fact that although both Wellesley and Ripon asserted a right to advise on matters of internal administration, the stipulations of the two Governors-General bore very different relations to general policy. Wellesley was strongly in favour of a right to intervene; but he was only able to give effect to his wishes in the special cases of Mysore and Oudh; his successors pursued a different policy, and most of the subsequent treaties contain a specific clause declaring that the Company and its officers should not interfere in matters of internal administration. The general policy was to avoid interference as much as possible; and though circumstances frequently rendered the policy impracticable, as when ruling princes were reduced to desiring help against insubordinate chiefs or rebellious subjects, or again when the Company's Government was desired to guarantee a loan because a Prince's credit did not stand high enough by itself, these departures from a recognized policy were viewed with disfavour and limited as much as possible. Wellesley's provision regarding the internal administration of Mysore was thus abnormal. The Company's practice was

to annex a state when its administration had fallen into complete disorder, rather than to insist on amendment at an earlier stage.

Under the Crown the policy has been reversed. On the abandonment of annexation as a remedy for extreme mismanagement has followed the obligation of preventing extreme mismanagement from occurring. In this sense Ripon's Instrument of Transfer, with its careful provisions to secure the maintenance of a British standard of administration, is much more characteristic of policy since 1858 than Wellesley's treaty was of the earlier policy. The change must not be exaggerated. In both periods needless interference was regarded as an evil to be avoided. But the conception of what would justify interference has changed. There are many acts which would have been viewed with strong disapproval by the Company's Government, but which that Government would never have taken overt action to prevent. The Rajput state of Udaipur, for example, long clung to the practice of *Sati*; and the Company did nothing. Traditional methods of punishment, such as the mutilation of thieves, or the trampling out of a Brahman's life by an elephant were permitted to continue unchecked. Such things would not be tolerated to-day; and the chief who encouraged or directed such practices would certainly be deposed. Before 1858 the principal demand made on the Native States was that they should not conspire against the Company; since 1858 they have been required as well not to fall too far below the standards of administration in British India. In short, inter-

ference in internal administration of Native States has come to be undertaken with less reluctance, on less extreme grounds, and with the object of avoiding more severe measures.

In this respect it is clear that the policy of Government has responded to the changed condition of affairs. In the first place the annexations of the earlier period resulted in establishing British power over some two-thirds of India. So that whereas, in the earlier period, the old traditional methods of administration still bore sway over the greater part of the country, and formed the normal mode of Government, in the later period the opposite position was established, and British Government became the rule, the Native States the exception. Consequently at first it was no easy matter to maintain British ideas of government within British territory, to say nothing of extending them outside the limits of our direct responsibility. But afterwards the play of natural forces tended rather to assimilate the Native States to British India.

To this must be added the unifying influences of the railway, the telegraph, and the press. When communications were slow and undeveloped, many things might be done that became impossible after the advent of those revolutionary influences. Other forces besides that of Government policy have combined to bring the Native States into line with British territories.

(4) *Assimilation of the States.*—Along with this should be set another modification of policy. Before the Mutiny each state was a separate unit, with its own specific rights and its own specific

duties. What was done in one state was no necessary criterion of what might be done in another. Dalhousie's Doctrine of Lapse, for instance was based on a careful discrimination between the positions of the various princes. It was not a general doctrine, but only a doctrine applicable to particular states. There can be no doubt that in later years individual rights and duties have more or less given place to a collective body of rights and duties, that what is done in one state is a precedent for what may be done in another, and that the provisions of each separate treaty have in course of time lost a certain amount of their original force. Each treaty was necessarily somewhat modified by the modern practice, in Lee-Warner's phrase, of reading the treaties all together. This is what Lord Curzon meant when he observed at Bahawalpur in 1903 that the political system of India "represents a series of relationships that have grown up between the Crown and the Indian Princes under widely differing historical conditions, but which in process of time have gradually conformed to a single type."

The change has borne fruit in a variety of ways. On the one side privileges secured by treaty have been weakened; but privileges resting upon precedent and policy have been extended. The Government of India may feel itself entitled to interfere in a matter in which interference seems completely barred by a specific treaty; but it cannot hold itself free to refuse a privilege, such as the privilege of adoption, because a particular chief did not receive one of Canning's sanads.

The relations between the paramount power and the dependent states have responded to the change in the circumstances of the modern world, and treaties signed a century ago no longer furnish the only or even a certain basis of action.

To some extent in the present century a reaction seems to have taken place against this conception and the policy it involved. They seem to have reached their climax under Lord Curzon; Lord Minto, his successor, laid down different principles, involving a more elastic policy. In his speech at the state banquet at Udaipur he said: "I have . . . made it a rule to avoid as far as possible the issue of general instructions, and have endeavoured to deal with questions as they arose with reference to existing treaties, the merits of each case, local conditions, antecedent circumstances, and the particular stage of development, feudal and constitutional, of individual principalities."

But though the rigidity of relations may have been relaxed, and Procrustean excess lopped off, the tendency itself persists in a milder form. However much interference is reduced it is still in the majority of cases altogether precluded by the strict letter of the treaties; and nothing could restore in 1918 the conditions under which they had been framed, or limit the obligations of a modern state to those which had been agreed on a century before.

(5) *The Influence of the Crown.*—One of the great disturbing influences has been the establishment of Crown Government, which intimately affected the relations between the Indian Princes and the Government of India. The former could not

conceivably feel any loyalty to the Company. It was a great, and, on the whole, beneficent institution ; many of the smaller states owed their continued existence to the intervention of its Governors-General ; but political feelings have always been, and will always be, determined less by remembrances of the past than by considerations of the future. These were on the whole not encouraging. The chiefs who reflected on the future of their families can have seen little at the end of the vista but the extinction of their political rank, and an ultimate descent into the ordinary paths of human existence down a steeply graduated pension. The prospect held little to encourage active loyalty ; and their passive attitude revealed little save their conscious inability to oppose men who had displayed such vigour in policy and arms. Politically, too, the Governors-General walked warily with them. They were isolated units, separated one from another by the pride of race, by the teachings of religion, by the memory of leagues that had failed and intrigues that had been betrayed, and campaigns in which one ally had been left by another to bear all the brunt of defeat in battle. It was the time of Subordinate Isolation, to borrow Lee-Warner's phrase. Secret messages no doubt passed from state to state ; but no intriguer succeeded in breaking down that mutual distrust or that belief in the Company's superior fortune which were the lessons severely inculcated by the past.

But the assumption of Government by the Crown changed all this in two ways. In the first place it established at their head no mere trading company

developing into a ruler by accident, but one of the greatest monarchs of the world, of rank so high that they could submit to her without humiliation, and of word so gracious that they could regard her without distrust. Their loyal respect was enhanced by distance, undimmed by familiarity. Their passive acquiescence in the rule of Company became an active support of the dominion of the Crown.

This transformation led to another equally profound. The states ceased to be isolated units, and became members of one body. In a sense, as we have seen, this tended in the direction of uniformity of treatment, the establishment of rules, and the formulation of a policy that at times threatened to become over-rigid. But even this had another aspect. The princes had become joint partners in the Empire. Even two most dissimilar Viceroys, whose words have just been quoted, agreed in this. "The Native Chief," said Curzon at Gwalior in 1899, "has become by our policy an integral factor in the Imperial organization of India. He is concerned not less than the Viceroy or the Lieutenant-Governor in the administration of the country. I claim him as my colleague and partner." "The foundation stone of the whole system," said Minto, "is the recognition of the identity of interests between the Imperial Government and the Durbars. . . . I trust that the ruling chiefs of India will ever bear in mind that the interests of themselves and their people are identical with those of the Supreme Government."

The proof of this is the many matters in which

the Princes have joined hands with the Government of India—to repress smuggling, to promote freedom of trade within India itself, to build railways and telegraphs and canals, to preserve forests, to extradite criminals. But the most striking examples were afforded, perhaps, by the visit of Edward VII as Prince of Wales, in 1874, when chiefs met on friendly terms whose families had never previously encountered each other save on the field of battle, and by the origin of the Imperial Service Troops. The latter, indeed, offer the most complete antithesis to the policy of Wellesley and Hastings. The subsidiary forces established by them were garrisons installed at a hostile capital ; the Imperial Service Troops are maintained by the States for the protection of the common country. The first were established and maintained by the use of pressure and coercion ; the second sprang from a spontaneous offer. The first marked the mistrust of the Paramount Power ; the second the union of interests between the states and the Empire. Indeed, the Imperial Service Troops mark in a high degree the growing sense of solidarity—in the Princes by their desire to make their states a more effective portion of the Empire, and in the Empire in its new willingness to take the Princes into partnership.

But, just as annexation and non-interference, or the abandonment of the first and the extension of the second, were necessary correlatives of policy, so too the policy of union and co-operation which was developed under the Crown, was accompanied by a clearly marked modification of status. The Company and its officials had never been able to

decide what the Native States really were. The confusion of ideas regarding them is clearly illustrated by Wellesley's Treaty of Seringapatam. On every side he invaded the sovereignty of the state. He imposed on it a subsidiary force ; he exacted tribute ; he denied its right to ally itself elsewhere ; he denied its right to garrison or rebuild its own fortresses ; he insisted on his right to advise in authoritative fashion on its internal administration. But the document in which he laid down this doctrine was a treaty, an international document, entered into by two parties, and which, one presumes, the Maharajah had the right, though he never had the power, to denounce. So it was all through in the Company's days. The forms of international law were maintained though the conditions which alone could give validity to those forms had disappeared. In the time of Dalhousie the Company still affected the status it had held in the days of Warren Hastings. The inconsistency had long been glaring. So early as 1814 Lord Hastings wrote : "In our treaties with them we recognize them as independent sovereigns. Then we send a resident to their courts. Instead of acting in the character of an ambassador, he assumes the functions of a dictator. . . ." And along with this fiction of international status went the infliction of the penalties of international war. Lord William Bentinck declared war against the Rajah of Coorg and annexed his territories. Sindia's Government in the time of Ellenborough was n accused of rebellion. One independent state car rebel against another.

But this fiction disappeared in 1858. The Princes of India became subjects, high in rank, indeed, but still the subjects of the Queen, in the same sense that they had been the subjects of the Moghul Emperors. Their international position disappeared. They were no longer in danger of a declaration of war, nor of annexation of territory. Their authority was the deputed authority of the Queen, and they could not be at once loyal subjects of hers and frivolous or irresponsible despots. Hence the pressure that appeared in the later period on their systems of administration, and the co-operation that has been established between their governments and the Government of India.

BOOK III

Political Development

CHAPTER VIII

EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT

(1) *The English System of Education.*—While India was being more and more intimately affected by European political influences, while her foreign policy was being more and more determined by European conditions, her administration more and more inspired by European ideas and standards, and her government more and more controlled from London, the system of English education established by the Whigs began also to bear fruit, although its fruit was not precisely what had been anticipated. The system had indeed been planted under the influence of a false psychology. Macaulay and his brother Whigs had inherited the generous if inaccurate ideas of the 18th century. They still believed in the perfectibility of man and the omnipotence of education. In accordance with the teaching of Helvetius and Cabanis, Liberal opinion had come to regard the difference between the races of mankind as due to upbringing and not to history, to individual, not to age-long environment. The early French revolutionary leaders had thought it sufficient to strike off the fetters of the slave in order to transform him into a good citizen. In like manner Macaulay and Bentinck believed that the study of English would transform the Indian into an Englishman, and, as Macaulay said, create a

class, " Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect." In spite of the development of psychology and the change in educational ideas, much of this seems to have survived, and educated Indians are still criticized for not having fulfilled the ridiculous prophecy of the Whigs.

It is now, however, generally agreed that the abandonment of the endeavour to develop Western learning through the Eastern languages was a profound mistake. It is at least certain that the excessive use of English as the medium of instruction has rendered the educational system less effective than it should have been. The mere fact that the language of the schools is not the language of the home, cannot but have produced its necessary consequences. The boy lives in two worlds—one the world of books, dim, abstract, rarely touching his own experience; the other the world of life, warm and coloured and concrete, but rarely related to his books. Nor has he been taught to build a bridge from one to the other by the habit of translation. Our educationalists in India seem to have regarded the practice of translation from one tongue to another as vicious, probably because few of them have been sufficiently masters of two tongues to make the process instructive. In offering this criticism I may seem to commit an educational heresy and to ignore the advantages attendant on the " direct method " of language-teaching. But the truth is that, firstly, " direct method " as understood in Europe and as practised in India are very different things, and, secondly, " direct

methods" are wholly inapplicable to the more advanced studies. The result of instruction in English and the neglect of translation has been the lack of correlation between the boy's actual life and his studies in school. Consequently the latter have failed to influence the former as much as they might have done.

In no case could it be expected that the system of education established in India should be in advance of that practised in England. As a matter of fact it was much worse. The principal merit possessed by English education in the mid-19th century was the social and moral training provided in the great public schools and universities, in which the young taught themselves the necessity of compromise, obedience to public opinion, the art of leadership, the advantages of team-work. Under the influence of this vigorous training, well-adapted to benefit and brace the average individual, has been produced the sort of men who have made and upheld the Empire, who have created British commerce, who have made and continued English political life. But their training has been much more moral than intellectual, and better calculated to produce the practical virtues than the fine flower of scholarship. This indeed requires delicate faculties and easy circumstances, which the average person neither inherits from his parents nor acquires for himself. But the English system of education in India reproduced the defective English methods of intellectual instruction and omitted the vigorous system of training character and morals. In India neither schools nor

colleges were residential; the universities were mere examining bodies; the students remained individuals, they did not become members of a corporate body, they were not subjected to the intimate and manifold influences of the English public school and university.

(2) *The Development of the Indian Universities.*—Education in India since the Mutiny has run very much on the lines already laid down by the Company's government and the assumption of government by the Crown scarcely marks so clear an epoch as in other departments of policy. In this respect the new Charter Act of 1854 and the educational despatch of that year was the point of departure for a new policy which the Ministers of the Crown accepted. That despatch enunciated the great principle of popularizing Western education in India. Till then, the Directors said, the efforts of Government had been too narrowly restricted—there had been "too exclusive a direction of the efforts of Government towards providing the means of acquiring a very high degree of education for a small number of the natives of India, drawn for the most part from what we should here call the higher classes." The despatch accordingly directed the establishment of universities, the expansion of secondary education, the creation of normal schools, and the encouragement of missionary and other educational enterprise by the establishment of a system of grants in aid. "We are desirous," it declared, "of extending far more widely the means of acquiring general European knowledge."

The first step taken under this despatch was the establishment of Educational departments in place of those amateur committees to which the management of education had been confided at each Presidency. At first, however, the departments were nearly as amateur as the committees had been. The new Directors of Public Instruction were almost as likely to be soldiers or civil servants as educationalists. The main difference was that the new bodies were more officialized; the officials on the old committees had acted in their unofficial capacity; the men in charge of the Educational Departments, as Directors of Public Instruction at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay were primarily administrators, and education therefore tended to become a matter of administration and routine. At the same time the new departments were more liberally supplied with funds, they were provided with office establishments, inspectors were appointed, rules laid down.

The next step was to set up universities. In the crisis of the Mutiny, in the latter part of 1857, when the minds of every man in India were centred on Delhi, and Cawnpore and Lucknow, when the loyalty of the Native chiefs seemed to hang on a thread, and the foundations of the Empire shook beneath the blow it had received, Canning could still find time to assemble his Legislative Council and pass Acts for the furtherance of education. Universities were established at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. They were modelled on the University of London—and therefore not teaching but examining bodies. They had no particular powers

of control over the institutions affiliated to them. Control of examinations would, it was thought, give them all the means of influence that was required. Nor was a very exacting standard of examination adopted. The Directors had laid down a formula in 1854. The degrees of the universities were to be such as to command respect without being so difficult as to discourage the student. The great principle of the despatch was, as has been shown, to popularize English education. The ideal was on the whole faithfully followed. The University of Calcutta, in spite of Canning's reluctance, prescribed no minimum for the attainments which would be deemed worthy of a degree. The University of Madras prescribed small text-books or a chapter or two of more substantial works. The only person in India at that time to foresee the evils likely to result from this was the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, nephew of the great Anglo-Indian administrator and historian. He had from the first advocated the establishment of the same standard as that of the University of London. "The evil of inadequate general education," he said, "can only be averted by Government, and can be fully averted only at the very outset." To the objection that the adoption of the London standard would seriously diminish the size of the new universities, he rejoined: "Such a statement, if demonstrated, might be a very good argument for delaying the foundation of a university, but can never be accepted as a reason for deteriorating the quality of its degrees." And from the first there was a marked tendency to relax not very exacting

requirements. In 1857, at Calcutta, when 13 candidates only secured two degrees, and only 111 candidates were thought fit for admission out of 464, it was decided to lower the demand on the ground that the tests of degrees as originally fixed were too high to be compatible with the object of the university entrance and degree examinations, which was "to pass every student of ordinary ability who had fairly profited by the curriculum of school and college study which he had passed through."

From that time onwards the Indian universities have been the field of a "battle of the standards." Critics so early as 1867 declared that a university which merely examined was "an academical solecism." When the establishment of a Punjab University was under discussion in the following year, the Punjab authorities "hope that we shall avoid the error of modelling the university after that of Calcutta and constituting it a mere examining body. The main object of a university is not so much to test what students know as to guide them in their studies and to train them in proper methods of learning. . . . A university that shall be a mere examining body is . . . quite unsuited to the requirements of this country, where scientific method in study is almost unknown." These remarks offer a fair sample of what has been perpetually contended ever since the establishment of universities in India down to the time of Lord Curzon's Commission in 1902 and the Calcutta University Commission in 1916.

Much of this was due to a complete failure on the

part of everyone concerned to appreciate the distinction between a pass and an honours standard, a distinction, in fact, which only became consciously recognized in England itself in the course of the period in question. A pass degree in England was nothing but an indication of limited attainments. It represented the amount of knowledge which a man who need not earn his own living required in order to move without too much discomfort in refined society; professionally it was the minimum social and intellectual qualification for the man who intended to take holy orders, or to become a schoolmaster. It was then the academic label you would expect to find attached to the country squire or the country parson; but the man who was content with that was unlikely to find himself promoted to the bench of bishops or even invited to stand for Parliament. It was the mark of ordinary intelligence and ordinary application. The Honours degree was something different in nature. That was the mark of a man who had ambition beyond the ordinary—who desired a college fellowship, who looked to a political career, who after the establishment of competitive examinations hoped for admission into the higher Civil Service, in short, it was the mark of everyone who had his own way to make, and good brains to make it with. Now that became more and more the case with the Indian undergraduates. They were almost all poor, almost all desired to do the best they could for themselves with Government service as their first choice. In other words, they all belonged to the type which in England would have attempted to

take honours. In England many of them would have been weeded out before they entered a university, and many more before they had been in residence a twelve-month; but in India they had only to encounter pass standards and a pass examination.

It is perhaps regrettable that the University of London, which offered the first example for the Universities of India, was not allowed a more active share in their management, and that its papers and standards were not adopted as well as its organization. For in India there was no educational public, no educational criticism worth having, no public opinion to guide either the Government or the Universities themselves, no external standard by which Indian educational achievements could be measured. The adoption of the London papers would have brought the results of Indian education within the view of experienced English educationalists, would have elicited a more advised criticism than was anywhere available in India, and would perhaps have remedied errors before they had become too deep-seated for easy removal.

Meanwhile secondary education had been developing, too, though not nearly at the rate of university education. In 1865 there were only 390 boys at school for every undergraduate; but in 1886 the proportion had sunk to 314. There are now as many undergraduates in Bengal as in Great Britain and Ireland. The population of the two regions is approximately equal, but the openings for higher education in the latter are evidently much more numerous than in the former,

and, as only one-tenth of the population of Bengal is literate, the ratio of undergraduates to schoolboys is ten times what it is in England. The inference is that in England the undergraduate is more carefully picked, more intellectually select, than in Bengal. In India, universities have developed far more rapidly than any other branch of education. In this sense, and as compared with education in England, Indian education has been top-heavy.

(3) *The Educational Service.*—Nor was the intellectual training which was provided equal even to the defective pattern on which it was moulded. At the time when English education was established in India the study of English was still in its infancy. There were scores of men trained in and familiar with the languages and literatures of Greece and Rome for every one who possessed an equal familiarity with his own literature and language. They were not taught. Scholars in English of that day had to train themselves. They were few in number, and averse to abandoning their libraries in order to undertake the drudgery of teaching. Thus from the first the average schoolmaster and lecturer in India tended to be a second-rate man. There has never yet been gathered together under any Indian university the expert knowledge which is to be found within the walls of a single college at Oxford or Cambridge. Indeed Indian education only secured first-class men by accident. The number of those who have risen to any sort of eminence from the ranks of the educational service is curiously small, and educationalists of real talent have been much more frequent in missionary schools and

colleges than in Government institutions. The Englishmen who governed India were picked and well-paid men, those who taught India were not.

The ultimate blame for this must rest upon the shoulders of Government. Its educational policy has been distracted by incompatible objects. It proclaimed the need of educating India, but it tried to do so on the cheap. This comes out in many ways. It is shown by the way in which educational equipment was starved. It is shown by the expectation that a schoolmaster paid like a casual labourer could teach anything to anybody. It is shown by the recognition of secondary schools before provision had been made to staff them with efficient teachers. It is shown by the policy adopted towards the educational service which was supposed to be charged with the grave and vastly important duty of conducting education in India. Government in short declared war on ignorance without counting the cost.

The history of the Educational Service aptly illustrates the point, and goes some way towards accounting for the failure of the policy. In 1854, the Directors had observed that at first perhaps the heads of the new department should be filled from the ranks of the Government Civil Service, "but we desire that neither these offices nor any others connected with education shall be considered as necessarily to be filled with members of that service to the exclusion of others, Europeans or natives, who may be better fitted for them; and that in any case the scale of their remuneration shall be so fixed as publicly to recognize the important duties

they will have to perform." But the Government of India was more eager to show progress than to lay solid foundations. At Bombay it was proposed to establish two normal schools, one at Ahmedabad and the other at Poona, with six Europeans on the staffs on an average salary of 500 rupees a month. The Government of India pompously objected that this was "a scale . . . not inferior to the most elaborate European seminaries of that class." The proposal was supported by the opinion of Temple—then Headmaster of Rugby—who considered that the rates should be raised if able men were required. But cheaper men could be had for normal schools, and were recruited from the ranks of elementary school teachers; so that men like Mr. Paul Bradley, of *Our Mutual Friend*, were responsible for the training of Indian teachers. It was an egregious blunder. Such men, however competent in a narrow way, had neither the education nor the imagination needed to train Indian teachers. They proved a complete failure. When good men were secured, they were likely, as at Madras in 1868, to be promptly drafted off elsewhere.

Nor was the recruitment of the other educational posts satisfactory. In the early days a certain number of civilians were appointed not only as directors, but also occasionally as inspectors. But we may be fairly confident that the latter represented the bad bargains of the service, and under the Crown such appointments were definitely discouraged, along with those of officials of other departments, such as chaplains and the like.

Meanwhile appointments were made at haphazard. Sometimes a man of parts was selected, as when Edwin Arnold was appointed head of the Deccan College at Poona; but the general tendency was to prefer the cheaper and less qualified individual. Government as a whole was probably under the influence of the Philistinism dominant at home, and could not see why a mere educationalist should be well paid. Everywhere departmental convenience has been preferred, until very recent times, to educational interests; and the sort of man whom the departments really liked was one who was willing to be transferred from the teaching of history to the teaching of physics, and from that to the inspection of schools. Such a system necessarily destroyed all a man's interest in his work, and long rendered the higher instruction in a Government college decidedly inferior to that in a well-conducted missionary institution. Lastly, neither Government nor the departments realized the need of the teacher for leisure in which to collect his ideas and increase his knowledge. Such a thing was regarded by sturdy administrators as mere slackness.

Many causes thus contributed to emphasize and exaggerate the defects which would in any case have resulted from the careless and unsatisfactory recruitment to educational posts. But in few respects were these consequences more evident or more noxious than in the matter of the vernaculars. On the hypothesis which underlay the whole system of English education in India the members of the Educational Service should have acquired

a much more profound and literary knowledge of the history, customs and languages of the province in which they served than was required of the covenanted civilian who had merely to transact business. It is a comparatively easy matter to acquire sufficient conversational knowledge of a language to conduct the ordinary business of an office, and to understand the complaints and petitions of the ordinary inhabitants. But to learn enough to discuss in the vernacular with a cultivated Indian problems of history or antiquities or philosophy is a much more exacting matter. Yet the fact has been that the educational official has seldom acquired even the practical acquaintance with the vernacular possessed by the ordinary covenanted civilian. The tests prescribed by Government were ridiculous, mainly because Government could not make up its mind to give the educationalist the leisure necessary for successful linguistic studies; and the educationalist, dealing almost entirely with Indians already acquainted with English, lay under no personal necessity of acquiring the knowledge for himself.

The general policy of Government thus subjected Indian university education to many defects. It only recruited men of parts by accident; it gave them small chance of becoming proficient in any branch of learning; the work required of them was elementary, for until recent years it never rose above a pass standard, and exhausting, for their classes swelled to a great size. Who can be surprised if in such circumstances their work was perfunctory or that the Indians who emerged out

of such a system into eminence felt they owed their success to their own talents, and had secured it in spite of, rather than by means of, the English system of Indian education?

(4) *The Professional Classes.*—In these conditions there sprang up in India what is usually described as the "educated class" of Indians. In some respect the term is a misnomer, for it seems to exclude from the honour of education those who have not been educated on the Western model. In many ways this class corresponds with our middle-classes here in England, for it includes the lawyers and doctors, the journalists and Government servants; but this term is too wide, for the class in India includes only a few of the great body of traders and bankers who form so large, powerful and wealthy a section of the class in England. Again, in England the middle-classes are closely linked up both with the aristocracy and with the working-classes; transition from one to another is gradual, inter-marriage unrestricted, and the definition of boundaries uncertain; this is not the case in India, where the influence of caste has hindered a classification of society based in the main on the continued possession of certain degrees of wealth which involve corresponding types of manners and culture. In India the educated class is characterized more by occupation than by a specific degree of wealth. It is much narrower than the English middle-class in that it does not include the occupation of commerce; and that it is not linked up with the other broad sections by intercourse and intermarriage. It forms a professional class, originally

limited to members of certain castes with traditions of literary occupation, and even now only gradually extending its recruitment to the other castes of Hinduism, together with a certain Muslim leaven.

This professional class, as it may best be called, has long possessed a feeling of unity incomparably greater than that existent in any other section of the Indian population. The trader, the landowner and the cultivator of the different provinces, and even of different parts of the same province, have been conscious of class and individual interests, but have had little general, little national sentiment. Their patriotism was severely localized; it was limited by caste, by creed, by language. The professional class has been the first to transcend this particularism, though even there the narrowness of outlook still survives to animate the Maratha and the Sikh. But with allowance made for this survival, the professional class has a sense of solidarity to be found nowhere else in India. Its members are consciously Indian. They have in English a common language; from their education and their press they have drawn a common stock of ideas; by occupation they lead similar lives and are inspired by similar interests and similar ambitions, from Karachi to Calcutta, and from Madura to Lahore. In 1858 they were few in number; but with the establishment of the universities they began to grow, and in the latter part of the period they have grown with great and ever-increasing rapidity.

(5) *The Employment of Indians.*—This illustrates the success which attended the Company's desire

"of extending far more widely the means of acquiring general European knowledge." But the success was chequered, for the policy framed to give effect to the Company's pious desires was curiously lacking in provision for the future; it was not consistent with itself. Government set to work to develop education, but neglected to encourage an expansion of employment corresponding to the growth of the professional class. It should have realized that there was a limit, imposed by the existing economic condition of India, to the extent to which doctors and lawyers, press-men and schoolmasters could be maintained. There were two other avenues of employment—one the service of Government, the other the service of industry. The first was not capable of indefinite expansion, the second was. A wise Government would have sought to do what Lord Reay attempted at Bombay towards the close of the century—endeavoured seriously to establish and expand technical education, both higher and lower. Had this been accompanied by a measure of protection, and a limit imposed on the expansion of merely literary education, forces might have been set at work to absorb the professional classes as fast as they were produced. Such a policy was, however, inconceivable. Free-trade ideas, English interests and traditional ideas of education alike forbade it; and so the only provision made by Government to meet the needs of the new class of Indians was their slow and reluctant admission into the upper grades of the Government departments.

The history of the employment of Indians under

the Government of India is indeed singular. In order thoroughly to anglicize the administration, Cornwallis began by filling all the higher administrative posts with Europeans His executive orders were invested with legislative permanence by the Charter Act of 1793, which forbade the employment of any but a covenanted servant of the Company in all but a few specified posts bearing more than £800 a year. This was not vice on the Company's part. It was on the contrary the result of a strong desire to improve the administration of the Company's territories. The exclusion of all but covenanted servants was aimed far more at European adventurers and political jobbery than at Indians. The Act of 1833 was conceived on more liberal principles. It attempted to substitute competition for nomination as the means of recruiting the Covenanted Service, and it contained the famous clause declaring that no one should be debarred from holding any post by reason of race or religion. The Directors succeeded in evading the first; the second could produce no practical effect so long as the higher posts remained the close preserve of a nominated service. Bentinck raised the pay and position of the Indians employed in the Judicial Department. Dalhousie endeavoured to find new posts for them. But in spite of the views of Munro, Malcolm and Elphinstone, the higher Government officials formed a closer caste than had even the *mansabdars* of Akbar.

The beginning of the change came in 1854, when the principle of competitive entrance into the Covenanted Service was forced upon the Company,

and in 1858, when the government was assumed by the Crown. It then became possible for the first time since 1793 for Indians to enter the higher ranks of Government service in their own country. But though legally possible, it was still almost impracticable. The competitive examinations were based upon European education and could only be taken at London. Indians were thus required to possess a relatively high degree of European knowledge. For this they needed to study in England, and therefore not only to undertake the voyage to England, which the condition of examination prescribed in any case, but also to make a prolonged stay in England. The Muslim in this respect was faced by no religious difficulty, but he had never taken to Western education, and was altogether out of the running. The Hindu, and especially the Brahman, had shown the greatest willingness to absorb Western knowledge, but could not make the long voyage or live in Europe without violating long-established rules of caste. In time the effort was made, the caste-rules were ignored, Indians began to come to England, and the first to succeed in breaking into the Covenanted Civil Service was Satyendra Nath Tagore in 1863. From that time a slender stream of Indians began to trickle into the ranks of the Indian Civil Service. By the High Courts Act of 1861, Indians became eligible for the highest judicial posts. The oft-quoted pledge of the Queen's proclamation—"That as far as may be, our subjects of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may

be qualified by their education, ability and integrity duly to discharge "—had been more or less fulfilled. At least the bar had been removed.

(6) *The Statutory Civil Service.*—But no one could seriously expect the Indian to remain content with this; and Government can hardly be acquitted of a singular failure to observe the tendency of the times. When flood-waters have to be carried off, the prudent engineer does not wait to see the point of least resistance determined by the breaking of the dam; on the contrary he builds sluices at the points where the surplus water can be best carried off. It seems to me that the policy which has actually been followed—that of admitting Indians to the Indian Civil Service when they had met and overcome difficulties greater than those which the English candidates had to meet—was one calculated to foster jealousy on the one side, and discontent on the other, and much more likely to promote than to soothe racial jealousy, as may indeed be seen from the embittered controversies still proceeding about the composition, recruitment, pay and privileges of the Indian services.

With one exception the policy followed has been that of nominally admitting Englishman and Indian on equal terms. That was the idea underlying the proposals made by Lawrence, when Governor-General, to establish scholarships which would make it less difficult for Indians to compete successfully in the open examinations. These proposals were suddenly shelved, almost before they had come into operation, in favour of a scheme that was to be talked over for ten years, and seriously tried for

two. In 1870 the Duke of Argyll carried a Civil Service Act through Parliament enabling Indians to be appointed to listed posts even though they had not fulfilled the conditions of the Act of 1858, i.e., entered the Indian Civil Service by competition. This was to come into force under rules to be arranged by the Secretary of State and Governor-General in Council. But the discussion lasted from 1870 until 1878, when at last it terminated in Lytton's Statutory Civil Service.

Lytton is one of those Governors-General who have seldom received the recognition they deserved. His superficial defects, his sharp pen, his unconventional ways, made him many enemies. But for all that he was a man of deep insight. It is curious to note how in more than one instance his political enemies were compelled to adopt measures very similar to those which they had unreservedly condemned when proceeding from him. We have already seen Lord Ripon, after ransacking the records of his predecessor in the expectation of finding schemes for the conquest of the moon, adopt Lytton's policy in his final settlement with Afghanistan, and find it very difficult to induce the Liberal Government to concur. Lytton's Vernacular Press Act was repealed by Ripon, but in later years another Liberal, Lord Morley, was induced by circumstances to consent to a Press Act. And though Lytton's Statutory Civil Service has found few friends, it was based on ideas which if they had been consistently followed would have anticipated and avoided many of the later difficulties that have emerged.

Already he found established that cult of efficiency

which, paradoxical as it may seem, has been the bane of Indian administrators under the Crown. The problem of Indian government, as they have been apt to view it, has been how to establish and maintain a Western system of administration, with all its complex departments and elaborate activities, in a poor Eastern country, mainly devoted to agriculture, and not producing a tithe (per head of population) of what is produced in a Western manufacturing country. So they tended to lose sight of the broad fact that India could not afford more than a good cheap despotism. Various concurrent causes led them into this error. One was the influence, enormously reinforced after 1858, of ideas from England, leading to an attempt to do everything as it was done at home; another was the criticism directed at Government by the newly educated class and their organs in the press, which tended to attack the simpler, old-fashioned methods of India; a third was the influence of communications which strengthened the central Government and enabled it to interfere with much greater vigour than in the past. This cult of efficiency has been the stumbling-block in the way of the increased employment of Indians under Government, and has thus not only imposed an unduly expensive system of government on the country, but also fostered discontent among those who have watched post after post created and filled by Englishmen. As Lord Minto observed with great truth, "Efficiency goes too far if it carries with it a sense of injustice, and less efficiency may well mean a happier administration."

It was much to Lytton's credit that he discerned this fact a generation earlier. "I am convinced," he wrote to Salisbury in 1877, "that the fundamental political mistake of able and experienced Indian officials is a belief that we can hold India securely by what they call good government. . . . Politically speaking, the Indian peasantry is an inert mass. If it ever moves at all, it will move in obedience not to its British benefactors, but to its native chiefs and princes. . . . Look at the mistake which Austria made in the government of her Italian provinces. They were the best-governed portions of Italy; she studied and protected the interests of the native peasantry; but . . . the peasantry either remained passive or else followed the lead of its national superiors in attacking its alien benefactor." Efficiency then was not enough to keep India contented. Lytton then went on to lay his finger on the weakest point of the British case—the failure to employ Indians, more particularly at and down to this time, the Indians of the old ruling or wealthy families. "Under the present system," he wrote in 1879, "we are practically bound by law and custom to appoint Europeans to all the higher posts. To appoint a native to any such post is an altogether exceptional act for which we are obliged to show very special reasons or obtain special authority. What I say is—shift this condition, at least in regard to a certain number of high appointments. . . . In regard to these particular appointments let the general rule be laid down that *prima facie* natives only are to hold them. . . . Define more clearly the promises which have

been given so vaguely—indeed so rashly. Cautiously circumscribe them, but then make them realities within their necessary limits."

His proposals ultimately led to his Statutory Civil Service—so called because based upon the Act of 1870. Under rules at last drawn up in 1879, 20 per cent. of the recruitment for the superior Civil Service in any one year might be made from Indians selected by the Local Governments. This was followed by a resolution directing the Local Governments generally to confine their selection to young men of good family and social position to whom employment in the uncovenanted service had not offered sufficient attractions.

The working of the scheme did not realize Lytton's expectations. The young men of good family and social position preferred living at ease to undertaking the burdens of official duty, the regularity of employment, the rules and subordination imposed on even the superior civil servant. It was not surprising. It might even have been predicted from the experience of Europe. The class from which the civil services of Europe are nominally drawn is not the aristocracy, but the middle-class. The same thing happened in India. The Statutory Civil Service in a few years became a mode of promotion out of the old uncovenanted service. The arrangement was confirmed by the Public Services Commission of 1886, and so the Lytton plan came to an end. Its net result had been to open an avenue of promotion for the Indians of the Uncovenanted Service into the higher range of posts.

(7) *The Expansion of the Government Services and the Competitive System.*—The main criticism to which English policy is open regarding the employment of Indians in the Indian Services lies in this—that while expansion of the services went on, the European element was allowed perpetually to grow. Thus in Mysore under British administration a vast change took place after 1860. Cubbon who had ruled it for 26 years managed the whole country with no more than eight European assistants, and managed it admirably; but his successors swiftly expanded the Europeans employed in Mysore until they numbered more than ten times as many as Cubbon had required. As a critic observed, a new department of Public Works was created, to build jails instead of irrigation dams. This was an extreme case, even for India under Crown administration; but between 1867 and 1903 the number of Europeans receiving over 1,000 rupees a month rose from 638 to 1,278.

This was not a mere wanton increase. It is probable that a good case was made out for every augmentation, and what was done was the resultant of two main ideas—one, which goes back to the time of Cornwallis, that the Government is British, and must be conducted on British lines; the other reflecting the closer connection between the policies of London and Calcutta since the Mutiny, requiring the Indian Government to imitate all the activities of a modern European Government. But for the first, the swelling cadres might have been filled with Indians; but for the second the cadres need not have swollen.

In this respect the English Government has suffered from the defects of its qualities. Its intentions have been benevolent; but the benevolence has been displayed rather in providing India with a good and efficient government than in training Indian administrators. A less efficient Government more largely staffed with well-paid Indians, would not have been exposed in India to nearly as much criticism, always tending to pass into hostility; but it would probably have been exposed to much more constant attack in London by advanced Liberal opinion. At the moment it was easier to ignore the first than to oppose the second. Successive Secretaries of State have preferred the line of least resistance, especially as it coincided with their own natural inclinations.

Moreover, the existence of the competitive system as the source of recruitment of the dominant service in itself tended to strengthen the cult of efficiency, while at the same time it tended to facilitate the extension of the activities of Government. For on the whole it encouraged men of the type of Macaulay at the expense of men of the type of Munro. Macaulay would have headed the list; Munro might possibly have crept in at the bottom. It certainly raised the intellectual level of the Civil Service. So far it was all to the good. But administrative talent is a different thing, and in that respect the new service was less clearly an improvement on the old, for such talent may easily be possessed in a high degree by a man who is not facile with the pen. As a means of recruiting a civil service such as that of England, competition

is unsurpassed. The civil servant here has one function; he is a subordinate carrying out the orders of Parliamentary Ministers and seldom invited to give his opinion in matters of policy. Political functions are limited to Parliament or the popularly elected organs of local government. But in India the subordinate and the political functions were performed by the same service. A member of the Civil Service might begin his career by performing the functions not only of magistrate, but also of head-constable, County Surveyor and County Council; he might end it by holding an office not unlike that of Home Secretary or Chancellor of the Exchequer. While competition affords an admirable criterion of a man's qualities as an efficient servant, it affords no criterion at all of his qualities as a wise leader.

Furthermore, it broke down the traditional relation between a certain group of families and the administration of India. On all democratic theory such a relation is indefensible; but none the less such aristocratic principles have had their use as a stage of development in human history, and it is, I think, open to doubt whether this Anglo-Indian aristocracy was not swept away too early. It did not guarantee a high degree of cleverness; but it did secure a reasonable standard of ability, and it provided men whose early breeding inspired them with an affection for India, an inclination to study Indian ways and origins, a habit of considering Indian languages, religions and customs, of which they had heard from their earliest childhood, as subjects meriting the closest attention and regard

and study, not merely as a means of professional advancement, but as an end in itself. They were to use the cant word of modern times, more naturally sympathetic than the successful passer of examinations. Perhaps Frere was prejudiced against the Competition Wallahs, but he wrote : "Some of our most useless and unpopular men among the natives are the very men whose intellectual powers are of a very high order."

The degree in which the introduction of the competitive system broke down the connection between certain families and the Covenanted Service is remarkable. Of the successful candidates between 1855 and 1874 only 7 per cent. were sons of members of the Service. For a while the old Anglo-Indian families were able to maintain the connection by sending their sons into the English Army, where they secured commissions in regiments stationed in or about to proceed to India, and so, by way of the Staff Corps, secured appointments in the Non-Regulation Provinces. But gradually this avenue too was narrowed down, so that the Indian administration tended more and more to pass out of the hands of those whose interests in India were a matter of family pride and tradition. From the point of view of efficiency it was no doubt a gain; from the point of view of racial relations it was a loss which has never been made good.

CHAPTER IX

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SENTIMENT

THE various attempts to open out employment for Indians in the higher ranks of the bureaucracy came to little, partly owing to the natural reluctance of the Covenanted Service to share its power, partly owing to the laudable desire of maintaining a high standard of Government efficiency according to Western standards. But success in this matter, however gratifying to individual Indians and their families would have left one great question untouched. Even if the recruitment of Englishmen to the services had ceased altogether, the Government would still have been despotic in the most complete sense. It would still have been exposed to the attacks of those Indians who did not form part of the ruling services, for at the most liberal estimate they could not have found employment for the whole of the educated class. It was natural therefore for reformers, whether English or Indian, to look for some method of gradually changing the system of government, so as to modify it in the direction of current political ideals. Reform indeed was becoming inevitable. The rule of law, which the English Government had succeeded in establishing, was

bearing its fruit. Indians, as Maine said, in the constant presence of courts and lawyers, were every day becoming less disposed to regard an executive order as a decree of Providence, and more conscious of positive rights, not dependent on opinion or custom, but capable of being actively enforced. The notion that a modification of Government was inevitable became common. In 1861, the Financial Member in the Legislative Council alluded to a future when India would be a nation with active political life; the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Sir George Campbell, told a large Bengali audience in Calcutta that he looked forward to the day when a Bengali House of Commons would be sitting in the very chamber where he spoke. Efforts in this direction followed two main lines—one, the association of Indians with the business of local government; the other, their association with the business of legislation.

(1) *Local Self-Government.*—Both of these, it will be observed, involved radical departures in political principle. The essential basis of the Government of India was a centralized despotism, under which, however much might be done for the people, nothing was done by them ; and in India circumstances made the Central Government more than usually jealous of sub-dividing its power. Its finance depended upon the land, and upon the land cultivated by peasants in small holdings; industry was decayed; and commerce, though considerable in itself, was small when compared with the area of the country and the density of the population. But such economic conditions militate

against any easy political transition. The extension of political power takes place most easily when class merges into class by imperceptible stages, and when the new claimants to power already possess economic weight. Political development in India would have proceeded with least friction and difficulty if the bureaucracy had called into its councils, and invested with a partnership in its power, first the great land-holders, and then the great merchants of India. Perhaps the severest criticism that should be passed on the educational system is that it failed to catch these obvious partners in British rule, while it catered for those who lacked wealth or lands with which to back their political pretensions. This disjunction of property and education impeded every attempt to widen the basis of British rule.

The idea of political development in India is neither recent nor Indian in origin. The views of that great man, Sir Thomas Munro, are familiar, and have been often quoted of late years. In 1824, he looked forward to the time when "it will probably be best for both countries that the British control over India should be gradually withdrawn." He did not stand alone. His contemporary, Elphinstone, though regarding the end of the Empire as more likely to be brought about by foreign attack or military mutiny, considered that if those dangers were avoided British rule might be terminated by Indian progress reaching "such a pitch as would render it impossible for a foreign nation to retain the Government." Lord Hastings, usually remembered only as the military Governor-General who

overthrew the Marathas, declared : "A time not very remote will arrive when England will on sound principles of policy wish to relinquish the domination which she has gradually and unintentionally assumed over this country, and from which she cannot at present recede." This was in 1818.

These views represent the best aspect of British policy in India, nor need we be surprised if ideas which ran counter to personal interests took some time before they emerged into the sphere of practice. We find examples of such delay in every country and every age. We may follow the ideas of Munro and Elphinstone and Lord Hastings down through the best Indian administrators to the time of Dalhousie and Canning. The great difficulty was how to begin; and the problem seemed much more difficult to men of the early and middle 19th century than to their successors, whose political thought has been deeply affected by the idea of evolution. The first experiments were naturally made in the sphere of local government, and were based on English experience. In England local government had on the whole tended to remain in the hands of local persons, rather than the paid agents of the monarchy. In Saxon times the affairs of the shire were managed by the Earl and folk-moot ; as the monarchy grew in power, the change was reflected in the powers of the Sheriff who came more and more closely to resemble the collector of an Indian district. But his preponderance was not of long duration. Justices of the peace, local magnates appointed to maintain order and administer the criminal law, rapidly grew in importance after

their first appearance; their functions spread to every branch of local administration, and from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century affairs were almost entirely under their control. In England then there had been three stages—the first popular; the second bureaucratic; the third aristocratic; and the last of these was that with which Englishmen in the nineteenth century were familiar, and which they first attempted to introduce in India. In this their political instinct was sound, not, of course, because aristocratic institutions are the best in themselves, but because political stability is best secured by the union of political and economic influence in the same hands.

The first definite attempts to associate Indians with the government of their country, apart from subordinate positions in the various services, were made by Canning. Like a good Whig, he was aghast to find great landlords wholly without political influence or functions of any kind, and taking example from the local administration with which he was familiar at home, he began the experiment of entrusting landlords in various provinces—taluqdars, zemindars, and jagirdars—with magisterial functions. In this he encountered much support and much opposition in the Covenanted service. Frere, for instance, warmly approved. "I am convinced," he wrote to Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State, "that it is the greatest and most urgently needed of all improvements on this side of India, and I cannot imagine how society and the administration have kept together so long without it." And again in an official minute of

1861 : "It often afterwards occurred to me as a fact of almost portentous significance, that from the borders of Oudh back to Calcutta . . . I might travel for a whole day through many an estate of princely extent yielding a vast income and immense influence to its owner, but that no one of these owners could exercise the legal authority of a parish constable . . . unless he happened to be one of the few dozen of honorary magistrates who have within the last few months and at the instance of the Government of India been appointed in Bengal."

On the other hand, the move was sharply criticized by the revenue officials, who favoured the recognition of peasant proprietors or village joint-proprietors rather than that of great landlords. These objected that the newly-made magistrates would use their power to enforce their own rent demands. But, on the whole, so long as Canning remained in India, the step was regarded with favour. Canning himself believed it a great thing, urging it upon his correspondents in England as a development that should be closely watched. In a letter to Lord Granville he dwells on the visible change that had taken place in the demeanour of the taluqdars of Oudh. On a recent visit to Lucknow he had met sixteen or seventeen who had displayed particular activity as magistrates, and found the sullen hang-dog look they had worn 18 months before replaced by one of confidence and self-possession. "The feeling . . . that they are trusted," he wrote, "and that it is intended . . . that their authority shall be treated with respect by English

as well as natives of all classes has made men of them."

Yet the plan came to little enough. It led no further. It neither introduced the Indian aristocracy to political life nor brought about their active co-operation with the Government. The reason may be found in a curiously prophetic letter written by Canning himself in 1860 discussing the selection of his successor. "Who is to be my successor . . ?" he asks. "If John Lawrence, he will go far towards upsetting in a year or two all that I hope to have accomplished in my last three years, both in Oudh and in the Punjab. He will not do it by direct means—I can make that very difficult for any man—but by giving a cold shoulder to all measures for increasing the consequence of and placing trust in the native chiefs and gentry generally. . . . A sneer or a shrug from the incoming Governor-General pointed at some unhappy Sirdar or Talookdar who had blundered in his duties, would be a signal for consigning the whole class once more to snubs and obstructions, although the system might remain undisturbed on paper, so far as the Home Government knew anything about it."

This seems very much what actually happened. Honorary magistrates continued to exist and to be appointed ; but the idea never developed. Canning planted, but his successors neither watered nor reaped, and the attempt marks a lost opportunity of bringing the Indian land-holders into political life.

Odd as it seems, the Indian Government of a

later date preferred institutions of a more democratic pattern. Laws had been passed in 1842 and 1850 permitting municipalities to be established in the larger centres of population, and from much earlier times the three Presidency towns had had municipal organizations of their own. The period following Canning's administration was marked by the rapid development of municipal policy. Special Acts were passed for the main provinces of British India except Bombay which preferred continuing under the old Act of 1850; and many municipalities were set up by the provincial governments. These were mainly in the hands of nominated commissioners, and were instituted principally with a view to improving urban sanitation. Under Lord Mayo their sphere of activity was enlarged. The Resolution on Provincial Finance in 1870 declared that "local interest, supervision and care are necessary to success in the management of funds devoted to education, sanitation, medical, charity and local public works." A new group of municipal Acts was therefore passed, to enable these bodies to undertake the functions thus defined, and the system of election, which till then had been limited in law to Bengal, the North-West Provinces and the Punjab, and in fact to the last two, was extended, though the Central Provinces is said to have been the one province where it was introduced with success. Finally, under Lord Ripon a third series of Acts was passed in 1883-84, extending the elective system, and introducing the election of private persons instead of officials as chairmen. While these changes were in progress the con-

stitutions of the three great Presidency towns were more than once revised and enlarged. In 1856 all three were under the conduct of paid commissioners; but elected councillors gradually took their places, and especially in Bombay the Corporation displayed considerable activity and interest.

In rural areas local self-government has been of later and slower growth. This dates from 1865, but only began effectually with Lord Mayo's measure of financial decentralization, which included the development of local self-government as part of the policy; this led to the appointment of committees to administer funds available for local purposes in rural areas. They were principally concerned with roads. These beginnings were much developed under Ripon's resolution, which led to legislation in various provinces establishing a Local Board in each district, with subordinate boards, commonly representing the revenue subdivisions. In some provinces *panchayats*, representing groups of villages, were also set up. The minor boards were commonly nominated, but normally a considerable proportion of the district boards were elected by the members of the minor boards. The chairman was almost everywhere nominated; and in the district boards he was almost invariably the collector of the district.

These admirably intentioned proposals were on the whole cast too much in the mould of Western ideas; and it is interesting to compare what was actually done by Lord Mayo and Lord Ripon with what was advised by Sir Bartle Frere, the mid-Victorian administrator who perhaps most recalls

the type of Munro and Malcolm. The true despot, he observed, is the ruler who most needs to know public opinion. He therefore advocated village councils, comprising the chief people of the village—thus basing his system, as Government failed to do, on a natural unit. These village councils were intended (1) to make presentments on all matters touching the village itself, and (2) to provide an electorate for the choice of members of the councils which should be set up in each district. These district councils should comprise not only the members deputed from the villages, but also the principal land-holders—jagirdars, inamdars, etc.—who should have seats of right, and who would be allowed a precedence in seat and debate. Here we notice three departures from the scheme finally adopted. The first is the absence of the minor sub-divisional boards, which actually represented an area too wide to admit the local patriotism of the village, and too narrow to deal with matters of any weight ; in fact these minor boards are said to have worked worse than the district boards. The second is the specific recognition accorded to the large landowner as such. It may be said that Ripon's scheme left plenty of room for them among the nominated members ; but there was in India a good deal of difference between sitting on equal seats all round a table and holding a position proportioned to traditional rank in a public durbar. The landowner would probably have attended Frere's district council ; he cared nothing for membership, elective or nominative, of the District Boards. The third point of difference is that the

District Board was meant to be a body dealing with specific matters and exercising specific powers ; it administered the affairs of the local funds. But Frere's District Council would have been quite a different kind of body. It must have been deliberative rather than executive ; it was designed as an organ of public opinion rather than administration ; it was to be consulted on all matters touching the district ; it was to express the rural needs in the rural vernacular ; wisely and patiently managed it might have gradually acquired a prescriptive right of determination, and the collector have been gradually transformed from its master into its expert adviser. Such a possibility was ruled out in the case of Ripon's district boards by their narrow functions, their limited powers, their incompletely representative character.

All these experiments in local self-government were intended to form part of the political education of the people. Mayo said : " The operation of this resolution . . . will afford opportunity for the development of self-government . . . and for the association of Natives and Europeans to a greater extent than heretofore in the administration of affairs." Ripon was even more emphatic. "It is not primarily," he said, " with a view to improvement in administration that this measure is put forward and supported. It is chiefly desirable as a measure of political and popular education." It cannot, however, be claimed that the measure succeeded in this respect ; and the principal discussions have consisted in controversy over the cause of this disappointing conclusion. On the

whole the official view has been that Indians were not ripe for self-government; the Indian view, on the contrary, is that these institutions were never given powers sufficient to arouse interest in their duties, or liberty to do as they deemed best. The evidence recorded before the Decentralization Commission contains many statements on the two sides. The truth seems to be that the official ideals of efficiency were not sufficiently relaxed to tolerate the inevitable errors of popular experiment, and that the scheme in itself was too artificial and Westernized to attract any but those possessed of Western education, and too limited in its operation to fulfil the educative functions that were expected from it.

(2) *Development of the Legislative Councils.*—Until 1833 legislation in India had no special organ. The same bodies made laws and issued executive orders. Laws were only differentiated from the latter in form; nor indeed was there apart from the British Parliament any body capable of legislating for British India as a whole. The Government of Bengal could control the executive action of the other Presidency Governments, and indirectly, through its control of their executive governments, it could control their legislation also; but it was formally empowered to pass laws only for the territories under its immediate management; and the laws that were passed were binding only on Indians, not on Europeans, unless registered in the Supreme Court, an indignity to which Government never submitted.

The first change in this position was made by

the Act of 1833. The Company's monopoly of the Indian trade, attacked in 1793, had been abolished in 1813; and now its trading functions disappeared altogether. "The Company of merchants trading into the East Indies" now definitely ceased to be a commercial body. That meant that the conduct of trade with India would in future be entirely conducted by private persons. Hitherto such private traders had required the Company's licence to proceed to India, and had been liable to immediate deportation for misconduct. It was felt that this system was too much at variance with English customs to continue; but at the same time there was a general agreement that the population of India could not be handed over to the commercial exploitation of Europeans. Hence a decision to strengthen the Government in India, and to empower it to make laws equally binding on Indians and Europeans alike; and, as Englishmen were accustomed only to legislatures popularly elected, special precautions were needed before such powers could be given to a despotic government like that of India. Therefore in 1833 all legislative power was confined to the Government of Bengal, henceforth known as the Government of India, and, as a further safeguard, a Legal Member was added to the Government, to examine and advise on all legislative projects. As this new member's duties were confined to legislation, his appointment marks the first differentiation of the Legislative from the Executive Council.

A further step was taken by the Act of 1853. The centralized legislature had not known very

much about the subordinate presidencies of Bombay and Madras, and now each government was authorized to depute a member each to sit in the new Legislative Council, which comprised the four Executive Councillors (including the Law Member, who now became an ordinary member of Executive Council), the representatives of Bombay, Madras, Bengal and the North-West Provinces, and the Chief Justice and another Judge of the Supreme Court of Calcutta. Differentiation was thus advanced a long step, and the change was emphasized by the rules for the conduct of business introduced by Dalhousie. These were modelled on the English procedure. Bills were read the first time without debate ; on the second reading the general principle was debated ; the details were then referred to a committee for report within three months ; on report the Bill was considered in a committee of the whole house ; and finally read a third time and passed. The Madras member proposed that speeches might be read ; but this was rejected without a division.

It is curious to observe that as soon as this body had been constituted, official as it was, it began to display a marked tendency towards independence. The President of the Board, Sir Charles Wood, demanded that it should submit to him all legislative projects before they were introduced. Dalhousie replied that he was sure they would do nothing of the sort. Wood rejoined plaintively that he had never meant to invest them with any independent powers at all. "I do not look upon it," said he, "as some of the young Indians do, as the nucleus

and beginning of a constitutional parliament in India." "I am unable to see," answered the Governor-General, "that I have conceded to the Legislative Council any greater power than the law clearly confers upon it." When the Council and the Court fell out over the trivial question as to whether the Administrator-General should receive 3 or 5 per cent. on the estates he wound up, and the Court directed an Act to be amended in accordance with their wishes, the Legislative Council bluntly resolved that the Court had not the power to require the Council to enact any law it pleased. Wood was much disturbed at the undutiful though legal conduct of his offspring. He repeated again and again—as though repetition would invest his words with more authority—that he had never meant anything of the sort, that he had introduced the Bill himself, and that he had never understood it as conferring such powers. He was neither the first nor the last legislator to fail in limiting the consequences of a Bill to his intentions.

This ridiculous position continued until 1861. When the Indian Councils Act was passed by the Imperial Parliament, Wood, firmly resolved not to repeat his former mistake, excluded the Chief Justice and puisné judge who had occupied seats *ex officio*, and who, though in the forefront of revolt, had therefore been irremovable; moreover he abolished the nominees of the subordinate governments. The new Council was to consist of the Governor-General's Executive Council together with not less than six or more than twelve persons, of whom not more than half might be

officials, nominated by the Governor-General for two years. Moreover the functions of this Council were explicitly restricted to legislation. It could not therefore call for papers, or receive and discuss petitions, as the former Council had dared to do. These precautions must have seemed ample to secure the proper subordination of the Legislative Council to the wishes of the Executive. The Governor-General could always command a majority; he could get rid of a troublesome councillor within two years at longest, and the Council could do nothing except discuss Bills which had afterwards twice to run the risk of veto, first by the Governor-General and then by the Secretary of State. It was perhaps significant of the spirit of the new legislature that it tolerated that practice of reading speeches—so indicative of calm, mature, and possibly futile deliberation—which the former Council had rejected from the very first.

Into an assembly thus sedulously protected from misusing its little powers, it was thought possible to introduce Indian members. This was what Dalhousie, to whom sympathy with Indian desires is seldom attributed, had wished to do in the former Council. Now it was allowed, though you might search every clause of the Act in vain for any specific reference to Indian members. This was very much in accordance with what has come to be a rule for Imperial Acts relating to India. They must be examined quite as much for the restrictions which they omit as for the positive directions which they include. The High Courts Act of the same year permitted the appointment of Indian judges,

one of the earliest large steps forward, without specific ment'on. The Act of 1892 admitted of but nowhere commanded the introduction of the elective principle into the Indian legislatures; the Acts of 1908 and 1919 can hardly be understood without reference to the circumstances in which they were passed, and the rules which the Government of India was authorized by them to make. In like manner in 1861 Canning was empowered to nominate Indian members to his Legislative Council because the Act contained no definition of any kind regarding the half-dozen non-officials whom he might name.

I do not know with whom this proposal actually originated; but it had been urged upon the Home Government by Dalhousie in the course of the discussions preceding the Charter Act of 1853. The Mutiny probably explains why a measure that was rejected in 1853 was conceded in 1861. No doubt many besides the wise and moderate Saiyid Ahmad attributed much of that irreparable misfortune to a complete failure to gauge public feeling in India, and thought with him that Government's task would be much easier if it could take regular counsel with leading Indians. That idea was now realized. In 1862 were nominated the Maharajah of Pattiala, the Rajah of Benares, and Sir Dinkar Rao. All three, it will be observed, knew much more about the Native than about British systems of administration. The first was the Sikh chief who at the time of the Mutiny had taken so resolute a line in favour of the English Government; the second quasi-master of a zemin-

dari of almost princely rank ; and the third the minister whose wise and uncorrupt management had restored Holkar's dominions to a state of prosperity. The next group of nominations consisted of three great zemindars. Presently these and their like were reinforced by retired officials like Sir Saiy'd Ahmad ; and in the 'eighties we begin to find merchants, editors and lawyers represented in the Council.

The Legislative Council established in 1861 was, as we have seen, too narrowly hedged round with restrictions of various kinds to be able of itself to assert the least shadow of independence. It is therefore the more remarkable to find the Executive Council taking up the cudgels on behalf of its legislative sister. More than once do we find the former endeavouring to reassert the claim of the peccant Council of 1853 to be something more than the mere mouth-piece of the Home Government. So early as 1865 Lawrence's Government attempted to protest against Wood's claim to dictate what laws should be passed in India ; Wood indeed rejoined that he had never presumed to dictate to the non-official members ; but as he admittedly dictated to the Executive Government which commanded a majority of voices in the Council, his disclaimer did not amount to much.

He had indeed signified in the plainest way his opinion of the Indian legislature by setting up in London in the very year of its creation the body known as the Indian Law Commission. As usual there were excellent reasons for the step. It was a time of great legislative activity. Indian law was

in a state of great confusion. It urgently required to be examined and codified. The former Law Commission which had sat in India had produced no tangible results. The work to be done was complicated and difficult ; it demanded the services of the most skilled jurists and draftsmen. Wood's decision can thus be defended on every ground of efficiency. Nor were the members appointed unworthy of their task. The work was done by such men as Lord Justice James, Mr. Justice Romilly, Mr. Justice Willes. It was undoubtedly well done. But the whole procedure recalls the frequent attempts of an earlier age to regulate the legislation of distant dependencies, and like them it provoked opposition.

Indeed, unless the Act substituting the new Legislative Council of 1861 for the old Legislative Council of 1853 was to be regarded as a mere farce, void of all significance, it must be admitted that the establishment of the Law Commission entirely violated its spirit. Draft Acts prepared by the Commission, the Duke of Argyll wrote in 1869, were to be considered by the Governor-General in Council and, if doubts arose, returned to him for further consultation with the Commission, after which he would send the Act out in the form in which he desired it should be introduced into and passed by the Legislative Council. Such an extreme declaration of the legislative supremacy of the Secretary of State, though unassailable in law, was manifestly open to attack in policy ; and after some delay Mayo and his Executive Council returned a crushing rejoinder. They pointed out

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that such a method of legislation would cast on the Executive Council the burden of examining such Bills clause by clause, as though they were a Select Committee; secondly, such a doctrine would reduce the Legislative Council to a shadow although invested by the Act of 1861 with sole power to pass laws; and thirdly, the provisions of the Act, which enabled the Secretary of State to disallow laws passed by the Legislative Council, evidently did not contemplate his assuming the character of sole legislator for British India. The Duke rejoined by affirming the right of supreme control vested in the Home Government; but the point was in effect conceded by the disappearance of the Commission in 1870.

On at least two later occasions in the 19th century claims to something like independence in legislative matters were preferred by the Government of India against the Secretary of State. The first was in 1876, when the Government was required to abolish the duty on imported cottons. The second occurred in the 'nineties during Elgin's government. These latter papers, so far as I know, have never been published, nor have I seen them; but references to them in other documents show that the Secretary of State—Sir Henry Fowler—then laid down in the most uncompromising language the doctrine that the members of the Government of India are bound, even against their own conscience, to support and carry through such legislation as the Secretary of State requires.

These disputes suggest two reflections. One is, how strong must be the centrifugal forces in an

empire like the British, when even a strictly official government, such as that of India, is moved so frequently to endeavour to assert its legislative independence, and in this respect to claim that the Secretary of State possesses no other power than that of veto. The second is that this tendency in the period we have been considering must have owed much of its force to the presence in the Legislative Council of unofficial Indian and European members. The Government of India was thus enabled to speak, not only with the authority of the man on the spot, but also as representing an Indian public opinion with which the Home Government was not in contact ; and the importance of Canning's introduction of Indian members into the Legislative Council lay not only in its being one of the earliest recognitions of the Indian right to participate in the government of their own country, not only in its affording to the Indian Government specific advisers regarding Indian opinion, but also in encouraging it to assume, at all events in legislative matters, some degree of independence of the Home Government.

In this respect we may perhaps regard the claims put forward by Lord Elgin's Executive Council as having been encouraged by the development of the Legislative Council under the Act of 1892. In the course of the preceding thirty years there had been a great extension of education, of the number of persons taking an interest in the political affairs of their country, of the number of journals devoting much space to the political conduct of the Government. On the whole the process had

resulted in directing a constant stream of criticism against the policy pursued. Often this was ill-informed or perverse. But the student of politics will seldom find the question of the hour debated in a spirit of right reason. The condition of interesting the ordinary man in great political questions is to persuade him that his personal interests are concerned ; and we find political interest active or stagnant pretty nearly in proportion to the extent to which the machinery of such persuasion has been developed.

In the present instance the machinery for persuading the people that Government was ruining them in mind, body and estate, in this world and the next, had developed great activity, while the corresponding machinery for persuading people that their material and moral welfare depended on the maintenance of the Government did not exist. It was thought that a development of the Legislative Council might enable Government to state its views and purposes in a manner more likely to reach the people than that provided by its blue-books and reports. If for instance, Dufferin argued, the members of the Legislative Council had the right to ask questions of Government on matters of domestic interest, Government would have the means of stating its policy and objects, of removing misconceptions, of making the facts of a case publicly known.

The proposals made in the time of Dufferin came to fruition in the time of Lansdowne. The Act of 1892 raised the number of additional members from the old minimum of 6 to 10, and from the old

maximum of 12 to 16; it enabled the Governor-General in Council to make rules under which the annual budget might be discussed and questions asked, thus abolishing the narrow limitations within which the Council had formerly worked; and it further empowered the Governor-General in Council to make rules under which future nominations should be made. Under this last clause lurked the introduction of a new principle in Indian politics. Till then non-officials had found a place in the Legislative Councils exclusively as nominees of the Governor-General, or (in the provincial councils) of the Governors and Lieutenant-Governors of provinces. Now Indians themselves were to have a say in their selection. The rules made under the Act provided that while the Governor-General should nominate ten additional members on his own responsibility, he would nominate one on the recommendation of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce, and four more on the recommendation of the non-officials in the Provincial Councils, themselves largely selected by municipalities, university senates, and commercial bodies; and as regards his other nominations he was to be guided by the principle of making his selection as representative as possible.

It is easy to belittle these cautious and much-restricted advances of 1861 and 1892; but in judging them we should remember the times in which they were made. In respect of the first there was no Indian demand for constitutional advance except from a few isolated individuals. The change was inspired purely with the desire

of securing a more accurate and closer view of Indian feelings, so as if possible to avoid the blunders which had brought about the Mutiny. In respect of the second a demand had arisen, but it was new, it was relatively feeble, it had not been generally adopted even by the class of Indians from which it came. In both cases there was in many quarters a wide-spread disinclination to do anything. "Let well alone," was the common motto. In such circumstances no one can reasonably expect radical reform; and even the mildest reform (unsupported by political force) demands a good deal more altruism and willingness to take trouble for the sake of an idea than is altogether common among mankind.

While these changes were being made in the Legislative Council of the Government of India, provincial legislatures had also been called into existence and developed on similar lines. Under the Act of 1861, Legislative Councils were established in the provinces of Bengal, Bombay and Madras. But these provincial bodies, though important in including Indian nominees, were in a legislative sense of much less consequence than the Imperial Council. This was partly due to the restrictions naturally imposed by their territorial limits; but still more to other causes. In the first place the Imperial Council dealt with a great mass of general legislation, such as the Codes, to take the most conspicuous example. These naturally fell within the competence of a central legislature; but some of the Acts passed by the Imperial Council lay less certainly within its scope.

Such for instance as the Cattle Trespass Act, laying down, as Sir George Campbell said, the fine to be paid by an old woman whose cattle strayed anywhere between the Himalayas and Cape Comorin. Then alongside of the restrictions imposed by this legitimate and illegitimate activity, lay the jurisdiction of the High Courts, which could not be touched by any save the superior legislature. As this was a wide and far-reaching matter, many Bills of really local interest had to be sent up from Calcutta, Madras and Bombay to be dealt with in the Imperial Council. A third reason lay in special restrictions, such as that prohibiting the introduction of any Bill affecting religious interests until it had been approved by the Governor-General in Council. The jurisdiction of the High Courts is wide, but religious interests are wider still.

The provincial legislatures thus remained very subordinate, probably more so than the provincial governments were to the Government of India. However, they too shared in the extension of powers in 1892. The maximum number in Bengal, and the two presidencies, was raised to 20; under the rules made by the Governor-General in Council provision was made in certain provinces for the choice of non-official members by the municipal councils and district boards, the local commercial organizations, and the senates of the universities. And finally the Legislative Councils which in 1861 were formed only in Bengal, Madras and Bombay, were extended gradually to other provinces—such as the North-West Provinces (now the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh) in 1886, the Punjab

in 1897, Burma and Eastern Bengal later on. On the whole in view of these voluntary changes and reforms, it is not unfair to conclude that British rule in India has been decidedly less obscurantist than has usually been the case in the rule of one people over another.

(3) *The Beginning of Indian Politics.*—Until the Mutiny the English Government in India had always been accompanied by a great show of force. You would have found troops everywhere, not in great masses, of course, but scattered over the face of the country in small detachments, providing treasury guards at every district head-quarters, and escorts for the remittances of coin that were always passing from outlying stations to district head-quarters, and from district head-quarters to the Presidency town. The sight of troops on the march was common. One might suppose that this was brought about by the insecurity that would naturally be felt by a foreign dominion amid a large alien population ; and the general feeling of the overwhelming superiority of the British Government was a large and undoubted element in the ready submission which was paid to it. But much more than this, the military character of the Company's Government was imposed on it as an inheritance from the past. The progressive anarchy of the 18th century had broken down the traditional respect for Government and the automatic obedience to the law. Towards its close it would have been hard to find a territory outside the Company's boundaries where the collection of the revenues was not accompanied by a show of military force ;


the chronic warfare and perpetual fluctuations of state limits broke down the custom of paying taxes to one unvarying authority ; and taxes themselves came to be a sort of blackmail paid to avoid plunder rather than the regular levies paid as the price of order and protection. In these circumstances no Government could exist save on condition not only of being effectively prepared for war and rebellion, but also of being generally so reckoned. The maintenance of military strength and the propagation of a belief in it, were necessary conditions of Government. How ingrained the conception was is indicated by the curious fact that so late as 1869, when the trunk road from Mhow to Nasirabad was being made, it was popularly known as the "Gun Road," as though the only purpose of opening out the country was to make easy the transport of artillery.

Since the Mutiny, however, this conception of Government has steadily decayed. India was at peace in a way which had scarcely been known for two centuries. Dalhousie had overthrown the Sikhs ; and then when the Sepoy had thought to try the Company's strength, it had been manifested as never before. Sindia in the late 'sixties expressed the fact to the Resident, Henry Daly, in striking words : "Your prestige," he said, "fills men's minds to an extent which, to men who know how things were carried on scarce fifty years ago, seems beyond belief. Within that period, when Mahrattas went from time to time from Gwalior to the Deccan, small parties were not safe. . . . Their friends parted from them knowing that they

had set out on a journey of danger—perils through Thugs, robbers, spoliation and blackmail levied on them by the states through which they must pass; these things men, not old, still speak of. Now all pass to and fro without let and without hindrance. . . . I never put myself on a mail-cart, unattended and perhaps unknown, without appreciating the strength of your rule."

Then again the Mutiny had given point and substance to the criticisms of soldiers such as Charles Napier who had declared the system of dispersing military forces all over the country ruinous of military discipline; and at the same time the development of the railways permitted alike the reduction and the concentration of the army. Hence the policy steadily pursued with the development of communications, of maintaining the army in large cantonments at strategic points, so that regions which had been accustomed to the constant appearance of troops, now rarely saw a soldier. Even the practice of changing stations by route marches fell into disuse; so that though the Government was stronger in a military sense than it had ever been, its military power fell more and more into the background of the popular consciousness. Obedience to its orders became less and less dependent on a show of power; and the rule of law seemed to be replacing the rule of force as the basis of the state.

So far the Mutiny may be regarded as a misfortune not wholly without its compensations. But in another way it has never ceased to exercise an influence wholly for the worse, in strengthening



R. Godavary
Secunderabad
Samulcottah
R. Kistna
R. Kistna
Guntur
Masulipatam
R. Tungabhadra
Bellary
Ongole
ARABIAN
BAY OF
Chitaldrug
Chandragiri
Poonamallee
Nandidrug
Wallajahbad
Fort St George
Bangalore
Vellore
Arcot
St Thomas Mt
Ambur
Arni
Seringapatam
Krishnagiri
Wellington
Salem
Cuddalore
Sankridrug
Ahtur
Coimbatore
Namakul
BENGAL
Karur
R. Cauvery
Trichinopoly
Tanjore
Dindigul
Madura
SEA
Palamcottah
SOUTHERN
INDIA
Sketch Map illustrating the distribution of the troops in the Carnatic and neighbouring countries in 1800 and 1900
Places garrisoned in 1800
1900
0 100 200 Miles
CEYLON

and emphasizing the tendency of other causes to weaken and render more difficult the relations between the two races of Indian and Englishman. That had always offered a difficult problem, which had only been fully solved by exceptional individuals placed in favouring circumstances. And from causes unconnected with the Mutiny the circumstances were less favourable after it than they had been before. The fact is well illustrated by the careers of such men as Munro or Meadows Taylor, who, different as they were in talent, character, and career, both attained a deep knowledge of the Indian world. The readers of Taylor's autobiography will remember how many years he spent in a remote district of the Nizam's dominions, with no other European within call. His society and friends were necessarily the Indians among whom he lived. We see his mind taking on a romantic Indian colour. He comes to believe in dreams, visions, and prophecies. He falls sick on the road, and the stranger who takes him in and in whose house he is nursed back to health, is the Muslim taluqdar of Pargi. Munro was familiar with the same isolation, the same Indian friendship. His letters show him, all through his Revenue days, as usually alone, living with and among Indians, at Salem, in South Canara, in the ceded districts. He it is who points out that the judge sees Indians only at their worst, angrily litigious, undermining a good case with false evidence, either falsely accusing another or themselves justly convicted of crime ; whereas the revenue official, who, like Munro, spends his life among the villagers instead of sitting

in his cutchery, like the Bengal civilian, waiting for the zemindars to bring in the revenue, sees all sides, public and private, virtues as well as faults, and so learns understanding.

But since the Mutiny the conditions under which Taylor and Munro and their fellows acquired their knowledgeable sympathy with the people have been steadily growing more uncommon. The old lack of European society has disappeared. Not only have the officials multiplied, but so also have the missionaries and the men of business. The development of Government has tied men everywhere more closely to their desks. Personal rule has given place to a rule of system. The efficacy of Government has increased, but Government itself has become more mechanical. Hill-stations have become easy instead of difficult of access. Easier communications with Europe have meant easier and more frequent absences on leave. The vernacular, formerly the main vehicle of official work, comes less fluently to the tongue, and the increasing isolation of the official world has been only in part disguised by the Indian adoption of the English language.

And over these changes has hung the baleful recollection of the Mutiny. This first mainly affected the European. In the early years that followed, Frere wrote to Sir Charles Wood, the old sympathy with India changed to a feeling of repugnance; the old spirit of content with life and work in India, the old inclination to regard things in an Indian rather than an English light, gave place to a reluctance to stay in India longer

than needs must, and a disposition to judge things by an emphatically English standard. This necessarily had its reaction in the Indian mind ; and later on, as the memories of the horrors of the Mutiny grew fainter in the Englishman, a consciousness of the severity with which it had been repressed developed in the Indian. We find an inclination to seek a justification for its outbreak, and to express approval of its motives. At the same time the external evidence of the material force of Government was, as we have seen, less prominently displayed. We find developing a predisposition to doubt at once the power and the benevolence of English rule.

There had always been undercurrents of disaffection—it would have been very extraordinary had there not. Whole classes of men are not deprived of power without resenting the deprivation ; and we may take it for granted that there always were men in some corner or other plotting the overthrow of the British rule. The most obvious malcontents were Muslim. There are always a certain number of Indian followers of that most militant faith who must feel it a religious duty to shake off the infidel dominion ; and with them the religious motive is naturally stimulated by recollections of former greatness. Besides this, in the period immediately following the Mutiny, the British rule offered fewer compensations to the Muslim than to his Hindu fellow-countryman. A larger proportion of the Muslim than of the Hindu Government servants had elected to join the cause of the mutineers ; and the former were looked

on with suspicion. The official use of Persian had long disappeared. The school system made but the slightest provision for the study of Arabic, their sacred and legal language ; and even when they had mastered it, it had ceased to be of administrative value, for reform had swept away the last vestiges of Muhammadan law, and none now needed men skilled in interpreting the works in which it was expounded.

Accordingly we find the earliest dissatisfaction that went beyond a mere attitude of mind was principally, though, as we shall see, not wholly, Muhammadan. For instance, in 1859 the Muslims in the Educational Department were said to be discussing the lawfulness of serving the British Government, and a *faqir* was hanged for distributing seditious papers in the Punjab. He was no doubt an emissary of the Wahabis. In 1863 occurred the Ambeyla Campaign, in which Neville Chamberlain attacked their fastnesses at Sitana, and then it became known that they were being supplied with men and money from India. The discovery had been made by the devotion of a Muhammadan sergeant of the police. He arrested four men whom he had by chance discovered to be on their way back from the frontier to make arrangements for further supplies. The magistrate before whom they were carried refused to commit them on the sergeant's bare word. He then sent his son to join the Wahabis and find out what was actually going forward ; as a result of which in 1864-65 eleven persons were punished with transportation. A few years later their renewed activities became

apparent. In 1871 a considerable number of Wahabis were placed on their trial at Patna, and it appeared that a whole network of treasonable propaganda had been established, with swarms of preachers in every district in Bengal, each of whom had been carefully trained. While the prisoners were under trial, the judge engaged on the case was murdered ; and Lord Mayo's murder in 1873 was believed by many to be not unconnected with the Wahabi agitation. But the centre of the conspiracy had apparently been broken up by the vigorous enquiries of 1869-71, and this, coupled with the reforms of Lord Mayo in giving Urdu and Persian and Arabic a larger place in education, in giving aid to Muhammadan schools and establishing scholarships for Muhammadans, seems to have brought this particular phase of the matter to an end. Much personal discontent remained ; witness the Maulvi who (Wilfrid Blunt relates) hoped in 1883 that the Mahdi would drive the English out of Egypt. But organized hostility seems for the time to have ceased.

If the Wahabis at Patna offered one centre of smouldering hostility to the Government, the Maratha Brahmans at Poona offered another. Their recollections of independent power were even fresher than those of the Muslim ; and though they were not fired by an equally fanatical religion, that lack was made good by the feeling of nationality engendered by Maratha history. Conspiracies were discovered in 1862. The movement, Bartle Frere wrote to Canning, " is an evident offshoot of the discontent which lost its chosen leaders in the Nana,

Tantia Topee, etc., and which still smoulders in Central India and the Mahratta country. From all I can learn, any spark, such as a war in Europe or with America would have been followed by a number of concerted but separate insurrections in all parts of India between the Vindya Mountains and the Towchundra." The movement was detected too early to become dangerous, but it evidently did not die out. In 1879 a similar spirit led to an outbreak of dacoities in the Deccan, brought about, it was believed, by the excitement of the Afghan War. The leader of the movement issued proclamations against Government. However he was put down in a few weeks, and the only tangible success he secured was the burning of the famous teak-built palace of the Peshwas at Poona.

These and one or two other efforts were all of much the same kind—essentially efforts of the old India to expel the Western intruders. But discontent was already finding another mode of expression, which was to give rise to movements of quite another kind, showing even when most antagonistic to British rule deep marks of its influence. The first political fruit of the progress of education was the birth and development of the Indian press. Under the Company, when the Anglo-Indian press alone was of importance, the policy of Government had swung from severe censorship to the extreme of liberty. In the early days, when these Anglo-Indian journals were as often as not conducted by some Free Merchant who had failed in his commercial calling, criticism had

shown a marked tendency towards personalities and abuse. The long-standing feud between the Civil Service and the Free Merchants had betrayed itself on the one side in vituperation and on the other in repression. Editors were summarily deported, not only from Calcutta but also from Bombay. But this was a matter in which the autocratic system of India and the responsible system of Great Britain were in violent contrast. Where propaganda is the ordinary weapon of both Government and Opposition, liberty of the press is natural and indeed inevitable ; but where the Government can only be removed by revolution, and where the propaganda will be all against the Government, liberty of the press has usually meant that the autocrat distrusts his ability to keep it muzzled. It is scarcely compatible with the continuation of his rule. If this is the case where a people is ruled by an autocrat of the same race as themselves, still more is it so where he represents the domination of a foreign race. " A free press," said Munro, with his usual insight, " and the dominion of strangers are things which are quite incompatible and cannot long exist together ; for what is the first duty of a free press ? it is to deliver the country from a foreign yoke."

This, however, was doctrine which the Company scarcely appreciated. The censorship of the press was the sort of thing which the Anglo-Indian editors and their friends might use to stir up untold trouble in England, to bring the Company into public disfavour, and so perhaps contribute to its downfall. The Directors were therefore disposed, as men usually are, to prefer present convenience

to future security, and to let the European journalists criticize Government as much as they pleased, which indeed hurt no one seriously, for as yet there were no Indian journalists to teach their fellow-countrymen to distrust an alien Government. So when Metcalfe in 1835 was acting as Governor-General until the authorities at home could agree on a successor to Bentinck, he introduced a new Press Act, merely requiring every book and paper to bear the name of its printer and publisher.

In the fulness of time, however, an Indian press grew up, both English and vernacular, which set to work, as Munro had foreseen, to make the country uneasy under its foreign yoke. It uniformly attacked the Government, sometimes with great bitterness. At first this was in itself of small importance. The Indian journals were for the most part unsuccessful experiments. The public was too small and poor to make journalism profitable; and the commercial value of the advertisement was as yet little recognized. Consequently the Indian journalists were, like their Anglo-Indian predecessors of an earlier age, men who could find nothing else to do or boys who intoxicated themselves with their own eloquence of abuse. Their organs were with few exceptions short-lived and little read.

These journalistic attacks became prominent during the Government of Lord Northbrook; and Lytton, his sucessor, resolved to modify the law which had remained unchanged since the time of Metcalfe. As the English-reading Indians were still few in number, and as the English violence of Indian journals might be more or less counteracted

by the Anglo-Indian papers, some of which had a considerable Indian circulation, he decided to leave them alone but to impose restrictions on the papers published in the vernaculars, firstly because their readers would probably be relatively uneducated and so specially liable to be deceived; secondly, because they would not have the Anglo-Indian papers as an antidote; and thirdly, because the vernacular papers appealed or threatened to appeal to the great mass of the people on whose acquiescence rested the stability of Government. Accordingly, Lytton's Act—the Vernacular Press Act, passed in 1878—empowered a collector or a magistrate to require the editor of any paper written in an oriental language either to give a bond not to publish objectionable matter or to submit his proof-sheets before publication.

The Act can hardly have been oppressive because it was only put into operation against one newspaper—the Bengali *Som Prakash*. This fact was proclaimed by Lytton and his supporters as proof of its efficacy, and by his opponents as proof of its needlessness. It was no doubt much disliked by Indian journalists; it was contrary to the doctrines of Liberalism; and accordingly it was repealed by Ripon.

His conduct in this respect has usually been approved by all but reactionaries; but, as it seems to me, it is a matter which cannot be judged in isolation; we must ask ourselves whether it accorded well with his policy as a whole. Now while his policy as a whole was liberal and progressive, his decision in this particular case was far in advance

of the rest, for it was inconsistent with the nature of Government as it was, and as he meant it to continue. The period at which the Indian press should have been accorded the liberty to say whatever it pleased, within the limits of the law of libel, should have been not the time when the only constitutional advance consisted in the nomination of a dozen or so Indians to the various legislative councils and the very limited beginnings of local self-government, but the time, still awaited forty years later, when the Indian constitution ceased to be a despotism and became a responsible Government. Ripon's premature abandonment of press restrictions has involved two inconvenient consequences. In the first place it legalised a propaganda certain to be directed towards weakening the foundations of Government, and to which Government had no means of answer untainted by officialism ; and this was the more important because that foundation consisted in the acquiescence, not in the definite loyalty, of the people at large, a feeling therefore likely to be worn away with comparative ease. It may well be doubted whether so yielding a substance should have been exposed to the corrosive of propaganda at a stage when (in Ripon's view) the possibility of self-government was still indefinitely remote. It was exposing one form of government to an unnecessary strain before another form (in his opinion) could be established. In the second place this tacit encouragement of anti-government agitation, readily spreading from the printed to the spoken word, facilitated the amalgamation of two distinct political tendencies

which a wise Government would have sought to keep separate. From the earliest days of British rule in India those Indians who have reflected on the political condition of their country have fallen into two main classes—those who have desired to turn the English out at any cost, and those who at first accepted their rule as the lesser of two evils, and who later accepted it in the hope of gradually developing responsible government in India. The democratic privilege of a free press and free speech not only made it easier for the extremists to spread their views at the expense of the moderates, but also facilitated co-operation between the two classes, each hoping to use the other for its own purposes. Thus the subterranean party of violence has been enabled to come into the open to influence and at times to deflect moderate policy, and on occasion to supply the moderates not only with ideas but also with leaders. The policy of free speech and press has thus tended to develop moderate opinion at a more rapid rate than that at which Government was prepared to move. Ripon's policy in this respect was thus far in advance of his policy in others. It tended to widen the natural cleavage between Government policy and moderate Indian opinion. It was ill-timed, for it presupposed a stage of political progress which neither Ripon nor his successors were prepared to recognize.

(4) *The Political Situation* 1885-1905.—Meanwhile under Ripon's Government occurred the astonishing blunder of the Ilbert Bill—a matter for which no one has ever been willing to accept responsibility. At this time outside the Presidency

towns no European could be tried for a criminal offence except by another European. In earlier days this distinction had made small practical difference because the sessions judges who tried all serious accusations of crime were members of the Covenanted Service and so invariably Europeans. But in the 'eighties the Indians who had entered that service by competition, and who had preferred judicial to executive duties, were becoming sufficiently senior to look for promotion to the rank of district and sessions judge ; so that if the law stood unaltered they would be liable to the invidious distinction of being unable to try a class of prisoner who could be tried by their European fellows in the service. When these circumstances brought the question under the consideration of Government, it was resolved to do away with this racial discrimination, and a Bill was accordingly drafted by Ilbert, the Legal Member of Council. It was considered in Council, and only one member raised objections to it, recommending that its operation should be limited to Indians who had risen to the rank of district magistrate and sessions judge. Ripon brushed this aside—unwisely as the event showed—as a mere crotchet ; and when it went home for consideration, and Maine in the India Council wrote a minute supporting the proposed limitation and criticizing the Bill as likely to produce an uproar, the Secretary of State, Lord Hartington, put it in his pocket and forgot all about it. But when this measure was introduced into the Legislative Council in 1883 the uproar which Maine had predicted rose indeed. Every class joined in,

especially in Bengal. The merchants at Calcutta, who were not personally interested, were as violent as the planters of Behar who were. Ripon's entertainments were boycotted, as Clive's had been before him. He himself was insulted, as none had ever ventured to insult Clive. The attitude assumed was disagreeably reminiscent of the "colonial" spirit—of a West Indian Assembly desired to accord legal privileges to their slaves or South Africans discussing missionary teaching among the natives. At last a compromise was reached. A European on trial before a district magistrate or sessions judge was to be entitled to claim trial by jury, of which half were to be Europeans. With that the agitation smouldered out.

But it was only in accord with the fitness of things that this deplorable exhibition of ill-feeling should not end there. It was both a lesson and a warning to the Indian. Here was an agitation which moved Government from its purpose, the sort of thing of which he had only read in books—the agitation of Wilkes or the Corn Law League. Evidently the methods of agitation were as applicable in India as they were in England. And secondly, all this violent language and racial antipathy—in a sense the agitation was the last echo of feelings aroused by the Mutiny—evoked and emphasized corresponding racial feelings on the other side. The passionate claim of the European to predominance was to be answered by the passionate claim of the Indian to equality.

Indeed for some time past a change might have been noted in the course of Indian studies and

enthusiasms. The study of ancient India had developed into a cult of the past. Swami Dayanand, the founder of the body known as the Arya Samaj, taught that India had been degraded by the corruption of her primitive faith and the intrusive tyranny of foreigners. The early Theosophists, Colonel Olcott and Madame Blavatsky, the latter of whom claimed to have been a Hindu in a previous incarnation, aided in this movement ; Olcott went about lecturing on the ancient greatness and the modern degradation of India ; and gradually the belief spread that India of old had been united, great and prosperous ; the achievements of Asoka and Chandragupta were quoted in proof ; the shadows of ancient dynasties, of which we know in fact little more than their names, were transformed by enthusiasm into the solid figures of great heroes who attested the vigour of India in the past and prefigured her revival in the future. This uncritical habit of reading a good deal more into ancient documents than was ever in them is a common phenomenon among a people attempting renascence ; and though we must accept their history with caution, we find in it at least certain evidence of a rising spirit of nationalism and the revival of ideals. "Back to the Vedas" became one of the cries of Young India ; and as the Vedas offer but slight or no support for many Indian customs which seem most reprehensible in Western eyes—the exclusiveness of caste, infant marriages, and the status of widows—the movement which it represents has inevitable leanings towards social reform.

The idealization of the Indian past was one element of the new Indian movement ; the other was the study of Western political thought, more particularly of its Whig and Radical exponents. The political struggles in England in the 17th century, the intellectual movement leading to the French Revolution, and the nationalist movements of the 19th century, were favourite subjects of study and reflection. Bradlaugh was a champion in the House of Commons ; and Tom Paine a favourite political philosopher.

The necessary result of spinning political aspirations out of such strongly contrasted strands was a good deal of inconsistency. Aristocratic ideals and democratic aspirations do not mingle easily ; and it was easy to criticize the Brahman, believing himself sacrosanct and performing ceremonies of purification after sitting in the same railway-carriage as members of the lower castes, and yet fervidly orating on the rights of man. But such intellectual inconsistencies do not really affect the cogency of a political creed. That is much more a matter of feeling and sentiment than one of reason. Political like religious argument normally convinces only those who are convinced already ; and effective political appeal is to the heart, not to the head.

Such a synthesis of contradictions cannot of course form the basis of a sound political system. But its defects only became palpable in the world of experience, not in that of argument ; and Indian political progress was still a matter of talk. In 1885 the inward change found its outward expression in the foundation of the Indian National Congress.

Before this, associations had been formed to represent and advance Indian views, such as the British Indian Association at Calcutta, the *Anjuman* at Lahore, or the *Sarva Janik Sabha* at Bombay. These had been local organizations. It was now thought that a body which would speak for educated Indian opinion as a whole would carry more weight. The objects of the Congress, as described in the prospectus drafted by a retired Convenanted Servant, A. O. Hume, were to make fellow-workers in different parts of India known to one another, and to arrange a common programme of action. "Indirectly," the prospectus stated, "this Conference will form the germ of a native Parliament, and if properly conducted will constitute in a few years an unanswerable reply to the assertion that India is still wholly unfit for any form of representative institutions."

The first meeting of this body was held at Bombay at the end of December, 1885. Here the only qualification for membership was the payment of a small fee; and any member might attend. It was not therefore a representative body for its delegates chose themselves; but in 1886 the delegates were chosen by public meetings and various bodies. They were almost exclusively lawyers, schoolmasters and journalists. At first the enthusiasts of political progress were few in number. The attendance comprised only 70 members, who had been collected with difficulty. But the second Conference was attended by nearly 450, the third by over 600, the fourth by over 1,200. Its early tone was strongly appreciative

of the benefits of British rule. It was in fact composed of men eager to co-operate and not to overthrow. The establishment of British rule was a merciful dispensation of providence ; it had been better in its results and direction than any other ; it had brought new light to India, and set up a lamp amid the darkness of Asiatic despotism—such were a few of the sentiments occurring in the first two presidential addresses, and listened to with enthusiasm.

The programme of reform put forward in its early resolutions was however extensive. At its first meeting it resolved that the abolition of the Council of India was an essential preliminary to all reforms. At the same meeting it declared for the establishment of simultaneous examinations in England and India for admission into the Indian Civil Service. It demanded enquiry into the increasing poverty of the country, attacked military expenditure, and the administration of the Excise Department, and the Salt Tax. It proposed the formation of a body of Indian volunteers, criticized the Arms Act, and demanded the training of Indians for admission into the commissioned ranks of the Indian Army. In the more narrowly constitutional field it advocated the separation of judicial and executive functions, so that the same individual should never at the same time exercise both ; and while at the first meeting it was content with demanding the enlargement of the Legislative Councils, with the introduction of the elective principle, and a right of criticizing the budget and asking questions of Government, this was in the

following year given more precise form by proposals which would have reduced the official element to a quarter and required at least half the members to be elected. While conceding to the Government a power of overruling a resolution of the Legislative Council on condition of publicly recording its reasons for so doing, it proposed that a Royal Commission should be appointed to ascertain the best way of introducing representative institutions into India.

These proposals had not the faintest chance of adoption. At that time the educated class still formed a very insignificant number of individuals. Education was expanding, but it had not nearly attained the volume it has since. Higher education, as Sir Verney Lovett points out, has increased threefold since the days of Dufferin. And further, the class which was represented by the Congress included hardly any Muhammadans, it included no agriculturists, it included none of those castes and races who flocked into the Indian Army, and who in the past had flocked to the standards of any military adventurer who would pay them. It might represent intellect : but it did not represent either wealth or power. But if the presumption on which representative government ultimately rests is that the party which commands a majority of voters is that which would win in an appeal to force, thus securing an approximate identity of material and political power, such basis was lacking in India. The party which carried most heads to the poll was not necessarily that which would command most sword-arms in the field ; and

representative institutions were as likely to need the support of the foreign troops as did a foreign despotism itself.

The effect of this attitude on the part of the Government was necessarily to throw the Congress into stronger and more definite opposition. Its orators gathered fire and heat. Its scope of criticism widened and deepened. The emphasis laid at first on the benefits of British rule grew perceptibly lighter and the allusions to them more perfunctory. Indeed, no wise person will found a political system upon gratitude alone. It is everywhere the shortest-lived of political feelings, and can only be kept alive by a sense of favours to come. In India the feeling that the favours of the future were unduly delayed gathered strength and volume.

The more acute minds in the Congress began to perceive that reforms were not likely to be secured by mere talk. A party of action began to emerge, with affiliations both to the public agitation of the Congress party, and to the secret activities of the old forces of violent discontent, and to the plots of anarchist societies outside India. At first this party of action centred at Poona ; later it spread to Bengal and the Punjab.

In the first instance the movement was related to that stream of feeling displayed by the Marathas in 1862 and 1879. It found its leader in a man of remarkable talents, Bal Gangadhar Tilak. By birth he belonged to the Chitpāvans, the section of the Deccani Brahmans which had produced the great Peshwas of the 18th century. He was a Sanskrit scholar of eminence, a strictly orthodox

Brahman, and in Congress circles belonged to that side which was actuated more by hopes of a Hindu revival than by aspirations after Western political ideas. He first emerged into political prominence as the champion of Hindu orthodoxy. In 1890, when Government brought forward a Bill to raise from ten to twelve the age at which Hindu marriages might be consummated, Tilak led the Hindu opposition in the face of the approval of such men as Telang and Bandarkar, not, it may be presumed, because he was blind to the social evils of the cause which he defended, but because he discerned in religious zeal a political force of the first magnitude, to be employed in securing the objects which he as well as the Moderate congressmen had at heart. His paper, the *Kesari*—the Lion—attacked the Government Bill whole-heartedly and denounced all its Hindu supporters as traitors to their country's cause. In 1893 in order further to reinforce the political effect of religious feelings he founded the Anti-cow Killing Society, directed against Muslims, who sacrifice cattle at their great festival of Bakr-'Id, and Europeans who devour beef at all seasons. He too sought to turn the worship of Ganpati to political ends, and set up as a political model for his countrymen the figure of Sivaji, the hero of the struggle against the Moghuls.

In 1895 was organized a series of annual festivals to commemorate the coronation of the great Maratha king. Tilak seized the occasion to refer to an incident which has usually been condemned by English writers as an act of treachery—the killing by Sivaji of Afzul Khan at an interview. In

itself the act can only be classed with the murder by Bruce of the Red Comyn or Cesare Borgia's conduct at Sinigaglia which drew the applause of Machiavelli. The usual Maratha defence of Sivaji is that the Muslim began it first. But Tilak disregarding this defence declared Sivaji justified even if he had planned the murder beforehand, since the Bhagavagita declares, "we may kill even our teachers and our kinsmen, and no blame attaches if we are not actuated by selfish desires."

At a later time Tilak denied emphatically that he had ever intended to countenance or encourage political assassination. Be that as it may, the fact remains that his language was so understood by some of his fellow-countrymen; and he could hardly complain if Englishmen took the same view. Indeed it seems very doubtful if his denial was really so serious as it was meant to sound. His cold clear mind cannot have missed the implication of his words. On the other hand he did not seek the violent overthrow of the British Government. He reckoned too accurately its material strength to waste his efforts in seeking to organize revolt. But he may well have calculated that a political assassination or two would attract more attention to Indian demands than all the speeches ever made at the National Congress. Such ideas would have won the approval both of his national hero and of ancient Hindu political theorists. In any case amid the panic which followed the appearance of plague at Bombay in 1896, and the ineffectual and desperately unpopular measures adopted by the Bombay Government to arrest it, a civilian and a

military officer were murdered in 1897 at Poona. The Maratha—also a Chitpāvan Brahman—who murdered Jackson at Nasik in 1908, admitted that he had been influenced by the *Kesari* and other newspapers ; and Tilak himself was imprisoned in 1908 for his comments on the murder by a bomb of two Englishwomen in Bengal.

In the latter province the movement towards violence differed from that in Western India in that it was more spontaneous, less dependent on encouragement from on high. It developed into a network of murder-clubs and dacoit-societies, with slenderer connections than in Western India with the open and professed politician. As at Poona, however, it also was associated with a definite religious revival—a Neo-Hinduism of not too respectable a nature.

In Bengal circumstances were more favourable to such development than elsewhere. The administrative system, based on the Permanent Settlement, rendered needless in that province those numerous mixed revenue and administrative servants who elsewhere formed so valuable a link between the people and the district officer. So that Government was in a much worse position than elsewhere to know what was going forward. The same reason brought it about that Government service did not absorb so large a proportion of the educated classes as elsewhere where administration was more elaborately constructed and more detailed in its supervision. Then again the Bengali had taken to English education with peculiar vigour. Private schools and colleges had sprung up, following on

the Education Commission of 1882, on whose advice Government had unwisely allowed aided schools and colleges to lower their fees ; and so education was not only more prevalent but cheaper and less successful than elsewhere. On the whole the educated Bengali was worse off than the educated Indian of other provinces, but particularly resented Lord Curzon's efforts to raise the educational level. Further, the Bengali is more emotional by nature than other Indian races.

From these conditions a whole crop of political crimes might easily spring, once popular excitement had been generated ; and the occasion for this was the partition of Bengal, which took place in 1905. Till that year all Bengal had been the administrative charge of one Lieutenant-Governor. Until 1871, the year of the first census, no one had known how vast was the population of the province. It then turned out to be 66 million, more than half as much again as any one had supposed. In the course of the following 30 years it rose by 12 millions. It had long been recognized that this was more than one man could manage. The eastern districts particularly, with their wilderness of waterways, evidently needed much closer supervision. The landlords were all absentee landlords ; and the police worse than in the other districts of Bengal. The region is said to have been the scene of habitual outrage and undetected crime. Lord Curzon's Government, therefore, after considerable discussion resolved to create the new province of Eastern Bengal, comprising Assam, Chittagong, and 15 other districts, with an area of 101,000 square

miles, and a population of 31 million. Dacca was the new capital ; and the population within the new boundaries was predominantly Muslim.

This change was made the occasion of a violent agitation. Eight million and a half of Hindus were included in this Muslim province ; so the cry arose that the Bengali nation was being divided ; the affair was represented as an attack upon their traditions and their language, as an attempt to rule by division. So far the grievance was mainly sentimental. But the Indian journalists and lawyers of Calcutta no doubt feared that the establishment of a new provincial capital might lead to the establishment of journals and lawyers of its own. Hence the agitation was carried on with hearty goodwill. A boycott of British goods was declared ; and the movement was placed under the special protection of the goddess Kali.

This deity affords one of the most striking instances of the catholic nature of Hinduism, which can accommodate with an appropriate god or goddess every occupation from the most elevated to the most criminal. Kali, the wife of Siva, is identical with Bhawani, the patron goddess of Sivaji and the deity who guided and protected the Thags in their murderous enterprises. She was now invoked by the politicians as the patron of the boycott. Hecatombs of goats were sacrificed in her temple at Calcutta. Not for a century had her court run with such streams of blood ; and at the same time as the public leaders of the movement invoked her aid, groups of boys still at school, and youths still at college bound themselves before her

image into confederacies of murder, vowing to offer her the blood, not of goats but of every European in Bengal. The English Government was to be overthrown by terrorism.

Thus both in Western and Eastern India political agitation was doubled by criminal conspiracy, and emphasized by occasional murder, sometimes of an Indian policeman who had done his duty, sometimes of an official who had distinguished himself for his sympathy with Indian progress, sometimes of women.

Such manifestations, embracing on the one side constitutional demands backed by examples and argument drawn from British history, and on the other revolutionary violence imitated from Continental secret societies, were not well adapted to encourage the advocates of Indian claims to press them on the English Parliament, for they seemed to confirm the opinions of those who declared all attempts to engraft Western institutions on Eastern societies inevitably doomed to failure. It was one thing to encourage enlightened leaders who desired to take their place in the administration of the Empire ; it was quite another to encourage men who would use any power they could obtain to promote the overthrow of British rule in India. Political assassination was a thing peculiarly repugnant to English ways of thought ; and this feeling was heightened when those singled out for death were known to be men particularly sympathetic towards Indian views, or when the criminals were such blunderers as to mistake women for their chosen victim. Nor again could the disclaimer

of the political leaders sound convincing so long as they and their organs continued to use language plainly provocative of such passions as lead naturally to the crimes they professed to reprobate. So that though political crime undoubtedly called attention to the complaints of the Congress, it weakened opinion in favour of granting Indian demands, gave occasion for suspecting some of the leaders of approving in secret what they condemned in public, and strengthened the influence of those who opposed advance of any kind.

Many causes, economic and political, evidently concurred to produce the general condition of unrest which prevailed about the conclusion of Lord Curzon's term of office. Plague and famine had ravaged the country; the growth of population and the accompanying extension of agriculture had involved the progressive cultivation in the previous 30 or 40 years of ever poorer and poorer soils, so that the cultivator had to work harder for a more uncertain living, while the consequent increase in the rental value of land had been largely absorbed by the landlords, or, where no landlord existed, by Government. It is perhaps noteworthy that the greatest discontent prevailed in Bengal where landlordism was most complete. The same increase of cultivation had contracted the old pasture grounds, so that the rules designed to protect the forests of India came to be felt more and more as a grievance. Then too an enforced free trade policy, twice carried by the insistent orders of the Secretary of State against the strong opposition of the Governor-General's Council

alienated the industrialists. The rise in the general level of Indian prices had grievously affected the educated classes of whom by far the greater part lived on fixed salaries which they could not augment as the cost of living rose. So that throughout the large class of agriculturists there was a general feeling of discontent, such as emerges, not when people have been long ground down by misery, for then the daily effort to live wears out all other volitions, but when people pass from a cycle of prosperity to one of hardship ; and among the industrial and educated class strong hostility to Government measures as hindering their way to wealth. These causes formed the background of the Indian political movement, predisposing men to discontent and opening their minds to the suggestions of those who accused the Government of causing these conditions.

Such economic causes affected all the interests of the country—agricultural, industrial and professional. The political causes directly affected only the latter, and were sentimental in essence. There was for instance the treatment of Indians in South Africa ; the attempts of Lord Curzon to improve the educational system, interpreted as an attack on Indian education itself ; and the excitement caused by bitter journalistic comment and provocative speeches on the Government's attitude towards Congress demands. And then, while the educated Indian was loudly claiming equality with the Englishman, demanding to be trained in arms, and protesting his right to constitutional instead of despotic government, the resounding successes of

Japanese arms against the Russians seemed a proof that the Asiatic was after all in the essential matter of war as good as the European ; and the effect on Indian opinion was the greater since the foreign peril which had engrossed Government for the previous generation and more had come from Russia. All these concurred to render classes, till then reasonably contented with their lot in life and mode of government, peculiarly susceptible to the influence of that irreconcilable hostility, which from being endemic was fast becoming epidemic.

CHAPTER X

THE POLICY OF REFORM

(1) *Minto-Morley Reforms.*—At this time the control of the Government fell into the hands of two men differing entirely in type, in experience, and in political party. In 1905 Lord Minto had been appointed by the Conservative Government to succeed Lord Curzon, when the latter resigned owing to his difference with the Secretary of State over the appointment of the Army Supply Member. At the close of the year the Conservatives were succeeded in office by the Liberals, and Mr. Morley replaced Mr. Brodrick at the India Office.

The new Governor-General was no politician, but had enjoyed a wide and varied experience of men. He had always been a keen sportsman ; he had served for many years in the Army, had fought in the Second Afghan War, and in Egypt ; he had taken an active part in local administration according to the admirable tradition of English aristocracy ; and he had occupied the high administrative post of the Governor-Generalship of Canada. He had therefore seen men from many angles, and his vision derived from this experience a solidity which is denied to those who only watch life from the study window, or confuse the problems of statesmanship with the fluctuations of party-debate. In addition

to these advantages he had acquired in his entirely practical career the art of managing men, the knack of getting his own way, or as much of it as circumstances permitted, without domineering over or irritating those with whom he worked.

Mr. Morley was very much the reverse of all this. He was essentially a first-class man in the academic, but not in the broad sense of the term. Had he been a little less clever, or his parents a little less well-to-do, he might quite easily have become a member of the Indian Civil Service, where he would have gravitated naturally to the Secretariat, and at last returned inordinately proud of his K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., after ruling in most unpopular fashion one of the lesser Indian provinces. He had a keen logical mind, a sharp tongue, and a sharper pen. With these, and the most uncompromising Liberal principles, he had made no small name for himself, at first in history and journalism, and later in the House of Commons; but his outlook on life was narrow. He could appraise a book better than a man, and a man's brains better than his character. He had spent his days in a world where what was said and written counted for more than what was done. As compared with Minto, he was more intellectual and less intelligent. His administrative experience was small for so prominent a politician. With a great gift of charm which he could use when he pleased, he had always been irritable; and with advancing years he had become capricious, dogmatic and domineering; like Macaulay he was too merely clever to attain serenity of view.

Neither he nor Minto knew much about Indian administration when they assumed their respective offices ; but what they did know was singularly characteristic of the two men. Morley had read enough—probably a few pages of Burke's interminable speeches on Warren Hastings—to enable him to pass a superficial judgment on the most complicated historical problem of Anglo-Indian history ; whereas Minto had himself seen the country, though from the angle of the subaltern, had himself fought on the frontier, and knew personally the famous passes which to Morley were nothing but names upon a map. Further, he was much quicker in taking stock of the situation. So it came to pass that early in 1906 both were inclined to political reform—the one from political conviction, the other from a personal judgment of the situation.

It has usually been believed that in this matter of political reform the Secretary of State was the propelling force, while the Government of India was reluctantly dragged in his train. But the facts appear otherwise. The reforms sprang from the Government of India—the proposals originated with Minto, by whom the official part of the Government was won over to much larger changes than it was of itself prepared to face ; and Morley's contribution scarcely exceeded approval and support. It would indeed have been impossible for the Governor-General to have initiated and carried through such changes without a sympathizing Secretary of State in England to back him, for otherwise the weight of official opinion would have

alarmed the Cabinet into inactivity ; but in the work of positive construction the Secretary of State seems to have played little part. Indeed it is curious to note how in his action the authoritarian pierces through the doctrinaire. Nothing must be done to impair the sacred authority of the India Office, or to limit the proud tone of command which it inherited from the Company addressing its servants in the East. The Hobhouse Commission might be sent to ascertain how far the Government of India might limit its powers of control over the provincial Governments, but not to consider whether the Secretary of State might limit the extent of his interference with the Government of India. If self-government was to be developed in India, it was difficult for any Englishman to imagine how it could be done except through parliamentary institutions ; every increase of power or influence conceded to the Legislative Councils plainly tended to that conclusion ; but Morley with curious and indeed characteristic blindness refused to admit that he had sanctioned a single step in a direction which would infallibly render the Government of India less dependent on Whitehall.

This peculiarity in fact rendered the aims of Minto and Morley less divergent than they otherwise would have been. Minto desired to secure two main objects. One was to break down the monopoly of high office which had marked the British Government in India ever since the Company had ordered Warren Hastings to remove Muhammad Reza Khan from his post of Naib Diwan. The other was to bring into political activity those forces of Indian

opinion which could not be supposed to lean towards the advanced political views of the Congress. The agricultural classes, from the ryots to the great landlords, had at the time no mouth-piece by which they could make known their views and desires; the mercantile and trading classes were politically quiescent; the Muslims had taken no part in the recent agitations. These classes must have opinions probably different from those of the orators of the Congress; and it was clearly desirable that they should have the power of expressing them, quite apart from the fact that they might constitute a counterpoise to the advanced politicians. These views which to Minto were merely a matter of common-sense, fell in aptly with Morley's peculiar situation—that of a Liberal desirous of putting Liberal principles into practice without incurring the obvious consequence of releasing India from the tutelage of London. So we find a Liberal statesman intimately concerned in schemes intended to invest with political influence a class more predisposed to Conservatism than any other in the world.

Minto's plans, as they developed, fell into three parts. The first was intended to create a special organ through which Indian magnates could express their political views; the second was to render the existing Legislative Councils more representative and more influential than they had been; and the third, which was framed quite as early as the other two, though the discussions regarding it were long kept secret, was to admit Indians to the Executive Councils.

The first of these was the development of an

idea which had long floated before the eyes of Indian statesmen. Lytton had wished to create an Indian Privy Council which the Governor-General could assemble and consult ; but the proposal had been whittled down to the empty title of " Councillors to the Empress " bestowed on a few of the Indian princes. Lord Curzon had suggested a Council of Princes to discuss matters of common interest. This proposal had been still under consideration when Minto arrived in India ; and though the plan was abandoned in the form in which he found it, for some time he hoped it would be possible to revive Lytton's idea and expand it by including other big men as well as ruling chiefs. " We should get different ideas from those of Congress," he wrote, "emanating from men already possessing a great interest in the good government of India." Accordingly the plan was set out in the Reforms circular of 1907. " It has long been felt," the Government of India said, " that considerable advantages might be expected from any measures which, without impeding the free action of the executive Government . . . would in some degree associate the great ruling chiefs and the territorial magnates of British India with the Governor-General in the guardianship of common and Imperial interests." In the course, however, of the discussions which followed these proposals, it appeared that the ruling chiefs themselves were averse, and that they would be unwilling to sit with persons of inferior status to their own, while their single advice regarding the affairs of British India would be regarded with suspicion. As an alternative, an Advisory Council

of notables was suggested in England, but Minto disliked this alternative ; so at last, by common consent, it was dropped. The times were perhaps past when it could have been tried with advantage. But indeed we must presuppose an entire change of policy since 1858 to have rendered it workable except perhaps under the government of Canning.

The second part of Minto's plans was to increase the influence and representative character of the Legislative Councils. The old rules prepared under the Act of 1892 had resulted in the choice by the various nominating bodies of a great preponderance of the professional classes, who though forming not two per cent. of the population had secured forty per cent. of the seats on the Governor-General's Legislative Council. It was admitted that they were entitled to representation proportionally, not to their numbers but to their influence ; but that scarcely entitled them to a virtual monopoly of the quasi-elected seats. One great question was how this situation could be altered and a counterpoise introduced. Ever since the introduction of the elective system had been first discussed, Government had held the view that representation by classes and interests was the only practicable way of giving effect to the elective principle ; and this conception was strongly emphasized in the Reforms proposals of 1907. The widest representation should be given, the Government of India said, to classes, races, and interests. To anyone familiar only with the territorial constituencies of the West, this conception seems peculiar. But then it was easy to show that in India the number of possible voters

was so small, while the number of rigid divisions formed by races or occupations crystallizing into castes so numerous, that general territorial representation would be an infinitely more hazardous matter than it could possibly be among the more homogeneous populations of the West. In accordance with these views the Government directed attention to a tentative scheme, assigning seats to each race, caste and religion. The proposal met with much criticism and little support. Indeed, being directed against the monopoly of the professional classes, it was certain of attack by the only section of the community at all vocal. In the long run it was abandoned. No doubt that was as well, although the theoretical objections expressed both by Indian writers and later on by Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford were perhaps less weighty than the fact that so complicated a scheme was unlikely to work. In the end the idea prevailed so far as to obtain special representation for the landholders of each province, for commerce, and for the Muhammadans. These, it was hoped, would form the wished-for counterpoise to the professional classes.

The second point was the question of the official majority. Hitherto provision had been made to secure a majority of officials on the Legislative Councils, and repeated rulings of the Secretary of State declared even members of Executive Council to have no more independence in their legislative than in their executive capacity. When, therefore, the Councils were enlarged in 1892, that measure enlarged the circle of opinion that might

be expressed in Council, but in no way modified the legislative power. The Secretary of State had the last word in every branch of government except the administration of justice ; he could order a Bill to be introduced and passed in the same way as he could order an official to be dismissed, or a bridge to be built. To some extent this fact had been obscured by the differentiation in form of the Legislative and Executive organs of Government, as is shown by the repeated claims on legislative independence preferred from India. But such a method of veiling autocracy behind an artificial majority was on the whole unfortunate. The Legislative Councils had been really advisory committees summoned by the Government for the consideration of legislative projects ; and the decisions ostensibly taken by them had actually been taken elsewhere. Such divisions of the form and the substance of power, common enough in our own constitutional history, form a practice little adapted for employment in cases where the devolution of power is consciously intended, for they are intensely provocative of strife ; and further, it will be observed that such division in India is exactly the opposite of our English process. Here the form has remained with the monarchy while the substance has been engrossed by the legislature and its agents ; in India the form was conceded to the legislature while the substance was retained by the executive. The process was easily capable of being represented as giving with one hand what you took away with the other. It would have been wiser to create advisory committees, and

in practice to allow them more influence than was legally theirs, than to create a formal legislature with no real power at all ; and further, the informal discussions of a committee develop far less heat and unreason than the formal debates of an assembly which can finally determine nothing.

These criticisms are offered, not in condemnation of those who established and expanded the Legislative Councils, because nothing is more difficult or rarer than a just estimation of the way in which a proposal will turn out in practice ; but in explanation of the failure of these experiments to conciliate educated Indian opinion, or to bring the representatives of the major Indian interests into the active political arena. Further such a system might have been introduced in 1892, when no one thought of it, but in 1906, when Minto was considering the new reforms, would have worn such an appearance of reaction as would have condemned it entirely. The official majority, as the means of maintaining control of legislation, was the accepted principle, which, though productive enough of evil, was not seriously attacked ; and the abandonment of power to pass any laws that were thought desirable or necessary was not entertained either by the Government of India or by the Secretary of State. The retention of the official majority in some shape or other was therefore inevitable. But Minto was anxious if possible to avoid its use. Under the 1892 Act the Bombay Government had for some time dropped it altogether ; and it was agreed to propose that the various Governments, while retaining the power to create an official majority if necessary, should

normally act without one. Morley in revising the scheme decided that it might be definitely adandoned in the case of the provincial Governments, but insisted on its equally definite retention in the Imperial Legislative Council. "The Governor-General's Council," he wrote, "in its legislative as well as its executive character, should continue to be so constituted as to ensure its constant and uninterrupted power to fulfil the constitutional obligations that it owes and must always owe to His Majesty's Government and to the Imperial Parliament." Whatever else happened, the authority of the Secretary of State for India was not to be impaired.

The third point was the extension of the Legislative Council's influence over the action of the Executive. This was provided for in two ways. In 1892 the restrictions in the Council had been so far relaxed as to allow it to discuss the budget; proposals were now made to render the discussion more detailed and prolonged, and the Council was authorized to pass resolutions on the subject. The right of asking questions had already been conceded to members; but it is not always easy to frame a question which will elicit precisely the information desired, and so this right was now extended to include supplementary questions as well.

On the whole the reforms of the Legislative Councils carried out by Minto may fairly be described as a sincere attempt to render Indian opinion more accessible to, and more influential with the Government, and that over a wider field

of administration. They did not indeed alter the mistaken basis on which political reform had been erected; they did not escape bitter criticism as being utterly inadequate; but they did mark an increasing association of the non-official with the Government. The power of moving resolutions was employed frequently, and in a very considerable proportion of cases with effect. The right of asking supplementary questions was used actively. And probably these concessions were much more important than the creation of electorates, and the attempt to secure representation of all types of Indian opinion which engrossed so much public attention at the time when the reforms were under discussion.

Minto himself certainly did not rank very highly these attempts to improve the Legislative Councils. They were concessions to educated opinion; but they were not the real thing. That lay, in his opinion, in opening the higher offices of Government to Indians. This particular branch of reform has usually been especially ascribed to Morley, and indeed his "Recollections" do little to discourage the idea; but this in particular seems to have originated with Minto. He was from the first, as he wrote to Morley, "all for giving the native population of India as large a share in the government and the public employment of their country as we can give." Already in July, 1906, he was writing to Morley of the possibility of appointing an Indian member of his Executive Council, and discussing it with his councillors. The proposal startled some of them, like a pistol pointed suddenly

at their heads ; and after six months' discussion Minto had only managed to secure the support of a single member. In spite of this, however, he resolved to recommend the appointment. The reasons alleged by those opposed to the scheme seemed very narrow, as compared with the importance of rallying to Government the loyal and moderate educated class, entitled on every ground to a greater share in the conduct of affairs. But when Minto's proposals were considered in England, the opposition in the Council of India was equally as strong as in the Governor-General's Executive Council ; and so when Morley raised the question in Cabinet, it was rejected. It was in these circumstances, as a sort of second-best, that Morley decided no longer to press the matter but to content himself with appointing two Indians to the Council of India, admitting that he would never have done so but for Minto's stubborn fight for an Indian on his Executive Council. Minto was defeated for the moment, but he still felt strongly that nothing would so clearly prove the sincerity of the reforms as the appointment. In this he was emphatically right. It was the most significant step that could be taken. Morley, therefore, returned to the charge. The Executive Councils of the Presidencies were enlarged by the Act, so as to include Indian members ; and after it had passed, in March, 1909, an Indian, Mr. Sinha, was appointed Legal Member of the Governor-General's Council. It was the most significant step that had been taken since the assumption of government by the Crown.

(2) *Revolutionary Movement*, 1906-17.—The

Minto-Morley Reforms were neither calculated nor expected to end the activities of the party of violence; they were intended to strengthen the hands of Government in dealing with it, and in that they succeeded. They made it much easier, for instance, for the Moderates, under the leadership of Gokhale, to resist the Extremists, under the influence of Tilak, in the Congress. At Surat at the end of 1907, Extremist violence broke up the meetings, and for the next ten years the Moderates retained complete control of the organization. Further, the reforms rallied the Moderates to the Government, not of course in the sense of making them supporters of the existing form of government, but by convincing them that constitutional progress could best be secured by constitutional means, that the comparative slowness of such methods was more than counterbalanced by the dangers of revolutionary violence, and that secret societies and political terrorism were dangers really demanding special measures of counteraction.

Of this there was no lack of evidence by way of political crime. This, it will be remembered, made its first appearance at Poona, and thence spread to Bengal. But it never attained in the former that degree of support which it secured in Bengal amidst the excitement of the Partition Agitation. Sporadic conspiracies evinced themselves by occasional murder or murderous attempt; but Tilak, the head of the Maratha extremist movement, was in jail; and though others might be more violent than he, they lacked his power of exciting public opinion.

In Bengal, however, it was much the reverse.

There the cult of the bomb under the special protection of Kali had attained considerable proportions. In 1908 there were 20 cases of outrage, in the course of which nearly 40,000 rupees were stolen, 11 persons killed, and 14 injured by the conspirators. During the following years their operations were somewhat less successful ; in the six years 1909-14 they only killed 20 of their unfortunate fellow-countrymen. Their great difficulty was the supply of arms. They succeeded in obtaining a few through the French settlement of Chandernagore, but this was quite incommensurate with their desires. The matter became the more important as their activities turned in the direction of robbery by force ; and the bomb, however excellent as the means of destroying an active policeman or official, was less adapted to the purposes of dacoity. It was awkward to carry on long journeys, and troublesomely impartial in its effects within the narrow limits of a house. They needed something at once portable, inconspicuous, and capable of being definitely directed away from the user. When in 1914 they succeeded in stealing fifty Mauser pistols, their activities were at once enlarged. In the three years 1915-17 their loot amounted to four lakhs of rupees and a half, and their victims—mainly inoffensive Indians—numbered 36 killed and 40 wounded. The campaign while still directed ostensibly towards overthrowing the foreign Government, was in fact turned against society at large. The persons concerned in these crimes were mainly youths belonging to professional families. Two-thirds of those convicted were

under 25, more than a quarter were not over 20; and over three-quarters were Brahmans or Kayasths —the castes whose hereditary vocations are learning and writing. The whole movement was plainly an unfortunate by-product of English education in Bengal, intensified by unlucky political circumstances.

But it was more than that. Nationalist as it was, it betrayed deep marks of foreign influences, brought into effective touch with the people of India by that contraction of the world which is the outstanding feature of the period as a whole. Commerce and markets and prices were dominated by world-wide tendencies; wars would stretch out to the limits of the habitable earth; and political currents would carry ideas hatched at Paris or Seattle to Delhi and Pekin. Just as the conduct and desires of the Indian Moderates were on the whole coloured by English example, so also the conduct and ideas of the Indian anarchists were coloured by the example of Continental revolutionaries.

Though deplorable, this was natural enough; and the Indian anarchists found in the writings of Mazzini and the Nihilists much that seemed very apt to their purposes, and which they believed with the ardour with which we are all disposed to believe what we greatly desire to be true. At first the chief agent for supplying them with this welcome, though windy literature, was Krishnavarma, who had fled from India because he feared arrest in connection with the Rand murder in 1897. After a time he started the journal called the *Indian Sociologist*, and founded the India House in London,

as a centre for discontented Indians. After a while he thought it prudent to migrate to Paris, and was later obliged to transfer thither the printing of his paper as well. He furnished one channel of foreign influence. Another centre of propaganda was in the United States, whither a considerable number of Indians went to study. A certain number of these were influenced in their choice by a desire to avoid England and English institutions, and may therefore be regarded as predisposed to listen to doctrines of violence. Gradually a definite group of Indian anarchists formed themselves there, with the encouragement, and probably also the financial support of the *Clan-na-Gael.* This eventually led to the formation in that country of the *Ghadr* party under Hardayal, a Hindu of Delhi, who strove his utmost by the constant despatch of emissaries and newspapers to bring about a revolution in India. He constantly preached to all Indians in America the paramount duty of returning to India to expel the English, and in 1913 was already foretelling the outbreak of the German war as a heaven-sent opportunity.

That event naturally led to a great increase in revolutionary activity. So far as the Bengal anarchists went, their zeal was doubtless fanned by their hopes of the British overthrow, but their lucky theft of Mauser pistols counted for a good deal more. But the war led to at least three definite conspiracies, in each of which influences from abroad allied themselves with native discontent with the object of bringing about a revolution in India. These were the *Ghadr* conspiracy for revolt

in the Punjab, the German scheme to land arms in Bengal, and the Pan-Islamic plot.

The first had been heralded in 1913 by the arrival in India of three Sikh missionaries of the *Ghadr* party, who had endeavoured to kindle a flame of discontent regarding the grievances of Indians in British Columbia, where a considerable number of Punjabis had settled. Early in the following year, by way of emphasizing the matter, a party of nearly 400 Sikhs and other Punjabis were shipped from various Eastern ports and carried to Vancouver, where they were refused admission for not having complied with the immigration rules; they were then carried back to India, and on their landing at Baj-baj in September they again refused to comply with the orders of Government, and, many of the returned immigrants being armed with revolvers, lives were lost on both sides when an attempt was made to enforce them. Ultimately 31 were interned, but 29 others, including the organizer of the business, disappeared. In the next three months several vessels reached India, bringing some thousands of returning immigrants, many of whom were Punjabis inspired by the ideas of the *Ghadr* party. Those against whom information had been received were interned under the war measure known as the Ingress Ordinance; and this certainly disconcerted the plans of the leaders, who had divided their followers into sections, to each of whom special areas of the Punjab had been allotted. But even as it was, secret meetings began to be held, revolutionary agents spread through the villages, there was an outburst of dacoities,

loyal gentlemen were murdered, and a rebellion, with its head-quarters at Lahore, was planned for February 21st, 1915, with subsidiary risings at Benares, Jabulpur and Dacca. This abortive attempt was followed by the Defence of India Act, under the pressure of which the movement collapsed.

To what extent material German assistance was accorded to this movement does not appear. That it enjoyed their sympathy is self-evident, and that its principal leader, Hardayal, received encouragement from German agents is almost certain. Hardayal himself took refuge in Berlin, where he, Barkatullah and others were attached to the German General Staff, which employed them in much the same manner as they did the revolutionary Russian agents. Early in 1915 the Bengal revolutionaries got into touch with the Germans through the German consuls at Batavia and Shanghai; and a cargo of arms, intended at first to be landed at Karachi for the use of the Punjab conspirators, was to have been diverted to Bengal. The scheme, however, broke down, as did another German attempt to ship arms from America to India. On the whole they do not seem to have known what they were about. A curious illustration of their ignorance is afforded by the letter addressed to the Maharajah of Nepaul calling upon him to attack British India; it was directed to the ruling Maharajah's father who had been dead six years.

They were scarcely better advised in their attempts at Muslim rebellion in India. The policy of the attempt was obvious. The state of war

between Great Britain and the Sultan necessarily made Indian Muslims uneasy ; and the alliance with the Sharif of Mecca, traditionally regarded by all pilgrims as their hereditary oppressor, was, whatever its political merits, an evident aid to hostile propaganda. Inspired by the idea of creating an anti-British Islamic league in order to overthrow the British Empire in India with the help of an Indian-Muslim rebellion, and with Afghan assistance, a Turco-German mission visited Kabul in the latter part of 1915. At Kabul they met Obeidulla, Muhammad 'Ali, and some of their friends, representing the irreconcilable section of the Indian Muslims. There, in anticipation of the downfall of Government, they framed one of those provisional Governments in which conspirators seem peculiarly to delight. The German part of the mission, perceiving that little more was likely to come out of it, left Kabul early in 1916 ; but Obeidullah remained. He invited the Emperor Nicholas and the Russian Governor of Turkestan to assist in turning the English out of India. He asked aid of the Turks. He framed a plan for forming an " army of God " on the Indian frontier —evidently the revival on a more ambitious scale of the old designs of the Wahabis. But conspirators can seldom keep their own counsel. This plan, like the others, took air. Some of Obeidullah's letters fell into the hands of the Government of India, and his provisional Government remained provisional.

The revolutionary movements thus failed altogether in doing more than create local alarm and

personal injury. This success, however, was not achieved by Government without resort to exceptional methods and special powers. Even before Minto and Morley had been able to proceed with their measures of reform beyond the stage of private discussion, they had recourse to an old Company's regulation—No. III, of 1818—which had been seldom used since 1858, and not frequently before that time. This empowered Government to deport persons whose activities were considered dangerous, but against whom specific evidence of crime was wanting. The leaders of the agitation against the Partition of Bengal were deported with others under this authority. Morley was very nervous about its use—less however, in regard to its effect in India than in regard to the effect it might have on the Ministry's position in the House of Commons. He repeatedly urged on the Governor-General the necessity of releasing the deportees, and on one occasion at least threatened him with the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet. That body, however, was little more able to impose its will on India than on Ireland. Minto replied that obedience to their wish would almost certainly lead to disorder, and that he was not prepared to take the risk. The release of these political prisoners was, therefore, put off until he considered it safe to do so—until, that was, the Government had been armed with further powers against political agitation. When his measures had passed, he rose in the Legislative Council and announced their release, which produced a considerable effect on Moderate, though little on Extremist, feeling.

The principal repressive measure introduced by Minto and sanctioned by Morley was the Press Act of 1910. Since Ripon had repealed Lytton's Act, the Indian Press had been limited by the law of libel and sedition ; and the limitation had scarcely proved effective. Many papers had been busy blowing up a flame of discontent. The new Act empowered magistrates to require security from the owners of presses, where there was reason to suppose they were likely to print seditious matter, and in the last resort, subject to an appeal in the High Court, Government could declare offending presses forfeited. The Act was not peculiarly successful in its operation, being unskilfully, and at times unintelligently administered ; and its main result was to drive seditious matter to secret presses. Apart from this the criminal law proved very difficult of application, particularly under the head of evidence. In a case of political murder, five persons arrested at different times each admitted that he and the four others committed the murder ; there was a good deal of concurrent information regarding some of their accomplices ; but still there was no evidence that would have been accepted in an ordinary court. Consequently it was not until the Defence of India Act was passed in 1915, and rules framed under it, that the authorities were able to get on terms with the revolutionists. In 1916-17 in Bengal the revolutionary conspirators were fairly hunted down, once the Act was put seriously into operation.

(3) *The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.*—We have just seen how the German War tended to increase

revolutionary activity in India. The *Ghadr* plot in the Punjab, the political dacoities and murders in Bengal, and the provisional Government of Obeidullah bear melancholy witness. But besides this the war heightened and exaggerated almost every other element in the Indian question, so that a problem already full of opposing factors became more urgent without becoming easier of solution.

The most obvious illustration of this was the way in which the ideas of the followers of Hardayal and Barkatullah were off-set by the sentiments displayed by other Indians. For the first two years of the war the Moderate Indian politician showed great enthusiasm for the British cause. Instead of that general collapse of the British power anticipated in Germany, the Government was able to take active measures for the furtherance of British success. It sent troops abroad, to France, to East Africa, to Mesopotamia, to Palestine ; it undertook the provision of munitions on a considerable scale ; it raised loans greater than it had ever before been able to raise, and it levied troops in larger numbers than it had ever before dreamt of levying. The princes of India offered all their resources ; the Imperial Service Troops were employed on the purpose for which they had been called into existence.

And all this was done under great difficulties, brought about by the operation of various tendencies in the period just before the outbreak of war. The whole influence of the Moderate leaders in the Legislative Council had been directed to secure a

reduction in military expenditure, in order to release funds for education and sanitation; and at the same time the Liberal Ministry in England was busy making "moral gestures," as the cant of the day has it, to an entirely unresponsive Germany; so that under these combined influences military expenditure in India had been pared to the quick. The nine divisions which, under Kitchener's re-organization, had been available for active service were cut down to seven; the field artillery was reduced; no heavy artillery was provided, and the scheme which Haig had prepared when chief of the Indian Staff in 1911 for the co-operation of the Indian and English armies in the event of a great war peremptorily rejected. India, and especially Indian troops were to pay dear for this combination of good motives and lack of foresight in the Government of India and the Government at home. The two divisions sent to France in 1914 could only be equipped with field artillery by drawing on that attached to other divisions; and when other troops were despatched to Basra they encountered enemy troops better provided with material than themselves. Worse still, the organization of reserves was so ineffective that in the early years of the war the details sent to make good the losses of the units on campaign were largely useless for the purpose, and consequently the fighting efficiency of the Indian troops abroad rapidly declined. Nor were the subsidiary services—medical and the like—in any way adequate. In France this defect came at once to light and was made good; but in Mesopotamia it long remained unknown, and was not

remedied until great harm had been done. Added to these evils were the existence in Afghanistan of a strong war-party which might at any moment have secured the upper hand, and from time to time raids on the part of the frontier tribes. So that the military activities of the Indian Government were hampered by defective equipment and organization, a constant possibility of invasion, and a disturbed frontier.

In the face of these difficulties, a great effort was made by Government and well supported by Indians in general. Over a million and a quarter men were raised during the four years of the war, two-thirds being combatants. Before the war the average annual recruitment had been only about 15,000 men. These were all raised on a voluntary basis, although a certain amount of official pressure was used, especially in 1918, after the collapse of Russia, and at the time of the great German offensives both East and West. Between June 1st and November 11th in that year, no less than 20,000 recruits were raised.

The financial effort was equally great, though the circumstances of the country rendered it necessarily less fruitful. Until 1916 no new taxation was imposed; but in that year the import duties were increased, export duties levied on jute and tea, and the income-tax increased and graduated; and in the next year a super-tax on incomes was introduced, the jute duty raised, and railway rates increased. These resources of increased taxation were supplemented by the issue of War Loans, accompanied by an active propaganda. The success

of these was remarkable. Up till that time internal loans had played but a small part in Indian finance. The policy of raising money, so far as possible, in India had always been recognized, but had been off-set by the equally undeniable advantage of raising money cheap. Besides Indian banking was undeveloped—a central bank was still wanting, and was not actually established until the union of the three Presidency banks in 1919—so that no adequate means existed of mobilising Indian capital. In these circumstances the success of the War Loans of 1917 and 1918 which brought in over 73 million pounds, was very remarkable. Moreover, they were raised from among the people. The subscribers to the first exceeded 150,000, and to the second 225,000, whereas the largest rupee loan of recent years before the war had produced but three million pounds from about 1,000 investors. In part these War Loans were favoured by fortune. The war had cut off the old supplies of gold in which the Indian had always been accustomed to sink his savings, so that the Government's offer met a popular requirement. But none the less the success of the loans marked a long step in the direction of financial independence, at the same time as they enabled the Government to undertake war expenditure on behalf of the Imperial Government to be repaid at a later date. Besides these measures, the Legislative Council voted a free gift of one hundred million pounds to the Imperial Exchequer ; this meant approximately the cost to Great Britain of the war for a month—a substantial mark of sympathy from a

country so poor in proportion to its size and population.

The third type of activity in which India took a considerable share was the manufacture and supply of munitions. Early in 1915, when the shortage of shells became known, the railway workshops and chief engineering firms undertook the manufacture of shell-cases ; later on the need of supplying the troops in Mesopotamia and other Eastern theatres of war led to a multifarious activity, which in 1917 the Indian Munitions Board undertook to co-ordinate ; at the same time Indian manufacturing resources were developed until the country was transformed into an adequate base of supply for most of the articles required, while wolfram, manganese, mica, railway material, leather and foodstuffs were sent abroad in great quantities, for the use of the Imperial forces or for the allied countries, or for both. A ready answer was thus provided for politicians still haunted by the old enquiry, originating in the earliest days of the Company, and repeated whenever Indian affairs closely attracted the attention of Parliament—whether India was worth keeping. Everyone agreed that Indian assistance in the great struggle must be recognized and her position in the Empire acknowledged in a fuller manner than had ever been done before.

Evidence of this feeling was given by the cordial acceptance of the Indian claim, put forward in 1915, to representation at the Imperial Conference ; the War Conference of 1917 was attended by an Indian prince, a Lieutenant-Governor, and an Indian who had sat on the Governor-General's

Executive Council ; these shared, as Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford said grandiloquently, "in the innermost deliberations of the Government of the Empire." It was a just return of honest help ; and indeed for a while the political future of India wore a more hopeful aspect than it had done for many years. Gokhale's conception of India as a self-governing dominion within the Empire took, under the pressure of the war, a firmer hold than ever before on the politically minded classes. The dominions accepted the principle of reciprocity of treatment of immigrants ; King's commissions were granted to Indian officers ; and the cotton excise, that for a generation had been regarded as a badge of servitude, was at last allowed by the Secretary of State to be taken off. These portents were accompanied by the knowledge that Lord Chelmsford, who succeeded Lord Hardinge as Governor-General in 1916, was considering schemes of constitutional advance.

But already at the close of 1916 the Congress which met at Lucknow showed that the Extremists, then led by Tilak and Mrs. Besant, were in a majority. The fact marked a veering of Indian political opinion. The first enthusiasm for the war had begun to wane. The need of vigorous action against the revolutionaries under the Defence of India Act was insufficiently realized ; and Moderate circles found themselves in the awkward predicament of Morley some years earlier—of having either to approve methods of repression which they had been attacking all their political life or to abandon support of the Government. Morley had adopted

the former because he was responsible for the carrying on of the administration; the Moderates inclined to the latter (though reluctantly) because they were not. Their position was the more difficult because the recognition of Indian status to which I have just alluded had not yet been manifested, nor had any specific declaration been made regarding the future of India. All they had to comfort them were loose generalities which might mean much or little when they came to be translated into fact. In the light of after-events it is clear that a Royal Proclamation in the terms of the announcement of 1917, accompanied by a statement that political reform could not be taken up until the war had been won, would have done much to strengthen the hands of the Moderates in their unequal struggle. But the Government at home and in India were probably too engrossed with the great military conflict to make up their minds on so difficult a problem, on which so much might be said on both sides, so that they shrank from committing themselves until they were forced to; when that time came, the value of their announcement had been heavily discounted. It is the penalty of waiting upon events.

Its effects were the more unfortunate because the war had brought forward the question of reorganizing the Empire and the more formal recognition of the self-governing dominions as partners with Great Britain. In some quarters it was feared that this would mean the transfer of the guardianship of India from England to the anticipated partnership; and the idea was pro-

foundly disquieting to Indians of all shades of thought. They were utterly unwilling to pass under the control of those who refused them admission to Australia, and dealt with them as inferiors in South Africa.

The Moderates, distracted by these considerations, and weakened by the deaths of two of their most influential leaders, Gokhale and Pherozeshah Mehta, visibly lost ground to the Extreme party in the Congress. Before the Lucknow Congress nineteen members of the Imperial Legislative Council had published a scheme for constitutional advance. Its essential feature was the abolition of the control of the Executive over the Legislature, but without establishing the control of the Legislature over the Executive. In other words, it sought to develop the Minto-Morley constitution into a parliamentary form of government, for which it had never been intended. This scheme under Extremist pressure was adopted after some revision by the Lucknow Congress as the minimum which Indian politicians were prepared to accept ; and the Congress formally approved the project of establishing a Home Rule propaganda by means of local leagues and committees.

A further development lay in the simultaneous acceptance of the scheme by the Muslim League on condition of heavy Muhammadan representation in the Councils of certain provinces. Till then the Muslim League had in the main concerned itself with the problem of protecting the Muhammadan minority against the Hindu predominance which the Muslims foresaw and feared. But the drift of

Muslim opinion away from Government, which had first become apparent in the course of the Balkan War of 1912, had been intensified by the war of 1914; so that an alliance of the most advanced leaders of the two religions became possible; and though experienced observers recognized that the union was neither deep nor permanent, its achievement was represented as an imposing success and a guarantee of the ripeness of India for the constitution which both the Congress and the League demanded.

The immediate result was the wide-spread agitation of 1917, directed by Mrs. Besant in Madras and by Tilak in Bombay, for the immediate grant of Home Rule. Every grievance was unearthed and emphasized by unsparing criticism. The recommendations of the Public Services Commission published at this time, were thought not nearly adequate to Indian claims for employment in the higher posts of Government. Government was attacked for not acceding without delay or discussion to the demands of the Congress and the League. Passive resistance was advocated, and adopted, at a special meeting of the Congress, as a weapon for bringing the Government to its knees. What was much more serious, the propaganda began to work in the rural districts. A Home Rule flag was invented and carried about; the villagers were told that it would shortly supersede the British flag; and promises of lighter taxes and the golden age—the common stock-in-trade of all political enthusiasts—were thrown out as a lure to win popular support. As has usually happened the

agitation spread to the schools and colleges. One aspect of the movement was a strenuous attack on the whole system of British administration with the projected substitution of a " National " system, and the boycott of the English institutions. All these were visible premonitions of that later reaction against British influences commonly called the Non-Co-operation Movement.

Meanwhile this agitation was most disquieting. The war was going ill in Europe. The Report of the Mesopotamia Commission showed that whatever the relative efficiency of Government might be, its absolute efficiency was liable to strange oversights ; it was revealed as a very human institution, liable to error, hesitating in the choice of evils, and at last choosing the greater. And now, distracted amid their various aims—of repressing revolution, of showing a sympathetic front to political progress, and of maintaining and augmenting the Indian war-effort—they paralleled their principal mistake abroad by a mistake of corresponding magnitude at home. After allowing the Home Rule agitation to gather speed and force, they resolved to intervene to check its progress. Mrs. Besant and two others were required to abstain from political agitation, and to reside within one of six prescribed areas. They chose, as was acidly observed, the pleasant hill-station of Ootacamund.

This measure proved to be fruitful of nothing save misfortune. It was too late to stop the ball which Mrs. Besant had set rolling ; it was too gentle to deter any of her followers from imitating her vehemence ; no one seriously minds being

interned in a hill-station at the hottest season of the year. The only result of the action was intensified excitement, coupled with loud and unceasing demands for the release of Mrs. Besant. Mrs. Besant was interned on June 16th ; and on August 20th, Mr. Montagu, who had accepted the seals as Secretary of State for India in July, made his famous announcement in the House of Commons ; and a month later again, on September 18th, Mrs. Besant was let loose once more upon the Indian world. She should, in fact, have been interned the instant she began her popular crusade, or she should not have been interned at all. To invite her to live from June to September in Ootacamund was to secure all the opprobrium without any of the advantages of repressive measures.

The incident in itself was small. Its significance lies in the fact that it helped to obscure the importance of the announcement which had just been made, and facilitated the growth of discontent with the reforms later elaborated, and which, though coinciding with Mr. Montagu's advent to office, was essentially independent of that event, for the policy it declared had been developed and elaborated in long previous discussions. As with the reforms of 1908, so also with those outlined in the Report of 1918, the current belief has been that they were imposed upon the Government of India from without ; and in the latter case as in the former it appears that the belief is not justified. Ever since 1908 thoughtful Englishmen had been considering how the despotic Government of India could be developed into popular government without

falling into that impasse where you had a powerful representative body on the one hand, and an irremovable government on the other, and which in the 18th century had brought down the old empire with such a resounding crash. In 1915 it occurred to Mr. Curtis, when studying the Indian problem in connection with the reorganization of the Empire, that the difficulty might be overcome by dividing the powers of Government between the existing executives responsible to the Secretary of State, and through him to the British Parliament, and new executives to be made and unmade by representative bodies in India. Early in 1916 a rough scheme was prepared by Sir William Duke, then retired from Indian service but a member of the Council of India, showing how the idea might be applied to the Government of Bengal. When Lord Chelmsford was appointed Governor-General in 1916, he was already convinced that responsible government should be declared as the goal of Indian progress ; and shortly after his arrival in India, the Duke Memorandum was sent out to him for his consideration. Already, at the first Executive Council over which he presided, he had propounded two questions —what was the goal of British rule in India, and by what stages was it to be reached ? The answers which were formulated were in substance those which Mr. Montagu announced in the following year. " The policy of His Majesty's Government," he said, " with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing

institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. . . ." At last, two generations after the Crown had assumed the Government of India, the goal of Indian progress had been formally defined. Till then Parliament had been content with desiring to secure good government ; the further object of self-government was at last declared with authority.

This announcement included a statement of the Secretary of State's forthcoming visit to India. We know that the original proposal to this effect had come from Lord Chelmsford to Mr. Chamberlain, who probably was delaying the announcement of policy until he had visited India. Mr. Montagu decided to make his announcement first and visit India afterwards. This he did in the following cold weather, receiving addresses from bodies of every description, and discussing the problems of constitutional advance with politicians of every shade. The whole business naturally kindled great excitement, and was not welcomed by quiet men who wanted at the moment to get on with their particular jobs. The tone was set by Mrs. Besant, chosen chairman of the Congress which met that year at Calcutta. It resolved that the League-Congress scheme should be conceded immediately and followed by complete Home Rule within five or ten years.

On July 8th, 1918, was published the joint report of the Viceroy and Secretary of State. That document embodied the principle devised by Mr. Curtis three years earlier, elaborated by the Duke

Memorandum, and studied by Lord Chelmsford since 1916. This principle, which we have learnt to call Dyarchy, was to be applied immediately to the provinces, and further progress was to be decided by decennial commissions of enquiry. The principle itself was confessedly no more than an expedient, evidently imperfect, but framed to avoid greater evils. It was a bold experiment; and if it lacked the sanction of experience, it was to be applied to a situation without a parallel. It is no easy thing to implant the political institutions which have been developed by one people in an entirely different environment, amid a society fundamentally unlike, in economic circumstances utterly dissimilar, and with an historic background offering no resemblance to that of Great Britain. But if, as Englishmen believe, representative institutions and responsible government offer the least defective method of conducting the complicated business of public affairs, dyarchy with all its risks was worth a trial. In any case, whether it succeed or whether it fail, the Report of 1918 marks a decisive epoch in the modern history of India. It is comparable with the Company's decision of 1771 to "stand forth as Diwan," which Mill truly recognized as marking a revolution. That signified the resolve to establish government on English lines within the English territory. Let us remember how it led at first to dismal enough results, and Warren Hastings was scarcely more confident in the possibility of firmly establishing British rule than "Al Carthill" is of its continuance to-day.

In any case the new policy, which has certainly

brought its own difficulties and dangers, marks the end of the three principal errors with which our past administrative policy may fairly be charged. As I have already pointed out, these were (1) a failure to recognize the direction in which the forces of political growth were moving, and to define the goal towards which those forces should be directed ; (2) the growing inclination of the Secretary of State, not indeed to govern India, but to interfere with the Government of India ; and (3) the failure to enlist Indian support by associating Indians more nearly with the higher forms of Government coupled with a tendency to prefer the employment of English to Indians in the name of efficiency.

The first has explicitly been ended, and Imperial policy defined. In the back of the English mind the idea had long been present. Everyone was agreed that the ideals of Munro and Elphinstone were those towards which we should be, and in fact were working ; for long the existing system of Government ran so smoothly that the need of a formal definition of our objects, and a conscious adaptation of means to ends, went unperceived. But while we should regret that this went on so long, the history of other dependencies, alike British and foreign, presents the matter in a different light and makes us rather wonder that the need has been perceived at all.

The second has not explicitly been ended. The Secretary of State still remains the master of the Government of India ; but the Government of India no longer speaks merely in the name of a

bureaucracy. Morley's excuse for interference—"We are already in pretty deep waters in respect of our self-governing colonies, and if the Government are to advance the same sort of claims, founded not on the principles of free government, but on the arbitrary decisions or views of a close body of officials—then we shall indeed be in a scrape"—is ceasing to be applicable. The reforms visibly strengthen the Government of India as against the Secretary of State. Here again we may notice that undue interference has in the main been due less to defects than to the defects of qualities. It was Morley's high political ideals and great desire for the welfare of India that made him so difficult a task-master. The fault lay in the system into which we had blundered, and which made a zealous active and high-minded Secretary of State an obstruction, and at times a danger.

Our third error has formally been recognized. The exclusion of Indians is at an end, and the only question that remains to be decided is the rate of their admission. This is doubtless the thorniest of all questions; and the transformation of the Indian Civil Service from a body of servants obedient to the Secretary of State into a body of advisers to responsible Ministers, will certainly involve many difficulties and many disadvantages in the process.

Into the form adopted or the early working of the new constitution, I do not propose to enter. It belongs to the period now opening, rather than to that which has just closed. But one aspect of the matter must be noted. The constitution adum-

brated in the Report of 1918 not only marks the close of a period, and the end of a form of administration ; it also marks a definite stage in a larger process—the influence and penetration of European ideas. The process began five centuries ago. For long its effects were negligible. Even after the administration fell into European hands, European influences on the lives of the people seemed so slight that the legend of the unchanging East sprang up, and was generally believed. But Orientals are no more unchanging than the European races. Neither change so long as the circumstances in which they live are constant ; both respond to changes in environment ; and if Oriental society is rigid as compared with the more fluid nature of European society, it is because the former was developed amid an environment, and especially under economic conditions, which over long periods of time had hardly changed at all. When new influences began to work, when the environment underwent modification, it was long before these forces could overcome the inertia of so great a mass of humanity as inhabits the sub-continent of India. Even then the great mass has always tended powerfully to relapse into its old posture, like a rock which you try to lift with levers. Being human material and not inert, this reactive force has not been constant but spasmodic. One of its great reactions was the Mutiny, when the old strove so fiercely to destroy the new. And what followed ? The forces of change, the swift transport, the lightning messages, the touch of foreign minds and thought, were not relaxed but redoubled. The year which

saw the massacres of Delhi and Cawnpore saw the foundation of the Indian universities. The noble fortitude of the men who lay, month after month, upon the Delhi Ridge faced by ten times their number till at last the imperial city could be stormed was fairly matched by the noble fortitude of the Governor-General who, amid those bloody and alarming scenes, could unfalteringly pursue the course of policy. This high patience led directly to the point from which the progressive realization of responsible government was clearly viewed as the ultimate purpose of British rule in India. This recognition has been swiftly followed by another crisis of reaction ; and here too the remedy lies, not in retracing our steps but in strengthening the bonds, physical, moral, and political, which bind India and the Empire together, and in steadily cutting away that race-discrimination which forms the worst inheritance of the period that has closed.

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